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Within the broad field of conflict resolution, mediation has traditionally been conceptualised 
as a tool for conflict management or settlement. In other words, in both theory and practice, 
mediation is assumed to be a process of interest-based negotiation facilitated by a third party 
with the aim of arriving at a tangible agreement. Whether the agreement be in the form of a 
ceasefire, partial settlement or signed peace treaty, this outcomes-based approach has 
traditionally dominated the mediation discourse. In African practice this trend remains, with 
most mediation efforts being restricted to the elite level in the form of political negotiations 
between high-profile leaders.  
This study aims to extend these assumptions of traditional mediation concerning the conflict 
resolution potential of the mechanism. Given that mediation brings disputants together in 
communication that is otherwise unlikely to have taken place, it opens a unique possibility for 
dialogue and improved mutual understanding. By developing a newer model of mediation, that 
of ‘process-based’ mediation, this study resituates the mechanism as a tool for holistic conflict 
transformation. This approach prioritises the process of mediation as an end in itself, as 
opposed to a means to settlement ends. When formulated according to the five characteristics 
of the process-based model, mediation projects are argued to engender transformations of 
conflict at their root cause by improving the quality of relational interaction between disputants. 
These characteristics are community participation, context-specificity, the use of an Insider-
Partial mediator, limited resource pressure, and a relational focus.  
Through a comparative case study analysis of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and the Rwandan gacaca courts and using the process-based model as an 
analytical framework, the study demonstrates the applicability of this model in cases of 
protracted conflict on the African continent. In comparing the relative manifestation of the 
model within these cases and their subsequent transformative success, the study provides 
support for the use of process-based mediation as a conflict response in Africa. The case 
comparison finds that the five characteristics of the process-based model are in many ways 
linked, with the most important transformative elements being community participation and a 
relational focus. By demonstrating the transformative potential of mediation practice, the 
findings contribute to a contemporary movement in mediation literature away from its limited 




In die breë veld van konflikoplossing is bemiddeling tradisioneel gekonseptualiseer as 'n 
instrument vir konflikhantering of oplossing. Met ander woorde, in beide teorie en praktyk, word 
aanvaar dat bemiddeling 'n proses van onderhandeling is wat deur 'n derde party gefasiliteer word 
op grond van belang, met die doel om tot 'n tasbare ooreenkoms te kom. Of die ooreenkoms in 
die vorm van 'n wapenstilstand, gedeeltelike skikking of ondertekende vredesverdrag bestaan, 
oorheers hierdie uitkomsgebaseerde benadering tradisioneel die bemiddelingsdiskoers. In 
Afrika-praktyke bly hierdie tendens voort, met die meeste bemiddelingspogings beperk tot die 
elite-vlak in die vorm van politieke onderhandelinge tussen hoëprofielleiers. 
Hierdie studie het ten doel gestel om hierdie aannames van tradisionele bemiddeling rakende die 
konflikoplossingspotensiaal van die meganisme uit te brei. Aangesien bemiddeling geskille 
bymekaar bring vir kommunikasie wat andersins onwaarskynlik sou plaasvind, skep dit 'n unieke 
moontlikheid vir dialoog en verbeterde wedersydse begrip. Deur die ontwikkeling van 'n nuwer 
bemiddelingsmodel, naamlik 'proses-gebaseerde' bemiddeling, word hierdie meganisme hervat 
as 'n instrument vir holistiese konfliktransformasie. Hierdie benadering prioritiseer die 
bemiddelingsproses as ‘n doel op sigself, in teenstelling met 'n middel tot skikking. Wanneer 
bemiddelingsprojekte geformuleer word volgens die vyf kenmerke van die proses-gebaseerde 
model, word daar geredeneer dat bemiddelingsprojekte transformasie van konflik tot gevolg het 
by hulle kernoorsaak, deur die kwaliteit van die verhoudingsinteraksie tussen disputante te 
verbeter. Hierdie kenmerke is gemeenskapsdeelname, konteks-spesifisiteit, die gebruik van 'n 
“Insider-Partial” bemiddelaar, beperkte hulpbrondruk en 'n verhoudingsfokus. 
Deur middel van 'n vergelykende gevallestudie-analise van die Suid-Afrikaanse Waarheids- en 
Versoeningskommissie en die Rwandese gacaca-howe, en die gebruik van die prosesgebaseerde 
model as analitiese raamwerk, toon die studie die toepaslikheid van hierdie model in gevalle van 
uitgerekte konflik op die vasteland van Afrika aan. In die vergelyking van die relatiewe 
manifestasie van die model in hierdie gevalle en die daaropvolgende transformatiewe sukses, 
bied die studie ondersteuning vir die gebruik van prosesgebaseerde bemiddeling as 
konflikrespons in Afrika. Die gevalvergelyking vind dat die vyf eienskappe van die 
prosesgebaseerde model op baie maniere gekoppel is met die belangrikste transformerende 
elemente, gemeenskapsdeelname en 'n verhoudingsfokus. Deur die transformatiewe potensiaal 
van bemiddelingspraktyk te demonstreer, dra die bevindings by tot 'n kontemporêre beweging in 
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CHAPTER ONE – RESEARCH OUTLINE 
1.1 Introduction 
The history of the African continent, rife with continued conflict and resultant combat, has 
shown how significant societal divisions can be when left unresolved. Conflict in Africa 
appears to persist in cyclical patterns, with there being a strong likelihood of recurrence in 
countries that have already experienced large-scale violence (Cilliers, 2018:22). There is thus 
a necessity for methods of national conflict resolution that interject at the transitional phase of 
conflict to break these patterns and address the root causes of such conflicts, to create longer 
lasting and sustainable peace. 
Two countries in which the threat of recurrent conflict was (and to some degree remains) all 
too real, are South Africa and Rwanda. Both have histories of deep conflict and division, with 
the majority of South Africans having experienced extreme oppression under the apartheid 
regime and the Tutsi population having survived a genocide aimed at eliminating their entire 
nation group. It can be argued that both the apartheid regime and the Rwandan genocide were 
caused by and served to further exacerbate deep divisions within the citizenries of the two 
countries. Once these violent regimes came to an end, the broken nations left in their wake 
required mechanisms for conflict resolution targeted at the transitional era and the need for 
national reconciliation moving forward. The two mechanisms that resulted, namely the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (hereafter referred to as the TRC) and the 
Rwandan gacaca courts system, have come to be widely respected as successful projects in the 
resolution of deep-rooted conflict.  
Despite not having been developed specifically as mediation efforts, these two projects 
demonstrate certain basic characteristics of the mediation technique. Both encouraged direct 
interaction between disputants1 in the form of a ‘truth-telling’ process, facilitated by a 
mediating body in the form of an institutional committee. Although these projects had differing 
primary objectives and practices, both aimed to mediate the expression of each sides’ 
experience so as to encourage reconciliatory mutual understanding between the disputing 
parties by the conclusion of the procedure.    
Although the mechanisms displayed the basic characteristics of a mediation project, one would 
be hard-pressed to find a discussion of either in most ‘traditional’ discussions of mediation as 
 
1 In both cases the disputants involved were perpetrators and victims of violent crimes, thus their interaction can 




a tool for conflict resolution. These traditional discussions are most often focused on elite-level 
interaction, with the signing of peace agreements regarded as the most important indicator of 
mediation success. In developing a reconceptualization of the mediation project, and what 
constitutes mediation success, these two community-based African examples bring traditional 
conceptions into question. As opposed to the traditional focus on short-term mediation 
outcomes, these cases suggest that mediation could in fact be a method for creating longer-
lasting peace in deeply divided African societies2.       
1.2 Background and Rationale of the Study 
As regimes rise and fall and power changes hands, conflict remains constant. Whether it be 
between individuals; ethnic/racial or religious groups; regions or countries, conflict and the 
divisions it creates affects every level of human and particularly political life. As such, the 
study of conflicts and their peaceful resolution has formed a constant, integral part of the study 
of society and politics, as scholars attempt to understand why conflicts occur and how best to 
resolve them.  
The broad field of conflict resolution encompasses many different theories and mechanisms in 
attempts to tackle the issue of reconciling conflicted parties to one another. One such 
mechanism is that of mediation. In its most broad sense one could define mediation as “a 
process of dialogue and negotiation in which a third party assists two or more disputant parties, 
with their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict without resort to force,” (Nathan, 
2012:1). As is the case with virtually any concept in the social sciences, any definition of 
mediation can undoubtedly be disputed, however the key component, that of a mediating body 
or institution facilitating discussion between disputants, remains the core of this approach to 
conflict resolution (Tillett & French, 2010:105; Fisher, 2011:159; Kressel, 2006:726; Touval 
& Zartman, 1985:7). 
However, the preoccupation in general conflict literature with issues surrounding armed 
conflict and so-called ‘hot’ war has resulted in a parallel preoccupation within both the 
literature on conflict resolution and mediation itself towards the resolution of these kinds of 
conflict (Tillett & French, 2010:2). Being a mechanism that facilitates discussion between 
active disputants that would otherwise not have been likely to proceed (Zartman, 2001:8), 
 
2 This study uses a characterisation presented by Guelke (2012:30), which regards a deeply divided society as 
distinguishable from other societies by the existence of an entrenched fault line that is recurrent and endemic, 




mediation has in traditional conceptualisations been firmly situated as a tool for conflict 
management or settlement (Mitchell, 1981:275; Burton, 1988:2; Ramsbotham et al, 2016:24). 
In other words, its utility has primarily been discussed in terms of bringing the leaders of 
disputing parties together and reaching some kind of agreement to reduce active combat. 
Throughout much of the mediation literature this assumption has permeated analyses, 
particularly with regards to measuring the success of mediation attempts, which is most often 
quantified by the signing of a peace agreement, settlement or ceasefire at their culmination 
(Touval & Zartman, 1985:14; Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006). With no regard for the longevity 
of such agreements or their contribution to building long-term, sustainable peace in deeply 
divided societies, this traditional practice and analysis of mediation arguably limits its utility 
as a tool for holistic conflict transformation. It is here that this study finds its point of entry into 
the scholarly discussion of mediation.  
When situated as a tool for conflict settlement, the mediation mechanism is seen to be “task-
oriented” (Fisher, 2011:159) and “interest-based” (Furlong, 2005:110). This outcomes-focused 
approach is therefore generally unconcerned with the nature of the disputants’ relationship and 
aimed more specifically at terminating immediate crisis situations and avoiding escalation of 
harmful violence (Wilkenfeld, Young, Asal & Quinn, 2003:282).  However, this study will 
contribute to a trend of departure in mediation theory from regarding the tool as one for conflict 
settlement, to a tool for holistic conflict transformation. Transformation initiatives target the 
structural and institutional foundations of the conflict and address its cultural implications in 
terms of altering the way actors perceive themselves and their opponents in conflict situations 
(Rigby, 2006:47). By addressing these foundational elements of conflict and the relationships 
between disputants, mediation initiatives could have longer lasting results and create more 
durable, society-wide peace.   
This study advocates that the key to viewing mediation as a tool for conflict transformation, as 
opposed to settlement, is moving from an ‘outcomes-based’ to a ‘process-based’ approach.3 
This shift requires focusing primarily on the relational process of mediation and how the 
interaction between disputants can be used as a reconciliatory end in itself, as opposed to a 
 
3 It must be recognised here that Horowitz (2007:57-58) does make mention of ‘process-focused mediation’ as a 
trend in mediation practice. According to Horowitz, process-focused mediation limits the mediator’s role to that 
of ‘traffic lights’, concerned only with the physical process of the disputants’ dialogue, acting as a kind of 
negotiation administrator. This is the only place where mention of a process-oriented mediation trend has been 
found. For the purposes of this study however, the term ‘process-based mediation’ will refer to the model of 




means to settlement ends. In this approach the mediators’ responsibility is no longer simply to 
facilitate agreements between disputing parties but is redirected to impact disputants’ relational 
interaction (Lederach, 2002:92). In this way the mediation effort could address the more deep-
rooted conflict that exists between disputants and actively attempt to prevent exacerbation, 
recurrence or catalysing of overt tensions and potential violence.       
1.3 Problem Statement and Research Questions 
Mediation has been limited to a tool for conflict settlement in traditional theory and practice, 
with this trend extending into African mediation scholarship and practice. The assumption of 
this limited utility is however problematic in that it underlies all mediation efforts undertaken 
by key actors, shaping action taken by major institutions for conflict resolution such as the 
African Union Mediation Support Unit (AUMSU). As a result, all of the resources dedicated 
to mediation efforts by bodies such as the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) and donor 
countries are directed at elite-level mediation operations that often prove unsuccessful or 
produce short-lived outcomes (Gartner & Bercovitch, 2006). 
Although there has been some assertion of the need for documenting African mediation 
experience and drawing lessons from the past (AUMSU, 2016; Mottiar & van Jaarsveld, 2009; 
Govender & Ngandu, 2010), there remains much debate within the conflict resolution 
discipline over the link between the shortfalls of previous mediation attempts and the 
inadequacies of an outcomes-based approach to mediation. This study will aim to highlight 
these inadequacies and propose a shift in thinking with regards to the theory of mediation, 
suggesting that the potential of the mechanism lies not only in precipitating peace agreements, 
but in driving a process of society-wide conflict transformation. This could potentially inform 
mediation practice that shifts its focus from high-level meetings to community-based projects 
that are informed by the context in which they are conducted and address the divisions that 
both cause conflict and are left behind by conflict.    
In addressing this research problem, the study will thus present the question: To what extent 
does ‘process-based’ mediation succeed as a tool for conflict transformation in African 
nations?   
In order to measure the ‘success’ of African ‘process-based’ mediation projects in transforming 
conflict contexts, two sub-questions will frame the discussion: 
- Under what conditions can a mediation project be deemed ‘process-based’? 




1.4 Research Design and Methodology 
This study will be done for descriptive and explanatory purposes. As the name suggests, 
descriptive research is done with the intention of describing phenomena and events. Descriptive 
studies, often qualitative in nature, answer questions of what, where, when and how (Babbie, 
2011:68). This study will be descriptive in that the analysis will first undertake a description 
of the cases in question, delineating the historical context within which each took place, as well 
as the intricacies of the implementation of each project. Thus, the questions of what the projects 
constituted, where they were carried out, at which point in history they were undertaken, and 
how they were implemented will all be answered.    
The study furthermore has a second purpose in explanation. Explanatory research is done to 
explain phenomena, or in other words to address questions of ‘why’ (Babbie, 2011:69). This 
study will aim to be explanatory in that it will explore why traditional outcomes-based 
mediation has thus far yielded mostly short-term solutions in African conflict resolution and 
propose a new way to utilise mediation in transforming conflict contexts and creating longer 
term peace.      
1.4.1 Case Study Design 
The research design of this project will be that of a case study design. A case study can broadly 
be described as “the in-depth examination of a single instance of some social phenomenon,” 
(Babbie, 2011: 301). The social phenomenon in this case being a mediation project that shows 
signs of being focused on the process of the mediation rather than its particular outcomes. 
According to Zartman (2005:3-4), case studies are arguably the most frequently used tool in 
studies concerning political negotiations and follow the trend of mediation research in focusing 
on the basic question of how outcomes are obtained through a negotiation. This is interesting 
in the context of the present research which challenges this focus of the mediation discipline, 
as in highlighting the process-related elements of the mediation projects the study will now 
also challenge the focus of the most commonly used research design within the study of 
political negotiations.  
Kaarbo and Beasley (1999:372) provide a broad definition of a ‘case study’, stating it to be “a 
method of obtaining a “case”4 or a number of “cases” through an empirical examination of a 
real-world phenomenon within its naturally occurring context, without directly manipulating 
 




either the phenomenon or the context.” This definition is illuminating for this study as it 
identifies the design quite precisely but does not assume a specific purpose for this kind of 
investigation, as there can be more than one. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of 
context and lack of researcher’s direct manipulation of the phenomenon or this context (Kaarbo 
& Beasley, 1999:373). 
The case study allows for understanding of phenomena in both their complexity and natural 
context (Miller & Brewer, 2003:22), with its main strength being that it provides in-depth 
insights into phenomena of potentially high complexity (Mouton, 2001:150). This design is 
therefore well-suited to the analysis of mediation mechanisms, which are most often employed 
in conflicts with high levels of content complexity (Tillett & French, 2010:139). While 
engaging with units of analysis such as nations, religions, social uprisings or, as in the case of 
this study, social projects, case studies help to develop intricate, cumulative historical 
explanations of complex cases (Bennett, 2004:19; Zartman, 2005:5). This type of case study 
can be referred to as ‘configurative-idiographic’, a design that attempts to build a near-total 
picture of the case, displaying the facts and not concerned with theory (Eckstein, 1992:136-
138). In this type the purpose of the case study is description (Kaarbo & Beasley, 1999:373; 
Brown, 2018:16).  
Given the descriptive purpose of this study, it will aim to describe the historical progression of 
the two projects as they took place in their natural context, particularly with regards to the 
characteristics of a ‘process-based’ mediation model. However, as stated by Brown (2018:20): 
“Deploying cases in this manner [for description] allows for the greatest possibility of 
authenticity and the least amount of generalisability.” This is due to the fact that no two 
practical cases are exact replicas, meaning that inferences drawn from in-depth analysis of a 
particular case cannot simply be generalised to others. This study, like most case studies, aims 
to extend beyond these limitations of purely factual description into the realm of theory-
building and thus must extend beyond the bounds of idiographic research.       
The configurative-idiographic type of case study is expressly not theory-driven. These studies 
are not guided by established or hypothesised generalisations, nor do they aim to generate 
theoretical propositions (Lijphart, 1971:691). However, this does not exclude the case study 
design from the scientific project of theory-building. Besides creating a clear historical picture 
of the cases in question, case studies may contribute to theory either by generating new 




(Bennett, 2004:21). The link of case studies to theory is said to operate on a continuum, in 
which the first stage sees theory being used to explore cases5, the next seeing cases used to 
develop theory, in the next cases may be used to explore and refine theory, and finally cases 
may be used as tests of theory (Kaarbo & Beasley, 1999:374-376). The link to theory of the 
case studies in this research will be to explore and refine the theory of mediation, looking 
towards an updated model that could be tested further.   
Case studies provide both wide and in-depth analysis of the cases in question and thus are able 
to model complex relationships. The importance of the descriptive ability of case studies is 
extended here, as it is the researcher’s in-depth understanding of a particular case that allows 
them to give context and meaning to data collected for causal explanations (Zartman, 2005:6). 
The complexity these models are able to encompass is a strength of the design when compared 
to the more straightforward, clinical relationships deduced by other approaches (Bennett, 
2004:19).  
Modelling complex causal relationships within specific case studies is therefore insightful but 
lacks generalisability as case study findings are often contingent on the specific conditions of 
the cases studied (Bennett, 2004:19)6. While it is logical that cases would have ‘within-case’ 
value, meaning conclusions will have validity in the context in which the study was done, it is 
not as widely accepted that any findings may be generalised beyond this context (Brown, 
2018:18; Flick, 2009:134). The construct validity that allows for detailed analysis of contextual 
variables comes at the cost of external validity – producing generalisations applicable beyond 
the cases in question (Bennett, 2004:34). In this light the historical specificity that can be 
viewed as a strength, is seen as a weakness of the design and has led to a stereotype of case 
studies as atheoretical (Kaarbo & Beasley, 1999:371).  
However, as exemplified by George & Bennett’s (2004:5) definition of a case study as “the 
detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical 
explanations that may be generalizable to other events,” there are scholars who believe insights 
from case studies may be extended beyond the specific cases analysed. Due to their high level 
of construct validity, case studies allow for contextualised comparisons of phenomena that may 
manifest differently in different contexts but are ‘analytically equivalent’ (Bennett, 2004:34; 
George & Bennett, 2004:19). It is for this reason that case study researchers often turn to a 
 
5 This type of case study is defined by Eckstein (1992:138-139) as ‘Disciplined-Configurative’ – existing general 
hypotheses can inform case explanations, but cases cannot in turn build or shape theories. 




comparative methodology to harness the strength of highly contextualised conceptual 
understandings to compare ‘analytically equivalent’ phenomena and contribute to a theory-
building project. This therefore supports the choice of methodology for this study, that of 
comparative analysis.    
1.4.2 Comparative Analysis Methodology 
Given the inherent limitations of case study research in building generalizable theory, an 
approach often used to offset some of the risk of overgeneralisation is to compare more than 
one case. As stated by Zartman (2005:7), “single case studies are of inherently limited utility 
in producing knowledge about negotiation as opposed to data on the unique case,” (emphasis 
added) and therefore in order to contribute to general theory-building, a comparative approach 
is useful.  
Eckstein (1992:125) provides a definition of comparative case study commensurate with the 
approach to be taken in this research, defining it as “the study of numerous cases along the 
same lines, with a view to reporting and interpreting numerous measures on the same variables 
of different ‘individuals’.”7 He states further that by using a comparative methodology in 
conjunction with case studies, theory may be successively refined through a ‘building-block’ 
technique in which regularities may be found through the simultaneous investigation of several 
cases (Eckstein, 1992:144). Miller & Brewer (2003:33) concur, stating comparative studies 
look for patterns of convergence between a single social process in different nation states. 
These patterns of convergence are intended to test and support the validity of a general theory 
that has been applied to understand and explain this social process.  
Expanding on this definition, the historical comparative methodology constitutes “The 
examination of societies (or other social units) over time and in comparison with one another,” 
(Babbie, 2011: 347) and focuses on the similarities and differences between units of analysis 
in order to discover causal factors affecting an outcome seen in the set of cases (Mouton, 
2001:154; Neuman, 2006:471). As stated by Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003:13), 
comparative historical analysis “makes possible a dialogue between theory and evidence of an 
intensity that is rare in quantitative social research.”  The qualitative comparison of these two 
cross-national cases of mediation aims to give validity to a newer theory of mediation and 
thereby influence the construction of future projects using it as a tool for conflict 
 




transformation. It is here however, in introducing the potential for causal analysis, that the 
method of comparing complex cases encounters a challenge.  
Although the detail and complexity of case research provides in-depth understanding of case 
and context, when comparing cases to one another, comparisons must battle the weakness of 
having many variables and a small number of cases (Lijphart, 1971:685). If cases are used for 
what Skocpol and Somers (1980:181) define as ‘Macro-Causal Analysis’, controlled 
comparisons are intended to follow an experimental logic and provide valid causal inferences 
through multivariate analysis. However, with a multitude of potential extraneous variables and 
the practical impossibility of finding highly like cases in the real world, there is a definite 
danger of conclusions providing spurious relationships.    
Skocpol and Somers (1980:176) argue however that the logic of ‘Macro-causal Analysis’ is 
not the only type of comparative analysis available to comparative scholars. They define two 
others, that of the parallel demonstration of theory and the contrast of contexts. Contrast-
oriented comparatists, similarly to those conducting configurative-idiographic case studies, are 
focused primarily on the unique characteristics of individual cases and use comparisons to 
show how these characteristics influence general social processes within these specific contexts 
(Skocpol & Somers, 1980:178). Parallel-theorists on the other hand use the juxtaposition of 
cases to “persuade the reader that a given, explicitly delineated hypothesis or theory can 
repeatedly demonstrate its fruitfulness – its ability to convincingly order the evidence – when 
applied to a series of relevant historical trajectories,” (Skocpol & Somers, 1980:176). The 
similarity between cases under this approach is not necessarily in identical dependent or 
independent variable values (as would be necessary for strong causal conclusions) but lies in 
the common applicability of overall theoretical arguments. In this way these studies aim to 
show the validity of their theoretical arguments.     
The present research will fit most comfortably into the latter approach, that of the parallel 
demonstration of theory. Due to the departure of this study from common mediation 
conceptualisations, and the resultant lack of similar cases based on this specific mediation 
model, the possibility of providing strong causal analyses based on multivariate analysis is 
limited. However, if a structured, focused comparative mechanism (as will be discussed below) 
can be produced from the theory as discussed in Chapter Two, this newer theory of mediation 




applicability (and thereby the validity) of the overall theoretical arguments. This is how the 
study will fit the purpose of the Parallel-comparatists.         
1.4.3 Alexander George’s Structured, Focused Comparison 
In terms of strictly devised comparative methodologies, John Stuart Mill (1843/1967) is 
regarded as the father of comparative case study analysis, particularly with regards to his 
“method of agreement”8 and “method of difference”9. Following the logic of experimental 
studies, these methods compare values of specific dependent and independent variables, with 
all other conditions kept constant. However, as has been stated, the reality in case study 
research is an impossibility of perfectly controlled case comparisons (Bennett, 2004:20). In 
using cases which may be influenced by different cultures, geographic locations, historical 
timing etc., controlling for every external variable becomes practically impossible.  
One scholar who attempted to respond to these limitations of Mill’s methods is Alexander 
George and his method of structured, focused comparison of cases (George & Bennett, 
2004:67-70). This study aims to achieve reliability and validity10 through this method which 
systematises the study of historical experience (George & Bennett, 2004:67) in a bid to develop 
more reliable and thus reproduceable case comparisons. Structured, focused comparison is 
regarded as the most-used approach for contemporary scholars engaging in case study research 
(Kaarbo & Beasley, 1999:370), and as the most recent authoritative statement thereof 
(Zartman, 2005:7).   
This method is ‘structured’ in that it asks a set of standardised general questions reflecting the 
research objectives to guide data collection, making possible the systematic cumulation and 
comparison of case findings. It is also ‘focused’ in that it only deals with certain specific aspects 
of the historical cases under examination (George & Bennett, 2004:67). By using this set of 
questions and focusing on clearly identified classes of events, data can be systematically 
collected and compared (George & Bennett, 2004:69). Qualitative research in general is often 
critiqued for its lack of rigor, replicability and a systematic approach, thus this method provides 
a response to these problems (Kachuyevski & Samuel, 2018:3). It is when used in this way as 
 
8 The researcher compares cases with the same value of the dependent variable to find potentially causal 
antecedent conditions (independent variables) that are also the same (Bennett, 2004:30).  
9 The researcher compares cases with different outcomes (dependent variables) to find antecedent conditions 
(independent variables) that differ, judging that antecedent conditions that were the same despite the different 
outcomes were not sufficient to cause these outcomes (Bennett, 2004:31). 
10 Reliability understood as the reproducibility of the research project, as opposed to validity understood as a 




the basis for a systematic methodological approach, that case studies may form the foundations 
for analytical claims with external validity (Brown, 2018:16).   
For the purposes of this study, George’s method of structured, focused comparison provides a 
helpful basic outline to follow. Using the mediation literature surveyed in the following 
chapter, a model for mediation projects to be conducted in deeply divided societies will be 
outlined, based on selected structured characteristics. The ‘questions’ thus guiding data 
collection will be to what extent each case demonstrates these characteristics. The comparison 
of cases can then be focused by this structure, with the analysis centring on the manifestation 
of the characteristics and how the transformative success of each project was impacted as a 
result.      
By focusing the comparison on specific theory-derived elements of the cases in question, this 
approach aims to combat the problem of comparing highly complex cases (Flick, 2009:135). 
The approach can be discussed as a kind of ‘coding’ of qualitative data, in which themes and 
categories are pre-decided and used to structure both the data collection process and the case 
comparisons. This process can also be referred to as qualitative content analysis, a model of 
text analysis in which the basic goal is to reduce a multiplicity of available information (Flick, 
2009:323).   
1.4.4 Case Selection 
The cases that have been selected as potential examples of ‘process-based’ mediation in Africa 
are that of the South African TRC established in 1995 and the Rwandan gacaca courts system 
founded in 2002.    
The TRC and the gacaca courts have been studied extensively as mechanisms of transitional 
justice, particularly in terms of their significance in formal legal systems. However, they have 
yet to be included in discussions of mediation, particularly in the African context. Both cases 
show characteristics of community-style mediation between perpetrators and victims, with 
institutional structures facilitating dialogue between the disputants, and respected individuals 
forming the panel of mediators conducting these dialogue processes.  
As this study is introducing its own theory-driven conceptualisation of mediation as a national 
conflict response, there are no well-documented cases of this specific type of mediation project. 
The cases selected therefore needed to be of a high-enough profile that there is sufficient 




requirements of salience in the general discourse of African conflict resolution and relevance 
to the conceptual issues addressed in the study (Zartman, 2005:7). The comparison relies on 
the applicability of this mediation theory to the cases in question, thus they must exhibit the 
basic characteristics of a mediation project in order to be comparable at all, but vary on the 
values of each element of the newer model, so as to make deductions about the effects of each 
element on the overall success of the project at transforming the root causes of conflict.  
The specific selection criteria for these cases are based on the primary elements of the study’s 
conceptualisation of a process-based mediation project. This conceptualisation is broken down 
into two focal criteria. The first as has already been mentioned is the presence of a third-party 
mediator or mediating body, facilitating and encouraging discussion between disputants that 
otherwise would not have taken place (Zartman, 2001:8). These conflicts were suited to the 
mediation process, in that a third-party was needed to break down the barriers of negative 
feelings between disputants, a strong disagreement or difficulty to ascertain the ‘truth’ of the 
situation, and an absence beforehand of a negotiating forum (Kressel, 2006:732).  
The second criterion, as the study is aimed at providing support for mediation aimed at the 
transformation of national conflict, is that the projects must have aims based on reconciliation, 
durable peace, and restorative justice. It is only with aims based on these key themes that 
mediation projects will focus on the change in quality of relational interaction between 
disputants that this newer theory of mediation espouses. Transformation extends beyond the 
immediate cessation of violence and creation of issue-based solutions (Mitchell, 2002:3), and 
endeavours to engender structural change to ensure long-term positive peace with social justice 
(Fisher, 2011:158). It would be impossible to assess conflict resolution projects on their ability 
to engender widespread conflict transformation if this is not what they were intended for. This 
is why the cases will not include any former ‘traditional’ mediation attempts in active African 
conflict that were primarily focused on the signing of peace agreements or ceasefires.                        
The two selected mechanisms did have different goals and procedures, with the TRC being 
aimed largely at truth-telling and the granting of amnesties (Wielenga, 2011), while the gacaca 
courts had more of a mixture of aims between truth-telling, reintegration of perpetrators and in 
some cases a degree of punitive measures (Bowd, 2010). However, both projects had the 
overall aim of reconciling citizens in the transitional phase of their post-conflict societies and 




mediation mechanisms aimed at conflict transformation, however with varying elements in 
their procedures and aims to be compared with the study’s model of ‘process-based’ mediation.   
1.4.5 Data Collection 
With improvements in technology the popularity of statistical methods boomed from the 1960s 
and 1970s, leading to increasingly negative assumptions about the capabilities of qualitative 
research (George & Bennett, 2004:6). Researchers in the social sciences have attempted to use 
technical statistical data to add credibility to their work in the scientific research community. 
However, as argued by Kachuyevski and Samuel (2018:7-8), highly technical research methods 
can in some cases create a divide between theory and practice as they may be overly lengthy 
and difficult for citizens or practitioners to fully appreciate. On the other hand, while 
quantitative methods provide stringent statistical interpretations based off so-called proxy 
indicators, qualitative methods allow for the interpretation of themes and patterns (Creswell, 
2014:17), giving real-world context and actionable knowledge to political research 
(Kachuyevski & Samuel, 2018:8).  
Therefore, the data to be used in this comparative analysis will be qualitative in nature. 
According to Babbie (2011:24), “Qualitative data are richer in meaning and detail than are 
quantified data,” and thus will be useful in building a detailed and in-depth understanding of 
the cases in question. Context is of great importance in the collection and analysis of qualitative 
data as there is a recognition of the complex intertwining between social processes and their 
social context (Miller & Brewer, 2003:193). This recognition of the importance of context is 
foreseen to be important in this study with its particular focus on African conflict. The African 
continent provides a unique social context that is inextricably linked to all social processes that 
take place therein, and thus must be examined in order to build the in-depth understanding a 
qualitative approach can provide. 
As is typical in qualitative research, through an emergent data collection process this study will 
make use of various forms of data (Creswell, 2014:186), including secondary sources such as 
published books and journals, and primary sources in the form of organisational/government 
reports. This qualitative data will be collected by means of desktop research. The data will be 
organised or ‘coded’ according to the categories described above. As these projects began and 
culminated several years ago, it will be necessary to look at what they were intended to achieve 
at their inception, what they were able to achieve by their conclusion, and the changing 




longer-term durability of conflict transformation resulting from these projects, it will be 
necessary to see how these perceptions have shifted over time. This will be achieved by 
assessing the literature produced concerning the projects and available data on public 
perception, such as that found in the South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB)11 and 
the Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer (RRB)12.    
1.4.6 Limitations and Challenges 
As discussed by Mouton (2001:155), a limitation associated with the comparative methodology 
are problems with selecting “appropriate” cases that both fit within the selection criteria and 
are comparable to a high degree. As has been stated, this is a problem for this study in particular 
due to the lack of previous mediation attempts based on this model. However, to mitigate this 
limitation the cases selected both exhibit the basic characteristics of a mediation project and 
thus are comparable but vary on their individual demonstrations of the model’s characteristics. 
This will thereby make possible deductions concerning their varying successes. Mouton 
(2001:155) also notes that in cross-cultural and cross-national studies, as this one will be, there 
are constraints in comparability due to the differences in areas such as language, tradition and 
culture. However, in the context of this study these differences are in fact a necessary condition 
in order to evaluate the relevance of context-specificity and utilise this strength of the case 
study design.       
A challenge facing this study in particular is the definition and measurement of ‘successful 
conflict transformation’. Definitively measuring the level of conflict transformation in a 
country proves difficult when the term itself encompasses such a vast array of conflict 
relationships. This study will therefore aim to build a broad picture of the level of conflict 
transformation in each country, based on triangulation of various sources of data concerning 
themes such as reconciliation, peace and restorative justice.       
1.5 Contribution of the Study 
By shifting the focus of mediation efforts from the outcomes it produces and towards the 
transformed conflict environment a mediation process could engender, this study could provide 
evidence for a new approach to mediation efforts. This approach could potentially provide 
 
11 2017 SARB report produced by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, South Africa. The SARB uses 
survey data to measure public perception of the state of reconciliation in South Africa.  
12 Reports published in 2010 and 2015 by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission of Rwanda in 
collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme. Uses survey data to measure public perception 




longer-lasting effects than those of the traditional outcomes-based approach. Furthermore, this 
study will focus on mediation in Africa, a continent with a long history of violent conflict that 
continues to this day and is in desperate need of new approaches to resolution. With 
peacebuilding resources being low in supply and high in demand on the continent, the conflict 
responses required are those that can efficiently and effectively address the deeper roots of 
conflict in a society and thus help to avoid lapses back into the costly and persistent cycles of 
violence. This study could provide evidence for mediation as a conflict response with the 
potential to achieve such goals, provided its practice and utility is reconceptualised as a process 
of conflict transformation and not simply agreements for conflict settlement. 
In discussing and describing a contemporary holistic approach to mediation and comparing this 
to similar mediation attempts already having been carried out on the continent, this study would 
aim to make both a theoretical and practical contribution, thus being both basic and applied in 
nature. Theoretically, it could provide support for a newer model of mediation, moving away 
from the traditional outcomes-based approach. Practically, it could provide evidence that this 
model is one worth emulating in future peacebuilding efforts on the continent and give 
practitioners in the business of conflict resolution reason to revisit the conduct of mediation as 
a conflict response tool in transitional societies. 
1.6 Outline of the Study  
This study will be presented in five chapters. This first chapter has served as an introduction 
and outline of the study to be conducted, including the research design and methodology. 
Chapter Two will form the conceptual and theoretical framework of the study with a discussion 
of traditional mediation theory and the major debates surrounding its description as a 
mechanism for conflict management, as well as mapping the progression of mediation theory 
towards the goal of broader conflict transformation. This chapter will further provide the 
analytical framework for the study in the form of a model for process-based mediation projects.   
Chapters Three and Four will then be dedicated to the construction of the cases and the analysis 
thereof with regards to the analytical framework produced in Chapter Two. Chapter Three will 
be dedicated to the historical contextualisation of each case, with a discussion of the conflict 
climate in each nation that necessitated the resolution projects, followed by a description of 
these projects. The data collection and presentation for this study will be done in Chapter Four, 
where the comparative analysis of the TRC and the gacaca courts will take place. Following 




on to the cases, highlighting their relative manifestations of the criteria included in the study’s 
conceptualisation of this new type of mediation project. The two cases will be contrasted and 
compared, looking both at how they are similar and how they differ in demonstrating a process-
based project, and how these differences have led to the relative conflict transformation of each 
historically conflicted nation.  
Finally, Chapter Five will follow with a discussion of the findings in Chapter Four and relate 
them back to the research question as originally posed in Chapter One. This chapter will serve 





CHAPTER TWO – CONCEPTUAL, THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
Just as conflict has retained a constant presence throughout human history, so has mediation 
played an integral part in its resolution. Evidence of mediation practice is found in cultures 
throughout the world, and in ages as far removed as the Biblical – from Moses acting as 
mediator between God and men to shamans in Asia, America and Oceania mediating with 
spirits (Horowitz, 2007:51). However, in the contemporary era with weapons so destructive 
and technology so developed, mediation has become an even more important tool in 
terminating violent conflict that is both costly and irrational (Bercovitch, 1996:2).    
The upsurge in mediation practice, particularly in the post-Cold War era, has led to a 
consequent surge in scholarly work surrounding the discipline, with many adding their analyses 
to the conceptualisation of the term ‘mediation’. Upon examination of these varied analyses it 
becomes clear that there are at least two broad approaches to the practice, a traditional and a 
non-traditional. The traditional can be described as a ‘problem-solving’ approach, situated 
within the field of conflict management. The non-traditional however is more of a 
‘transformative’ approach, aptly named due to its situation within the field of conflict 
transformation. Although this study is concerned with the potential of mediation as a tool for 
conflict transformation, in order to provide full reasoning for this preferred conceptualisation, 
it is necessary to provide an overview of mediation in all its varied forms; the aim of this 
chapter.      
2.2 Mediation Defined 
As one of the primary mechanisms utilised and discussed in the field of conflict resolution, the 
concept and practice of ‘mediation’ are subject to much debate. In structuring an initial 
conceptualisation of the term, an often-cited definition of the term ‘mediation’ provided by 
Christopher Moore is useful. Moore (1986:14) describes mediation as an “intervention into a 
dispute or negotiation by an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party, who has no 
authoritative decision-making power to assist disputing parties in voluntarily reaching their 
own mutually acceptable settlement of issues in dispute” (emphasis added).  
This definition, while including every aspect of mediation practice that are often assumed 




contribute to the discussion of mediation best practice, as this study aims to do, it is important 
to begin with an analysis of these key elements and the various debates surrounding them.  
2.2.1 Conflicts Conducive to Mediation Intervention 
As a result of overwhelmed legal systems and the often exorbitant costs associated with legal 
disputes, mediation has increasingly been utilised as a form of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
that relieves courts and can reduce costs of resolving conflict (Fisher, 2011:159). Despite its 
popularity and widespread practice however, it must be recognised that mediation is but one of 
a plethora of conflict resolution mechanisms. Furlong (2005:124) identifies a key element that 
is often regarded as the signifier for mediator intervention as opposed to any of these other 
mechanisms, that of the stalemate. He states that prior to parties reaching a stalemate, pure 
negotiation through direct interaction between disputants is the tool most likely to be 
implemented. However, there are other signifiers that suggest mediation to be the most 
appropriate approach and these will be discussed below.   
Kressel (2006:732) distinguishes three sets of barriers which may impede pure negotiation and 
thus encourage the intervention of a mediator. The first of these are interpersonal barriers, in 
which negative feelings between disputants or dysfunctional communication between them 
infringe on the quality of direct interaction. The second are substantive barriers, in which 
disputants disagree strongly on the content of the disagreement and have difficulty ascertaining 
the ‘truth’ or ‘facts’ of the situation. The third set of barriers are procedural, in which there is 
an absence entirely of a negotiating forum and thus a complete deadlock. Mediation may break 
down these barriers as it provides an opportunity for constructive communication in which all 
aspects of the conflict and possible solutions can be fully investigated and weighed up, 
potentially opening new political space that previously had not been seen (Ramsbotham, 
Woodhouse & Miall, 2016:213).   
Tillett & French (2010:139) ascertain a set of pre-conditions for mediation to take place, these 
being: previous failure to resolve the conflict through collaboration, disputants’ perception that 
they will not be able to resolve their issues alone, distrust or hostility between the disputants, 
extended duration of conflict, and a high level of complexity in the content of the conflict. 
Similarly, Bercovitch and Houston (1996:12) suggest mediation is likely to be called upon 
when the conflict has gone on for some time, if previous efforts have ended in stalemate, if 
both actors face unendurable costs if the conflict were to continue, and if the parties to the 




Although mediation is intended to provide a level playing field for negotiation, inevitably in 
some cases there will be an imbalance of power between disputants. Weaker actors may 
therefore turn to mediation in the belief that they could achieve a better outcome than they 
would otherwise have done without the mediator present. Parties may also agree to the 
mediation in the hopes that the mediator will act as a guarantor for any agreements reached, 
reducing the risk of either side reneging on the agreement (Touval & Zartman, 1985:9). In the 
case of victim-offender mediation and traumatic conflict, the presence of a third-party may 
make the affected victim feel safer in attending the negotiation (Furlong, 2005:124). 
Timing is also an important factor as contended by Zartman’s (2001:8) ‘ripeness theory’, in 
which mediation is considered the appropriate response once conflict has reached a “mutually-
hurting stalemate”. In other words, mediation should only take place when conflict is ‘ripe’, 
and a cost-benefit analysis demonstrates two conditions: that neither party is willing nor able 
to make any more power moves towards winning the conflict, and that the continuation thereof 
has become detrimental to all parties involved.      
In an empirical study concerning the effectiveness of mediation in mitigating international 
crises, Wilkenfeld, Young, Asal and Quinn (2003:282) found that mediation is two or three 
times more likely to be the conflict response of choice in times of crisis and hostility than in 
periods of lower intensity. This being the result of pressure due to a perceived deadline and the 
immediate consequences if an agreement fails to be reached. The study also found that the 
higher the number of relevant issues in a crisis, the higher the chance of the crisis being 
mediated (Wilkenfeld et al, 2003:285). Finally, it showed that territorial crises, conflicts 
involving geographically close disputing groups and those involving ethnic divisions, all of 
which have been the trend post-Cold War, are more likely to feature mediation than conflicts 
without these key characteristics (Wilkenfeld et al, 2003:286).      
In contemporary warfare with the reality of nuclear arms and the extended duration of conflicts, 
mediation provides an alternative to the zero-sum game that is resolution of conflict through 
‘winning’ or ‘losing’ a war. It is said to differ from other forms of third-party intervention in 
that it is an act of peacemaking, which in theory does not intend for one party to triumph over 
the other (Touval and Zartman, 1985:7). It is thus possible to resolve active conflict by reaching 
win/win outcomes in which the interests of all parties are considered and included in the 
decision-making process (Furlong, 2005:110). For disputants trapped in cycles of violence or 




fundamental objectives are to help them find a mutually acceptable solution and to offset their 
tendencies towards a competitive win/lose mindset (Kressel, 2006:726).     
2.2.2 Bias, Neutrality and Impartiality 
The next element for discussion, and possibly the most highly contested element of the 
mediation mechanism is that of the bias, neutrality or impartiality of the mediator themselves. 
While it is commonly agreed that mediators cannot be a party to the conflict in question (Fisher, 
2011:161), there is a general assumption evident in many conceptualisations that mediators 
must be both neutral and impartial (Tillett & French, 2010:105; Fisher, 2011:159; Horowitz, 
2007:51). In some texts, mediators are even referred to as “third-party neutrals” and in practice 
are often bound to the principle of neutrality by ethics codes (Wehr & Lederach, 1996:56). 
Tillett and French (2010:140) go as far as to say that a neutral third-party is the ‘distinguishing 
factor’ of mediation from similar processes such as collaborative decision-making and conflict 
resolution more broadly.  
Within the North American scholarship in particular, the ideal mediator is expected to have 
both externality and neutrality, thereby coming from outside the conflict situation and having 
no connection to either side (Wehr & Lederach, 1996:57-58; Horowitz, 2007:53). The 
mediator’s role is defined negatively, focusing on what the mediator is not as opposed to what 
they are or could be. This includes mediators being unconnected to disputants, unbiased, having 
no investment in a particular settlement or outcome, and not expecting any reward from either 
side (Moore, 1986:15-16). Intuitively this may make sense, as in order to ensure a fair and 
equal process one would assume the mediator should have no reason to favour one side or the 
other. In the case that a mediator were to show bias towards either party, they may risk losing 
the trust of the other (Touval & Zartman, 1985:9).   
In practice however, it is often the case that the third-party is partisan or allied to one side of 
the conflict. This may cause them to push solutions supporting that side or adding resources in 
its favour (Mitchell, 1981:275). For example, in the early 1990s at the beginning of the 
mediation of the Sudanese conflict, the mediating countries had different allegiances to the 
primary conflicting parties. Through the process this would change, as Eritrea, Ethiopia and 
Uganda came to support the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/National Democratic Alliance 
(SPLA/NDA) over the government of Sudan. With the support of these three mediators, by 
1997-1998 the mediation had reached the point of agreement with a solution favouring their 




assumption of the negative impact of bias and partiality of mediators, many authors argue these 
qualities could in fact be productive in the overall mediation process.  
For example, based on their experience as mediators in Guatemala and Nicaragua, Wehr and 
Lederach (1996:58-59) introduce the conceptualisation of a ‘new’ kind of mediator role, that 
of the ‘Insider-Partial’. This mediator is said to be best suited to traditional societies with 
community-based norms and values. The ‘Insider-Partial’ is purposefully drawn from within 
the conflict context as their acceptability stems from extensive trust and connections with the 
conflicting parties. The success of this mediator relies on their proximity to the conflict, partly 
due to the fact that they do not leave the conflict setting once negotiations have ended, and 
from the accumulated knowledge of the conflict context shared by disputants and mediator 
(Wehr & Lederach, 1996:58). The parties are assured of the genuine vested interest the 
mediator would have in seeing the conflict effectively reconciled, and the mediator has 
extensive contextual knowledge to assist in achieving this goal.       
Touval and Zartman (1985:8-9) argue it is in fact rare for mediators to be completely indifferent 
to the outcomes of the mediation, and that they almost always have some form of self-interested 
motivation for taking part. They list two such motivations, the first being that continued conflict 
may in some way disadvantage the mediator, for example if the conflict has gone unresolved 
for some time and the mediator wants to prove their problem-solving skills. The second is the 
potential to extend and increase their own influence through developing a stronger relationship 
with the parties involved. Touval and Zartman go on to state explicitly that impartiality is not 
important for successful mediation as parties accept the mediator based on their perceptions of 
what their own relationship with the mediator would be and the potential consequences of 
accepting or rejecting the eventual terms of agreement. They claim that parties are not as 
concerned as might be expected with the mediator’s general attitude and relationship towards 
them prior to the mediation (Touval & Zartman, 1985:15).   
An author who attempted to empirically test these varying hypotheses on mediator bias is 
Svensson (2009). On the one hand his analyses of biased and neutral mediators in civil wars 
showed that biased mediators can positively and significantly affect the likelihood of specific 
institutional agreements within peace agreements. On the other they showed that because 
neutral mediators’ sole purpose is getting parties to come to an agreement, they are less 
concerned with the provisions set out in the agreement. Therefore, neutral mediators create 




guarantees, government-sided amnesties and repatriation of civilians.” (Svensson, 2009:461). 
Without such provisions, Svensson argues that agreements are unlikely to develop democratic 
institutions which he deems essential for ensuring durable peace.              
2.2.3 Mediator Role and the Use of Leverage 
In conjunction with the debate over the bias and neutrality of the mediator is a debate over their 
subsequent role in the mediation process and the leverage they should or should not be able to 
wield over disputants. This concerns the extent to which mediators should control or guide the 
proceedings and the amount of influence they should be granted over its outcomes. Fisher 
(2011:158) in fact argues that third-party intervention types can be distinguished by the amount 
of power (read leverage) the mediator has over the mediation process, for example in an 
arbitration case as opposed to an international dispute.   
In terms of their more general roles, mediators help advance communication between 
adversaries, they may change adversaries’ images of one another, and they can suggest 
compromises, bargain and negotiate to encourage adversaries to change their stance (Touval & 
Zartman, 1985:7). In terms of coming to an agreement, a mediator could assist in differentiating 
positions and interests, helping create options, being an ‘agent of reality’ and reformulating 
previous disagreeable outcomes (Horowitz, 2007:55-56). Due to the possibility that parties 
may not have entirely constructive motives for engaging in a process of mediation, one of their 
most important roles is said to be deciphering the deeper motives of the disputing parties and 
ensuring they do truly wish to reach a mutually acceptable agreement (Fisher, 2011: 162).  
As in the case of bias and impartiality, it is often simply assumed that the mediator must have 
no decision-making authority with regards to the content of agreements, and furthermore that 
they must provide no recommendations or advice in their assemblage (Tillett & French, 
2010:105; Moore, 1986:14; Bercovitch & Houston, 1996:12; Fisher, 2011:159). Kirchhoff 
(2009:243) gives reason to this assumption by cautioning that disputants are more likely to 
remain committed to agreements they formulated themselves and thus mediators should avoid 
extensive contributions to their content. It is perhaps due to this reasoning that intermediaries 
are expected generally to prefer persuasion as opposed to coercion in bringing parties to 
agreement (Wallensteen & Svensson, 2014:316). 
Other authors however discard the assumption of a non-interventionist role for the mediator. 
Wehr and Lederach (1996) are two such authors who, following the conceptualisation of their 




stringent definition of mediation are misguided. They suggest that both the concepts of 
mediation and mediator should have simple definitions, with the addition of mediator roles as 
and when necessary. These roles could include the mediator-negotiator, mediator-legitimiser, 
mediator-conciliator, and mediator-broker – all of which are said to be necessary just at 
different times and in different contexts (Wehr & Lederach, 1996:70-71).   
Two more authors who concur with the extended view of mediator role are Touval and Zartman 
(1985:11-12) who present three different kinds of interventionist mediator, differentiated by 
the extent of their involvement in the decision-making process. The first considers the mediator 
as communicator or facilitator, where their sole purpose is improving communication between 
disputants. The second is the mediator as formulator, in which they present disputants with new 
solutions and outcomes they have not found on their own, but does not advocate for any specific 
agreement and has no power over parties reaching a decision. The final type sees the mediator 
as manipulator, where they use leverage and resources to manipulate the disputants towards 
certain preferred outcomes. While these differing roles present a more complicated 
conceptualisation of the mediator, Touval and Zartman (1985:12) consider each to be as 
practically possible and potentially useful as the other.      
If the definition of a mediator is to be expanded to include roles such as the mediator-
manipulator, there must be subsequent analysis of the potential use of leverage. The mediator 
as manipulator may engage in what Fisher (2011:165) refers to as “power mediation”, a type 
of mediation in which the mediator facilitates negotiations by using leverage or coercion 
through promised rewards or threatened punishments. Ramsbotham et al (2016:21-22) allow 
for the possibility of mediator leverage by defining mediation as “a voluntary process in which 
parties retain control over the outcome (pure mediation), although it may include positive and 
negative inducements (mediation with muscle).” Thus, these authors support the ideas 
presented by Touval and Zartman (1985) that mediators may have some influence over 
decision-making and that disputants do not always enter into agreements voluntarily.  
Wallensteen and Svensson (2014:316) on the other hand purposefully exclude the concept of 
‘mediation with muscle’ in their core characteristics of mediation as they claim this would be 
“premature”. They argue that the use of coercion to push a certain outcome or agenda is to be 
treated as another dimension entirely of action by third-parties. It must be noted that their view 
of mediation ‘muscle’ is as third-party military force and not individual leverage of the 




dimension would require looking at whether peaceful mediation is assisted or undermined by 
third-party military force. However, the ‘muscle’ of mediation need not always equate to 
military force as a mediator’s position affords them other forms of leverage inspiring 
agreement.   
In a discussion of ‘intangible leverage’, Princen (1992:42) states that “information is power” 
and thus that mediator leverage derives from both their material and immaterial attributes. 
Mediators are able to use the information available to them to separate disputants’ true interests 
and motives, and then suggest attractive outcomes or extract concessions, ultimately wielding 
influence over parties to the conflict. By using information leverage mediators can also increase 
disputants’ perceptions of the costs of conflict as they are able to discern what matters most to 
each party (Beardsley, 2008:723). In this way historical and cultural ties providing the mediator 
with in-depth contextual knowledge may be as influential a form of leverage as material 
resources such as military strength.  
Following Princen, Reid (2017:1402-1403) distinguishes between two kinds of leverage: 
capability and credibility. Capability leverage is constituted by material strength such as 
military backing or economic resources used to alter disputants’ bargaining range. The second 
is credibility leverage, through which parties may be swayed to cooperate due to the mediator’s 
store of information, contextual knowledge and perceived commitment to the peace process. 
Through a quantitative study of civil war mediation attempts from 1989 to 2006, Reid goes on 
to argue the importance of understanding leverage to be context-dependent and finds that softer 
forms of mediation “fostering rather than forcing settlements” can potentially ensure longer-
term benefits (Reid, 2017:1424).     
Thus, it can be said that mediator role, while often considered to be quite static and limited, 
may in fact be extended to include several types of mediator. The kind of leverage they wield, 
whether it be military ‘muscle’ or a more intangible form, will affect their role in the mediation 
process as a whole. There is a fine line for mediators to walk between being ‘power-full’, 
potentially constructing weak agreements relying on coercion for implementation, and being 
‘power-less’, failing to be taken seriously by conflicting parties (Mitchell, 1981:312). In line 
with the need for mediators to recognise their biases and partiality, it is therefore important for 
mediators to be cognisant of the leverage available to them and their consequent influence over 




2.2.4 Mediator Identity 
Considering the above debates over the role of the mediator, it follows that a further debate in 
defining mediation concerns who exactly the mediator should be. Mediators may be linked to 
disputants via social networks (e.g. community elders or religious leaders), they might have 
more authoritative power in a formal relationship with disputants (e.g. powerful states), or they 
may be professional mediators independent from disputants and intended to offer objective 
consultation (Fisher, 2011:162). As they differ in size, scope, strength and resources, each type 
of mediator may be useful in a different context. For example the social network mediator may 
offer easier access to parties or civil society actors whereas a professional mediator will have 
knowledge and experience of past peace processes (Ramsbotham et al, 2016:212). It is 
therefore necessary to distinguish the set of ‘tools’ available to each in order to account for the 
influence they may have on the process and outcomes of mediation (Reid, 2017:1423).   
If, as the previous section concludes, mediators can have a variety of roles based on different 
forms of leverage and the set of ‘tools’ available to them, this suggests the selection of mediator 
should be more deliberate and intentional than it is often found to be (Wehr & Lederach, 
1996:71). Mediators should be chosen based on their skills and social positioning, which will 
affect the stage at which their intervention would be most successful. Nation-states, or at least 
representatives of nation-states, often take the position of mediator in international crises 
(Rupesinghe, 1996:154; Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006:337). These situations provide interesting 
cases for analysis regarding bias and neutrality, as nation-states usually only involve 
themselves as mediators when they have an economic or political reason, or simply to extend 
their own influence (Fisher, 2011:161; Kressel, 2006:735). Besides their potentially unhelpful 
motives, this kind of intervention often results in diplomats being given mediatory roles based 
on their acceptability to the parties rather than on their expertise as mediators, ultimately 
threatening the overall success of the process.        
Apart from states themselves, the other most important governmental organisation in the 
practice of mediation is the UN. The organisation has a wealth of resources at its disposal that 
other mediators do not, for example an international forum, skilled personnel, and the ability 
to mobilise international consensus (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006:336). The UN could in fact 
be regarded as the most important actor in mediation worldwide, as its legitimacy and resources 
give it a special position and much bargaining power (Ramsbotham et al, 2016:217). However, 




in low-level disputes where it is considered too much of an outsider (Bercovitch & Gartner, 
2006:336).      
While mediation efforts at the nation-state level are the best documented, more and more 
intermediary efforts are taking place at the mid- and grass-roots levels of conflicted societies. 
These efforts are conducted by mid-level officials, NGO personnel and military officers on 
peacekeeping missions. These actors all use their organisational capacity to encourage 
disputants to cooperate (Fisher, 2011:161). Furthermore, there is a trend in current NGO 
interventions towards replacing outside interveners with a process of training local people in 
the skills of intervention combined with indigenous traditions of conflict resolution 
(Ramsbotham et al, 2016:215). This is supported by Rupesinghe (1996) whose analysis of 
conflict resolution in Sri Lanka provides support for capacity-building within the affected 
community so as to ensure sustained resolution efforts rooted in local traditions.    
Non-governmental and civil society actors have a particularly important role to play in 
providing society-to-society contacts. Ramsbotham et al (2016:215) refer to the subsidiary 
mediation practices of these actors as ‘Track II’ mediation, ‘Track I’ being that which takes 
place at the elite level. They assert that Track I and II efforts are proven to be more successful 
when operating in conjunction with one another, and that Track II efforts may inspire more 
concerted peacemaking efforts in governing bodies as they show society is making cooperative 
efforts alongside elites. Through empirical and case-study research Gartner and Bercovitch 
(2006) find that mediated agreements are likely to be short-lived unless non-state actors have 
been involved in their formulation.        
In a context where traditional forms of conflict management are evident, mid-level local 
authorities become important actors in Track II efforts. Wehr and Lederach’s (1996:58-59) 
mediator model of the ‘Insider-Partial’ can again be an important role to consider as these 
authorities have specific knowledge of the traditions governing their communities and also 
wield credibility leverage due to their position in society. Becorpi (2018:110) discusses the 
example of Sierra Leone where community chiefs are ‘custodians of land and tradition’ and 
can prove effective actors in local dispute resolution. However, while traditional leaders have 
important roles to play in their communities, in nations such as Sierra Leone which are rife 
with patronage networks that leave governance structures vulnerable to misuse, the 




2.2.5 Major Threats to Effective Mediation 
In identifying trends in mediation that could prove helpful in developing durable peace-making 
initiatives, it is also important to identify issues that have been found to impede such initiatives. 
There are a range of issues that could pose potential risks to the mediation project, of which 
Tillett and French (2010:142-143) identify several including power imbalance between 
disputants and the subsequent possibility of explicit or implicit coercion, lack of skills on the 
part of the mediator, latent trauma which may surface as disputants face one another, and 
conflict escalation outside the negotiation space placing pressure on both disputants and 
mediator to rush into an agreement. Kressel (2006:731) highlights other risks such as a shortage 
of resources to support the mediation, low commitment to the process, low motivation in 
reaching agreements or the problem of tackling matters of ‘principle’, all of which also pose 
threats to the effectiveness of mediation.  
Looking at the mediator themselves, it is possible that their individual qualities and rank may 
have an impact on the potential effectiveness of the mediation (Touval & Zartman, 1985:15). 
Mediator intelligence, contextual knowledge, expertise, commitment and imagination are all 
qualities that could affect their performance in the process. The influence of rank relates back 
to the leverage debate as a highly ranking mediator may have the authority and (explicit or 
implicit) coercive power to pull parties out of a stalemate, however outcomes may not be 
equally satisfactory and may place pressure on weaker parties to concede prematurely (Touval 
& Zartman, 1985:15).        
A factor that threatens the perceived effectiveness of mediation is a high level of conflict 
intensity. Kressel (2006:731) asserts that “in empirical studies of mediation, a high level of 
conflict is the most consistent factor associated with mediator difficulty in helping parties reach 
agreement.” He states that conflict intensity can be measured by the severity of prior conflict; 
disputants’ perceptions of one another as untrustworthy, unreasonable, angry, or impossible to 
communicate with; or the prevalence of strong ideological or cultural differences. As suggested 
by Gartner and Bercovitch’s (2006) ‘selection effects’ theory, mediation is expected to be 
chosen specifically in cases of protracted intensive conflict, therefore the threat of high levels 
of conflict is important to consider.   
Although a mediation project is generally only called upon if the conflicting parties agree to it, 
there must be an awareness of the possibility that their motives for agreeing are not always 




legitimating their own position or saving face in the eyes of the public (Fisher, 2011: 162). 
Perhaps as a result of the reality of these devious objectives, parties may also not fully commit 
to the process if they do not have faith that the opposite side will abide by their part in the 
agreement (Ramsbotham et al, 2016:204). It is possible that intermediary actions may not have 
any influence on conflict resolution at all, as parties may decide on a compromise between 
themselves before finding a convenient third party “to act as a go-between and legitimiser of 
their activities” (Mitchell, 1981:281).   
There are therefore many potential threats to the effectiveness of mediation. However, the point 
must be made here that as one reads different authors’ contributions to this discussion, an 
important trend becomes apparent. It is clear that many of these threats assume the aim of a 
mediation project to be achieving an agreement or settlement. This is a trend evident in the 
other elements of mediation conceptualisation discussed above but becomes even more 
apparent when the discussion turns to the effectiveness of mediation, as will be further explored 
below.   
2.2.6 Difficulties in Measuring Mediation Success 
Perhaps as a result of the difficulty in discerning when a conflict has truly been ‘resolved’, the 
mediation literature evidences a difficulty in measuring mediation ‘success’. As stated by 
Wallensteen and Svensson (2014:315), “the overall body of literature that now exists on 
international mediation provides credible evidence of its effectiveness, although the particular 
conditions under which mediation is effective are still debated.” In other words, scholars are 
willing to discern a mediation project as ‘successful’ without having a sound framework for 
the conditions that determine its success. Ramsbotham et al (2016:218) provide three reasons 
for this difficulty in measuring mediation success, these being: the complexity of conflicts that 
mediation often addresses, the multiplicity of mediation attempts and their differing 
approaches, and the confidentiality generally attached to mediation procedures (particularly as 
a result of these taking place at the elite level).     
In order to simplify the measurement of mediation success, and in line with the wider 
assumption of mediation goals, scholars often look to the outcomes of the project in the form 
of settlements or cease-fires (Bercovitch & Houston, 1996:14). In a study measuring and 
comparing the mediation success of individuals, states, and regional/international 
organisations, Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) determine success by whether the mediation 




Touval and Zartman (1985:14) state their preferred definition of mediation success as “the 
conclusion of an agreement promising reduction of conflict.” These conceptualisations 
evidence the fact that mediation success is not often determined by the durability of the 
agreements or outcomes it produces, nor do they assess whether the project had any effect on 
the fundamental divisions that caused the conflict.        
This focus on outcomes and agreements speaks to a wider assumption in mediation literature 
that the primary purpose of mediatory action is to facilitate negotiation towards an interest-
based settlement in times of crisis. This is evident in many definitions of mediation, including 
that of Moore (1986:14) mentioned at the outset of this chapter, in which some variation of a 
‘mutually acceptable settlement/resolution’ is positioned as the primary goal (Tillett & French, 
2010:105; Fisher, 2011:159; Kressel, 2006:726; Mason & Quinn, 2006:16). This thus situates 
the mechanism as a means of conflict settlement, rather than resolving the issue at its root 
cause. While this positioning will be discussed extensively below, it is worthwhile taking note 
of here, as it has a clear impact on conceptualisations of mediation success.   
2.3 Questioning the Durability of Mediated Peace   
Considering the above discussion of threats to effective mediation and the common way in 
which mediation success is measured, it becomes clear that explanations for each will depend 
on whether mediation is aimed purely at concluding immediate conflict, or alternatively at the 
resolution of all underlying causal issues. The tendency in mediation literature generally seems 
to be the former, with a pervasive assumption that a signed settlement or agreement is the 
ultimate goal of a mediation project. However as has been mentioned, rarely do analyses 
recognise the problem of the durability of mediated peace.      
Theoretically, as the mediation process is cooperative, contrasted with the win/lose orientation 
of other dispute mechanisms such as legal courts, it should provide better outcomes more suited 
to the disputing parties’ needs and wants. Furthermore, the intensive participation of disputants 
in the creation of their solution, as opposed to imposing a solution upon them, should lead to a 
kind of psychological commitment to agreements and their subsequent endurance (Kressel, 
2006:727). However, in reality this is not always the case, and mediated settlements are often 
short-lived.  
When compared to military victories, negotiated settlements are more likely to break down as 
they preserve a condition of dual sovereignty in the leadership of the nation. Military victory, 




the forces of the defeated side, thus making it difficult for that party to mobilise the resources 
needed to resume war (Mason & Quinn, 2006:21). Mediated settlements however include 
power-sharing components and leave both sides of the conflict with the available resources to 
renege on a ceasefire should they deem it in their best interest. The failure of the demobilisation 
project included in the Rwandan Arusha Accords of 1993 are one such case (Willard, 2014). 
This example proves particularly important to this study as the resultant tensions between the 
Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front are said to have been a key catalyst of 
the genocide in 1994 (Willard, 2014).    
One reason for the frequently short-lived nature of mediated settlements is the pervasive threat 
of time pressure in mediation projects. This pressure comes in different forms such as the threat 
of waning resources, imminent increase in violence or imposed deadlines by funding actors. 
While project timelines may help prevent a deadlock, they can also have a negative impact on 
the durability of agreements as the mediation process is rushed and agreements are made for 
the sake of reaching a deadline, and not necessarily because the substantive issues have been 
resolved. A study carried out by Pinfari (2011) concluded that while time pressure can in certain 
circumstances be associated with the culmination of broad agreements, only when time 
pressure is low or completely absent are agreements durable. The study further showed that 
time pressure has particularly negative consequences for the durability of agreements if the 
issues at hand are highly complex.    
Gartner and Bercovitch (2006) discuss a dichotomy in mediation efforts that influence the 
durability of settlements. They define two theories for mediation outcome based on what they 
call ‘selection effects’ and ‘process effects’. According to the theory of ‘selection effects’, 
mediation is often called upon in cases of intractable conflict, where the underlying cause of 
the conflict relationship is unlikely to be altered (e.g. ethnic or religious conflict). Thus, 
settlements are likely to be short-lived. On the other hand, ‘process effects’ suggest that the 
process of mediation should be able to identify both the internal and external causes of the 
conflict, thereby constructing more durable agreements that address these underlying causes 
(Gartner & Bercovitch, 2006:821-822). Gartner and Bercovitch create a framework capturing 
these opposing forces, arguing that the durability of the settlement depends on the interplay of 
these forces in each particular conflict. If the conflict includes intractable disputes, the selection 
effects are most likely to have the biggest impact. However if the mediation is focused on 
process and not outcomes, the ‘process effects’ may be able to contribute to the durability of 




Beardsley (2008) claims that the long-term ineffectiveness of mediation is a result of something 
even more fundamental than Gartner and Bercovitch’s ‘selection effects’. He defines this 
fundamental issue as ‘time inconsistency problems’: as time goes on mediators lose influence 
due to their temporary position in the peace process, and actors’ bargaining positions change 
thus their relationship with the mediator and with the opposing party will shift. While mediators 
struggle to curb these problems by promptly coming to an agreement, they may in fact be 
exacerbated by the promotion of settlements that are not self-enforcing (Beardsley, 2008:723). 
Analysis of all international crises from 1918 to 2001 confirmed that intermediaries often create 
artificial incentives that force agreement and create immediate stability but are not viable in 
the absence of constant third-party influence (Beardsley, 2008:724).         
What is important to note here, as stated by Diehl (1987:47), is that ‘peace’ is not simply the 
negative of ‘war’, but requires efforts extending beyond the conclusion of armed aggression. 
Thus, if mediation is confined to the negotiating table in times of immediate conflict, it is 
unlikely to have a long-term effect on the broader peacekeeping process (Diehl, 1987:47). 
Particularly in societies with protracted conflict, responses such as traditional international 
mediation that are restricted to high-level negotiations will be unlikely to transform the conflict 
at its underlying causes and thus be unlikely to bring about long-term resolution (Rupesinghe, 
1996:165). The above discussion illustrates this issue with mediated peace agreements, and the 
limits to long-term mediation effectiveness when the process is aimed solely at tangible 
outcomes in the form of signed settlements and agreements.          
2.4 Short-Term Agreement or Long-Lasting Peace? 
Having highlighted the tendency of traditional mediation literature towards conceptualising the 
mechanism as an outcomes-focused means for achieving conflict settlement, it is prevalent now 
to situate this conceptualisation within the broader field of conflict resolution. In doing so, 
inherent assumptions about the nature of conflict and the peacemaking potential of mediation 
may be illustrated and challenged, leading to a distinction between mediation as a tool for 
conflict management, and as a tool for conflict transformation. This distinction is intended to 
frame an advocacy of the potential of mediation in creating durable peace given its 
reconceptualization within the field of conflict transformation.    
2.4.1 A Shift in Theory – Management to Transformation 
It can be said that the field of conflict resolution as a whole has been generally preoccupied 




have been focused on the culmination of active combat. There is however an important 
distinction to be made between ‘conflict’ and ‘violence’. Active aggression is a manifestation 
of conflict, but does not equate to conflict and thus cannot be the singular focus of efforts at its 
resolution (Tillett & French, 2010:2). To analyse a conflict given this distinction would require 
distinguishing between its symptoms, signalling the conflict exists, and its causes, the factors 
which when addressed correctly could resolve the conflict (Tillett & French, 2010:6).  
Throughout the mediation literature, particularly before the early 1990s, the discussion appears 
to parallel this preoccupation of conflict resolution theory and situates mediation as a tool for 
crisis intervention. In this context, mediation is aimed at terminating the immediate crisis so as 
to avoid further escalation or the spread of violence (Wilkenfeld et al, 2003:282). Thus the 
focus is placed on conflict symptoms, i.e. violence and war, limiting its potential to treating 
these symptoms as opposed to addressing the root causes of the conflict. When limited in this 
way it could be said that many authors see mediation as a tool for conflict management or 
‘settlement’ (Mitchell, 1981:275; Burton, 1988:2; Ramsbotham et al, 2016:24).   
Conflict management approaches on the whole are focused on mitigating or controlling the 
destructive consequences emanating from conflict (Assefa, 2015:238) and thus this form of 
mediation situates the mechanism within this discipline. Mediation viewed as a tool for conflict 
management is seen to be “task-oriented” (Fisher, 2011:159) and “interest-based” (Furlong, 
2005:110). The primary goal in this approach is a reconciling of disputing parties’ interests 
into some form of the often-mentioned mutually acceptable settlement and is relatively 
unconcerned with the nature of their relationship. It is thought that interest-based approaches 
tend to be more consensual as parties feel their interests have been heard and integrated into a 
win/win outcome (Furlong, 2005:110).  
Approaches aimed at conflict management or settlement can be defined as ‘problem-solving’, 
based on human-needs theory and the idea that basic needs connect all parties to a conflict. 
Thus the response should facilitate the movement of these parties towards their ‘common 
ground’ of human needs (Rupesinghe, 1996:154). In the problem-solving approach it is 
accepted that disputants act as individuals, concerned mostly with their own interests. The 
focus is placed on the outcome as disputants are seen to accept mediation on the basis of the 
expectation that mediation will be the most effective way of achieving a favourable outcome 
(Touval & Zartman, 1985:10; Princen, 1992:61).The settlement agenda does not try to modify 




making ‘fair’ sacrifices to reach a compromise (Mitchell, 1981:276). The problem with this 
approach is that while negotiation over an agreement should theoretically open the political 
space for fair democratic contestation, the frequent use of mediation as a tool to end violence 
results in rushed consensus-based compromises that in fact shut down this political space 
(Maddison, 2017:159).   
Since the end of the Cold War, most armed conflicts throughout the world have become intra-
state. The use of mediation as a conflict response followed this trend, as from the 1980s the 
frequency of civil war mediation exceeded interstate mediation and from the 1990s negotiated 
settlements became equally or even more common than military victories (Wallensteen & 
Svensson, 2014:317-318). As conflict became less of a zero-sum game and its culmination no 
longer relied on one side defeating the other, “the relationship between the contending sides 
must, to a much greater extent, be defined by accommodation and dialogue, rather than by the 
imposition of victor’s justice” (Daly & Sarkin, 2007:9). In other words, in societies 
transitioning from war to peace, there were no longer ‘winners’ to set the agenda and thus 
negotiation became a necessary component in transitional politics.     
Furthermore, as a result of the intra-state nature of conflict, disputants are no longer able to 
isolate themselves from one another once the conflict is ‘resolved’, as nation-states are able to 
do. Military strategy has also changed, with armed combat no longer being fought in open 
fields but moving into urban centres. Civilians become both victims and perpetrators, drawn 
into the conflict by its close proximity (Daly & Sarkin, 2007:9). Relationships between 
protagonists are far more intimate and complex, as they share geographic regions, are 
economically interdependent and may be connected through social ties such as intermarriage. 
Therefore, simplistic conflict management strategies are no longer adequate in resolving the 
deep fractures existent in deeply divided societies that must continue to live alongside one 
another once the fighting has ended (Assefa, 2015:239).     
This change in the nature of conflicts necessitates a movement towards conflict resolution 
processes that recognise the importance of reconciliation and resolution processes in which the 
underlying causes of conflict as well as the antagonistic relationships between adversaries are 
transformed (Assefa, 2015:239). Particularly in contexts where violent internal conflicts have 
taken place, the division between opposing parties is characterised by a high level of 
polarisation and demonization. Therefore, in order for a mediation project to address these 




based on the compromise of party interests. An effective conflict response would have to 
analyse the historical background of the conflict in order to fully appreciate the polarised 
relationships between disputing parties and find ways of transforming them (Rupesinghe, 
1996:156; Miall, 2004:75).  
The two cases to be analysed in this study demonstrate quite succinctly this contemporary 
nature of conflicts, and the resultant need for a relationship-focused conflict response. In an 
opinion piece for the New York Times, former South African president Thabo Mbeki and 
esteemed scholar Mahmood Mamdani (2014) argue plainly that: 
“Central to the kind of justice dispensed at Nuremberg was the widely shared assumption that 
there would be no need for winners and losers (or perpetrators and victims) to live together in 
the aftermath of victory. But South Africa’s whites and blacks did have to live together in a 
single country — just as Hutus and Tutsis had to live together after Rwanda’s genocide.” 
South Africa and Rwanda provide examples of contemporary societies in which punitive 
conflict responses such as those carried out in post-WWII Germany could not be considered. 
In both cases the armed conflict was intra-state and permeated the whole of society, with the 
lines between victim and perpetrator often being blurred. If culpability for the conflict must be 
placed on a large portion of society, and these victim-offenders must all live alongside one 
another once conflict has come to an end, there is a need for resolution responses that focus not 
on truth or punitive justice but on reconciliation.   
This brings the discussion to a different approach to resolving conflict, that of conflict 
transformation. Despite debates over the conceptualisation of conflict transformation, one 
central tenet is that it extends the conflict response past immediate cessation of violence, the 
achievement of a compromise settlement, and the joint creation of an issue-based solution 
(Mitchell, 2002:3). A conflict transformation paradigm requires a broad approach in which 
“antagonists agree upon and create the political, economic and social structures that will 
engender positive peace with social justice over the longer term” (Fisher, 2011:158). Hoffman 
(1992:278) agrees that a transformative process is concerned with “broader social structures, 
change and moving toward a social space open for co-operation, for more just relationships 
and for non-violent mechanisms for handling conflict.” Ramsbotham et al (2016:206-207) 
concur that transformation is required at a range of levels to resolve conflict causes, these levels 
being context, actor and issue transformation, personal and group transformation, and structural 




In order to move from a settlement to a transformation approach, a conflict response must shift 
its aims and objectives parallel to the shift in theory. Thus, a mediation project aimed at 
transformation must refocus from the culmination of armed violence towards a more holistic 
approach, identifying the structural changes necessary to transform fundamentally divisive 
relationships between adversaries. Bush and Folger (1994:51) state, “Today, it seems that few 
think of the mediation movement as even relevant to the problems of disempowerment, 
division and alienation that lie at the heart of societal tragedies...” However, this is the point 
that this study aims to contest. While the effectiveness of mediation has been questioned as a 
result of the limited durability of mediated settlements, this does not necessarily speak to the 
potential of mediation when conceptualised as a tool for conflict transformation, and refocused 
on changing the nature of conflict relationships at their core.  
When seen as a tool for conflict transformation, the process of mediation becomes the focus. 
It is recognised that even if parties fail to come to some kind of agreement, through the process 
of interaction that takes place during a mediation, issues can be clarified, opponents can be 
humanised, and partial agreements may be reached (Kressel, 2006:732; Ramsbotham et al, 
2016:219). It is interesting to note that even an author such as Mitchell (1981:313) who fits in 
to the more ‘traditional’ problem-solving approach, also recognises the potential of mediation 
to have process-based effects such as providing new perspectives and redefining the nature of 
the problem among the parties themselves. This suggests that those who in the past assumed 
the problem-solving nature of the mechanism may in fact have recognised its extended 
potential to advance conflict transformation, but have been limited by the scope of mediation 
literature being produced at the time.           
2.4.2 Resolution vs. Transformation 
The question may be asked whether it is necessary to introduce another concept so similar in 
nature to that of ‘conflict resolution’. Akin to transformation, resolution as opposed to mere 
management or ‘settlement’ is intended to provide a more permanent solution to the problem 
causing conflict (Burton, 1988:2). Tillett and French (2010:2) define conflict resolution as “a 
multidisciplinary, analytical, problem-solving approach to conflict that seeks to enable the 
participants to work collaboratively towards its resolution.” In this sense, although the concept 
of resolution does imply more of a collaborative approach, directed at longer-term 




catch-all phrase, including every possible response to conflict regardless of specific aim and 
objective.    
The most important distinction between resolution and transformation in the context of this 
study however is its continued focus on outcomes of conflict responses. Conflict resolution 
approaches argue that conflicts based on fundamental human needs cannot be compromised 
but that it is possible to transcend conflicts if parties are able to “explore, analyse, question and 
reframe their positions and interests” (Miall, 2004:70). Resolution in its commonly accepted 
sense does not extend as far into recognition of relational aspects of conflict as does 
transformation. Conflict transformation turns away from a focus on outcomes completely, 
instead aiming to engage with and transform the patterns of conflictual relationships that extend 
beyond the particular site of the conflict. This paradigm extends to the very foundations of 
conflict, recognising the possible need to transform the very constitution of society and the 
power dynamics upon which it is built (Miall, 2004:70).   
The shift towards a transformation paradigm comes as a result of the changed nature of 
contemporary conflicts as discussed above. Contemporary violent conflicts are asymmetric, in 
other words they are often marked by inequalities of power and status between disputants. They 
are often protracted, and do not follow the cyclical or bell-shaped models of conflict phasing. 
Finally, because they are protracted, contemporary conflicts severely warp the societies, 
economies and regions in which they are situated (Miall, 2004:69). Therefore while conflict 
resolution could encompass any project aimed at resolving any aspect or manifestation of 
conflict, transformation is specifically conceptualised in response to the contemporary nature 
of conflicts in deeply divided societies.      
2.4.3 Concepts of Transformation and Transitional Societies 
In moving towards a transformation paradigm, as has already been alluded to, the priorities of 
a resolution mechanism shift. Transformation initiatives are more likely to be located in the 
post-war phase, when societies are transitioning from civil war or authoritarian rule and are 
involved in the process of societal reconstruction. A new set of literature includes new concepts 
that are worthwhile mentioning, particularly in the field of conflict transformation. These 
concepts include reconciliation, justice, truth, and peace, the definitions of which are all highly 
contested. Although there is not sufficient space in this study to address each of these concepts 
in their entireties, some important points may be raised in their relation to the overall project 





In most sources concerning conflict transformation, there will inevitably be some mention of 
the term ‘reconciliation’ and its importance in a process of societal transition. Assefa 
(2015:237) describes reconciliation as an approach that “tries to find solutions to the issues 
underlying the conflict but also works to alter the adversaries’ relationships from that of 
resentment and hostility to friendship and harmony.” He goes on to state that the main 
difference between reconciliation and other forms of conflict management and resolution is the 
voluntary admission of responsibility and guilt. In this way interactions between parties are not 
intended to be adversarial, communicating one’s own grievances against the actions of the 
other, but are also an act of self-reflection recognising one’s own role in the dynamic of the 
conflict (Assefa, 2015:240).   
In line with the previously mentioned issue of coercive mediation resulting in the break-down 
of agreements, Assefa (2015:241) states that admission of guilt or acceptance of responsibility 
based on coercion is unlikely to sustain enduring conflict transformation. Endurance of the 
changed relationship relies on self-reflection and self-criticism, thus recognising and redefining 
one’s own role in the conflict. This point will become important in a conceptualisation of 
‘transformative mediation’ discussed in the next section of this chapter.           
The conceptualisation of reconciliation provided by Assefa reflects a common theory of 
reconciliation as a somewhat idealistic goal of harmony and friendship. Particularly in societies 
that have experienced extreme violent conflict, this kind of reconciliation may be an 
impractical expectation. Both Little (2017) and Maddison (2017) support what they deem to 
be a more realistic conceptualisation of reconciliation that recognises its inevitable failure. 
These authors both accept conflict as ever-present and claim that it is important to recognise 
this fact when opening up space for conflictual engagement. 
As stated by Maddison (2017:156), reconciliation politics, much like mediation projects, are 
often approached with “simplicity and impatience”, aiming for efficiency as opposed to 
effectiveness. While this is not only an unrealistic approach to the resolution of deep-seated 
divisions, it also threatens to drive these conflicts underground from whence they are bound to 
resurface even more fierce than before.    
In a discussion quite relevant to the reality of deeply divided societies, Little (2017:201) argues 
that “instead of construing reconciliation as a harmonious and/or consensual accommodation 




social relations change over time in negative as well as positive ways” (original emphasis). As 
opposed to the individualistic concentration of many resolution initiatives, this argument 
suggests that reconciliatory efforts should rather focus on the social and structural effects that 
might be possible in a reconciliatory project.  
Particularly in the case of intrastate conflict, reconciliation in this way could be understood as 
coexistence, accommodation or toleration, but does not require a forced model of assimilation, 
integration, absorption or unification (Daly & Sarkin, 2007:205). Reconciliation understood in 
this way fits directly into the transformation paradigm in which “the capacity to live with 
apparent contradictions and paradoxes lies at the heart” (Lederach, 2003:52). Projects need not 
set arguably unrealistic goals of a harmonious ideal13, but instead could aim for disputants’ 
recognition of one another as a ‘moral equal’, part of a shared community but still accepting 
difference (Maddison, 2017:161; Becorpi, 2018:107).    
In this way, reconciliation practices could benefit from moving away from a Western ideal of 
individualism and towards the community identity evident in many African societies. The 
individual is defined through their community and thus “this network of mutuality makes 
reconciliation at the group level indispensable” (Daly & Sarkin, 2007:68). According to Zehr 
(2004:309) processes of conflict transformation should explicitly be based on a common set of 
underlying values – respect, humility, empowerment, and engagement. These are said to reflect 
a worldview based on interconnectedness. In this way the community identity such as 
evidenced in Africa should be emphasised as an asset in the project of peacebuilding.       
Finally, Little (2017:208) states that reconciliation cannot be viewed with an all or nothing 
approach when evaluating its success or failure. Reconciliation efforts may ‘fail’ at both the 
individual and societal level, but in some way still have contributed to the process of 
reconciliation as a whole. In this way it is “learning from failure rather than success that is the 
key dynamic in the development of reconciliation policy” (Little, 2017:207). If mediation is to 
be construed as a tool for conflict transformation, it should be viewed in this same light, 
discarding the ‘all or nothing’ agenda of the traditional settlement-focused approach and 
instead looking to its potential in incremental transformation of conflict causes. 
 





A point of contention in projects aimed at reconciliation and conflict transformation is the 
pursuit of justice. Particularly in deeply divided societies in which violent conflict has taken 
place, there is a dire need for reconciliation in the national reconstruction project however 
terrible crimes will have been committed for which many will seek justice. Reconciliation and 
justice are often seen to have a dichotomous relationship, with the assumption that 
reconciliation cannot be achieved if justice is pursued, but that reconciliation without justice 
leads to impunity, encouraging similar behaviours in the future and belittling victims’ suffering 
(Assefa, 2015:241).  
However, this dichotomy is not necessarily insurmountable, and reconciliation may rely on the 
way justice is sought. For example, legal trials may be able to promote reconciliation if they 
are conducted in an unbiased manner, aimed at holding those responsible for human rights 
abuses accountable, and not simply as a tool to make scapegoats out of the losing side (Daly & 
Sarkin, 2007:15). However, in order to contribute to a broader transformation of conflict, 
justice must move past the pursuit of an admission of guilt and punishment according to the 
law, the kind of punitive justice pervasive in Western legal systems. As with problem-solving 
mediation, this approach does not take into account the disputants’ feelings towards one 
another (Assefa, 2015:242). This brings the discussion to a distinction in the literature 
concerning transitional societies between retributive and restorative justice.   
Restorative justice is said to have “direct parallels” in the movement for reconciliation through 
an inclusive, participatory system including victims, perpetrators and the wider community 
(Daly & Sarkin, 2007:14). Characteristics that the two are said to share are goals of healing the 
victim, education of society, and helping perpetrators reintegrate; being a forward-looking 
mechanism for dealing with the past (constructive/transformative not punitive/retributive); and 
avoiding the stigmatisation and alienation that characterise penal justice (Daly & Sarkin, 
2007:15). Restorative justice as a conceptual framework is able to shift the focus from 
wrongdoing and justice to harms, needs and obligations, especially emphasizing engagement 
and empowerment (Zehr, 2004:306).         
Considering the changed nature of conflict and its involvement of civilians, not only is it 
difficult to determine who exactly were victims and perpetrators, but also how to deal with the 
‘grey zone’ of members of the public who may not have participated directly but benefitted 




collaborative process focused on recognition of harms and obligations, the project of seeking 
justice is less of a dichotomy with reconciliation as there is a mutual recognition of past wrong 
on all sides, and a forward-looking approach including the peacebuilding responsibilities of all 
involved (Zehr, 2004:307).      
This is generally the aim of Truth Commissions, to pursue the ‘truth’ and through this process 
seek a form of restorative justice. The mission for the South African TRC was in fact based on 
a conceptual framework of restorative justice (Zehr, 2004:307). In many cases truth 
commissions are able to obtain voluntary acknowledgement of guilt by offenders, part of the 
process of self-reflection said to be necessary in a process of reconciliation. However, the 
problem with these commissions is often a lack of sincere remorse, along with a lack of 
deliberate attempts to repair the relationship between offenders and victims (Assefa, 2015:242).       
2.4.3.3 Truth 
With regards to the concepts of ‘truth’ and ‘justice’, Little (2017:206) states that processes 
aimed at achieving these ends are “little more than fact-finding exercises”, to be carried out by 
policing and courts of law. The contribution of these processes towards the transformation of 
societal conflict can be debated especially considering the fact that a universal ‘truth’ is 
unlikely to ever be found. Inevitably different worldviews and experiences mean that the ‘truth’ 
of the past will look different to every individual that lived through it (Maddison, 2017:163). 
Each individual’s ‘truth’ is their own personal narrative which plays an important role in 
conflict transformation, trauma recovery and restorative justice. ‘Truth-telling’ processes may 
then be better conceptualised as ‘storytelling’, opportunities for which should be incorporated 
into peacebuilding processes (Zehr, 2004:308). 
This difference in ‘truth’ can prove problematic in transformative approaches as opposing sides 
simply have different views on where the divisive relationship stems from. In the case of 
victim-perpetrator conflict, perpetrators may be unable to admit guilt in the way victims would 
like as they genuinely do not accept their actions as wrong in the same way that victims view 
them (Daly & Sarkin, 2007:72). Conflict is not purely based on reality and facts, but also on 
perceptions and feelings (Tillett & French, 2010:2). Therefore, a conflict response assuming to 
be able to find the ‘truth’ of the situation fails to acknowledge that often the factual ‘truth’ 
matters less than the parties’ perceptions thereof.    
What mediation and the presence of a third-party could offer in approaching this difficulty is 




expectations they should or should not have of the process (Daly & Sarkin, 2007:76). In this 
way the mediation project could provide the space for constructive engagement and small, 
incremental transformations in disputants’ definitions of self and other.     
The model of Narrative Mediation is one in which the space for storytelling and the creation 
of a communal ‘truth’ could be achieved through a mediation process. This kind of mediation 
developed in the mid-1980s out of an interest in post-modernism and social constructivism, in 
other words looking at how meaning can be created through language and subjective 
interpretation of ‘facts’ (Hansen, 2004:297). The approach rejects the tendency of problem-
solving approaches to separate content and process, and instead recognises both as part of the 
meaning-making system (Hansen, 2004:300).  
Narrative Mediation consists of three phases: engagement, deconstruction of the conflict-
saturated story, and construction of an alternative story (Hansen, 2004:302). In this way the 
process pulls apart old ways of thinking, challenging each sides’ deepest assumptions about 
the conflict and about themselves, and deconstructing even the underlying power dynamics 
inherent in the conflict relationship. Then a collaborative process is undergone to construct a 
new narrative of the conflict based on the integrated perspectives of the adversaries. The unique 
outcomes of this approach are said to be the potential to evoke acknowledgement of and 
empathy for the situation and problems of the opposing side (Hansen, 2004:304).      
2.4.3.4 Peace 
The elusive concept of ‘peace’ can also be raised here as mediation through a conflict 
transformation lens could be argued to bring about a more constructive ‘peace’ than the 
ceasefires and settlements of traditional mediation. Curle (2015:219) distinguishes between 
‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peace, the former being the absence of overt conflict and the latter 
being a more constructive conceptualisation including “active association, planned cooperation 
and intelligent efforts to forestall or resolve potential conflicts.” When understood as a concept 
for the transformation of conflict relationships, mediation has the potential to bring about 
positive peace as the conflict at its core is no longer evident in the same way as it was before 
the project was undertaken.   
The post-Cold War context again becomes important here, as it was the movement towards a 
liberal peacebuilding project that allowed for the rethinking of conflict resolution mechanisms 
as broad-based transformation projects. The failures of the Cold War era had proven that simple 




interrupt the cycle of conflict and bring about positive peace (Helman & Ratner, 1993:7). The 
international community recognised the need for a more systematic approach, to be 
championed by the United Nations. In the early-to-mid-1990s following the fall of 
Communism, a liberal agenda including democratisation and more open economic policies had 
been presented as a kind of “magical formula” for positive peace (Paris, 2010:338). This 
assumption of peace following liberalisation was challenged by continued state failure in 
countries such as Cambodia and Angola despite attempts at liberal reform, and remains a 
debated issue (Paris, 2010:341). However, this context is important as it allowed for a 
rethinking of the conflict resolution process beyond the end of open combat.     
In his ‘Agenda for Peace’ report, presented in June 1992, former UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali highlighted the need in a post-Cold War world for efforts of ‘preventive 
diplomacy’, ‘peacemaking’, and ‘peacekeeping’, but also added the concept of ‘post-conflict 
peace-building’. Following the newer international focus on issues of human security, Boutros-
Ghali (1992:3) asserted that the threats to human life created by conflict could no longer be 
limited to consequences of military engagement. His introduction of the concept of post-
conflict peacebuilding followed this assertion, as he argued durable peace requires the 
identification and support of structures that will strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid 
conflict relapses (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:6). Conflict resolution thereby necessarily includes 
institutions that are dedicated to structural and systemic change in the affected nation.         
Returning to the practice of mediation specifically, Boutros-Ghali (1992:11) did follow the 
trend of positioning mediation within the peacemaking paradigm, discussing the mechanism as 
a tool for reaching settlement. However, if a distinction is made between peacekeeping, 
peacemaking and peacebuilding, mediation within a paradigm of conflict transformation could 
be situated in the field of ‘peacebuilding’. Although discussions around these efforts do tend 
to include a more structural approach than mediation is intended to achieve, projects aimed at 
peacebuilding are “initiated to deal with the underlying problems or basic needs of the parties 
to the dispute, to foster conditions that enhance the likelihood that the dispute will not escalate 
or re-escalate to military hostilities, and to enhance the likelihood that the dispute will be 
peacefully settled by the parties” (Mullenbach, 2006:56). Therefore if mediation is 
reconceptualised to focus on affecting the relational interaction between disputants, it may be 




2.4.4 Theories of Transformative Mediation 
As illustrated by the discussion of conflict transformation and its differing aims to practices of 
resolution and management above, “transformative” theorists regard conflict as a social 
phenomenon, not only concerned with rights, interests or power but rather with peoples’ 
interactions as human beings (Bush & Pope, 2002:72-73). This requires a re-evaluation of the 
mediation mechanism, as different foci will require a different approach in how a mediation 
project is conducted. This section addresses two theories for this refocused form of mediation, 
both of which provide vital insights into the make-up of a transformative approach to mediation 
projects.    
2.4.4.1 Bush and Folger’s Transformative Mediation 
Two authors who are regarded as the pioneers in the conceptualisation of transformative 
mediation are Bush and Folger in their book titled The Promise of Mediation: The 
Transformative Approach to Conflict, first published in 1994 with a second edition published 
in 2005. In this book the authors discuss four ‘stories’ of mediation, the satisfaction story, the 
social justice story, the oppression story and the transformation story. The last, and most 
emphasized story is that of transformation, in which the focus is on empowering the individual 
and inspiring in them recognition and empathy. What follows is a discussion of the reasoning 
behind this new approach and a description of these main transformative processes.   
As initially discussed, it is believed that parties use mediators for reasons such as saving money, 
avoiding formal legal systems, hoping to achieve a fair resolution and restoring a working 
relationship for the future. However, it could be argued that these motivations reflect a deeper 
reasoning for parties to turn to a mediator, that of wanting to find a new mode of dealing with 
their conflict in which they feel more involved in and in control of the process (Bush & Pope, 
2002:68).  
Bush and Pope (2002:71-72) discuss an interesting observation they have made from their 
careers as mediators in varied settings. They state that in most cases they have found that the 
part disputants find most difficult about conflict is not their frustration in achieving satisfaction 
of a right or interest, but is the way the conflict makes them behave towards themselves and 
others. Disputants illustrate feelings of alienation from their own sense of self and from their 




Transformative mediation aims to address the ‘interactional crisis’ that is said to be ignored by 
problem-solving approaches. This crisis is a result of a cycle of two feelings in the disputants 
brought about by conflict, the feelings of weakness and self-absorption. First, conflict brings a 
feeling of weakness, or losing control over both the situation and oneself, resulting in 
confusion, doubt, uncertainty and indecisiveness (Bush & Pope, 2002:73). Then, as each party 
feels weakened they become more focused on themselves, with an instinct towards self-
defence, suspicion, hostility and closing themselves off to the perspective of the other. These 
two feelings are said to then reinforce one another in a cycle of disempowerment and 
demonization that scholars refer to as ‘conflict escalation’ (Bush & Pope, 2002:74).  
When parties approach a mediator at the point of a ‘mutually-hurting stalemate’, this could also 
be understood then as the point at which this downward spiral of mutual alienation and 
destruction has degenerated to such an extent that parties recognise they need help in order to 
reverse the cycle (Bush & Pope, 2002:75). This is where the mediator steps in with a process 
of ‘transformative mediation’.     
What is required in order to reverse this cycle is a movement from weakness to strength, and 
self-absorption to responsiveness (Bush & Pope, 2002:80). This movement is said to be 
achieved through Bush and Folger’s (1994, 2005) processes of ‘empowerment’ and 
‘recognition’. In the literature concerning non-traditional forms of mediation, Bush and 
Folger’s work is considered a seminal text, with these two processes defining a mediation 
approach that achieves the full ‘promise’ of mediation in transforming the “quality of conflict 
interaction itself, so that conflicts can actually strengthen both the parties themselves and the 
society they are part of” (Bush & Folger, 2005:13).  
Through empowerment the individual is able to restore their sense of value and capacity, 
encouraging feelings of strength where there were feelings of weakness. Through recognition 
the individual is pulled out of their state of self-absorption and encouraged to see the conflict 
through the perspective of their adversary, recognising their differing perspectives and 
inspiring a kind of empathy and openness towards them (Bush & Folger, 2005:14-15). The idea 
of ‘recognition’ fits well with Maddison’s (2017:161) argument related above that 
reconciliation could amount to disputants’ recognition of one another as a ‘moral equal’. In this 
way mediation forms part of a process of transformation as the foundations upon which the 
conflict was built that form the ‘interactional crisis’ begin to transform and regenerate (Bush 




While it has been argued that mediation is not intended to be psychotherapy (Kressel, 
2006:729), this does not necessarily limit the potential impact it can have on the individual. 
Ramsbotham et al (2016:208) make an interesting point that true resolution of conflict cannot 
rely on the ability of the mediator to appeal to actors’ humanity, but requires a fundamental 
shift in parties’ interests, goals and self-definitions. This points to the fact that this kind of 
mediation is not necessarily a naively optimistic, heart-warming project, and does not expect 
disputants to leave hand-in-hand but is a process of relational change that has the potential to 
change fundamental individual definitions of self and other. This links to Assefa’s (2015:241) 
discussion of the place of self-reflection in processes of reconciliation. 
As has been mentioned in terms of a transformation approach to resolving conflict, the goal in 
transformative mediation is incremental movement in the processes of empowerment and 
recognition, regardless of how small or insignificant the shifts may seem (Bush & Pope, 
2002:82). In this way the mediator’s role and the value they add to the process is in helping the 
parties “make positive interactional shifts … by supporting the exercise of their capacities for 
strength and responsiveness through their deliberation, decision-making, communication, 
perspective-taking, and other party activities” (Bush & Pope, 2002:83-84).   
2.4.4.2 Lederach’s Mediative Capacity 
Another author who has been integral to the development of the conflict transformation 
paradigm is John Paul Lederach. Two of his more well-known publications, Preparing for 
Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures (1995) and Building Peace: Sustainable 
Reconciliation in Divided Societies (1997) are both widely cited in discussions of mediation 
and its reconciliatory potential. His 1997 volume is said to provide one of the most 
comprehensive statements of conflict transformation thinking for practitioners. Lederach 
advocates for the broad approach of a project in conflict transformation, addressing changes in 
personal, structural, relational and cultural aspects of conflict thereby transforming a war 
system into a peace system (Miall, 2004:73).  
Lederach’s (1997:25) description of reconciliation as a place is a point most relevant to this 
study. He describes reconciliation as a social space in which Truth, Mercy, Justice and Peace 




transformation and addresses all the above-discussed concepts of importance in transitional 
societies, Lederach’s reconciliatory ‘space’ provides a fantastic framework14.  
However, besides these seminal works, in an article entitled Building Mediative Capacity in 
Deep-Rooted Conflict (2002), Lederach presents a theory of transformative mediation that 
could prove even more important to this study and provides the foundation off which the 
proposed model of mediation for conflict transformation will be based. Lederach (2002:91) 
argues that traditional ideas of mediator role and purpose are insufficient in contemporary 
conflicts, particularly in cases of protracted conflict. His solution is institutionalising what he 
calls ‘social mediative capacity’, an approach aimed at taking relationships defined by cycles 
of violence and turning them into new modalities of nonviolent interaction. This stands in direct 
opposition to the problem-solving approach but aligns with Bush and Folger’s transformative 
approach by placing the focus of mediation on disputant relationships, which were considered 
entirely unimportant in the more traditional approaches.  
In this approach to mediation, the expectations of a mediators’ role are necessarily changed. In 
building a space with ‘social mediative capacity’ Lederach (2002:92) discerns that the 
responsibilities of the mediator can no longer be delineated into specific sets of action by a 
single person or institution, but constitute a ‘constructive change process’ with a focus on 
impacting the relational interaction between disputants rather than specificity of outcomes. 
Furthermore, in terms of the location of the mediation process, as protracted conflict permeates 
the whole of society, Lederach (2002:93) asserts that mediation efforts cannot be confined to 
direct dialogue between high-level political and military elites.  
An example Lederach (1997) provides in one of his earlier works is worthwhile mentioning 
here as it is illustrative of the potential effectiveness of creating a so-called mediative ‘space’. 
He discusses the example of an Israeli-PLO agreement made in 1993 involving mid-level 
officials who stayed together at a summer lodge during the negotiation process. These officials 
slept under the same roof, ate their meals together, and spent time interacting as individuals 
and not simply as political adversaries. This allowed the space for developing a true 
recognition15 and understanding of one another’s perspectives, and created a tone of acceptance 
and cooperation, as opposed to one of competition (Lederach, 1997:25). Although these talks 
were still conducted by mid-level elites with the purpose of reaching an agreement, the success 
 
14 For a brief comparison of the reconciliation approaches of South Africa and Rwanda based on Lederach’s 4-
part reconciliation theory see Wielenga (2011).   




of these talks in achieving a cooperative environment and constructive, forward-looking 
decisions made, highlights the importance of altering disputant relationships.    
2.5 Mediation as a Context-Specific Process 
A final important point to consider regarding the changed nature of mediation theory is the 
contemporary notion in general third-party literature that different conflicts at different points 
in time will require more than one unified method of intervention (Fisher, 2011:158). This is 
stressed by authors identifying conflict to be a dynamic process and thus the need for conflict 
responses to change shape parallel to these shifting dynamics (Ramsbotham et al, 2016:206; 
Bercovitch, 1996:4) 
According to Bercovitch and Houston (1996:15), the success of the mediation is above all 
reliant on its ability to be “adaptive and responsive” to the wider conflict context. It must 
include all actors, issues and perspectives, adapting as and when these change over time.  
Kressel (2006:738) argues that differences among mediators are shaped by the social context 
within which they operate and the types of dispute they handle. He states that in this sense all 
mediation is in fact “local” because it is shaped by the context in which it is practiced. Thus 
the content of the negotiations, the mediator’s role and the strategies they employ should all 
reflect and be shaped by the conflict in which they operate.    
When considering the context of the conflict, there must be a cognisance of the societal, 
regional as well as international levels that may influence a peacebuilding project. Furthermore, 
while being aware of the changing dynamics of the conflict at present, taking context into 
consideration also requires addressing the historical background, particularly in the case of 
protracted conflict where attitudes disputants may have towards one another are shaped by 
previous interaction (Miall, 2004:75-76).   
Similarly, as discussed regarding the role of the mediator, Wehr and Lederach (1996:72) assert 
that mediators should be chosen based on the context of the conflict. Particularly with regards 
to traditional communities, their work in the Esquipulas case in Nicaragua suggested that 
choosing the mediator based on the values and norms of society can be an important ingredient 
for success.  
2.5.1 Traditional African Conflict Resolution Mechanisms 
An awareness of context is particularly important for this study and its focus on conflict 




and ethnic groups on the continent, one would be remiss in attempting to discern a ubiquitous 
form of African conflict resolution. However, despite differing approaches, there are  
similarities in the underlying values attached to many African dispute resolution mechanisms.  
The most important characteristic of many African nations that forms the foundation of their 
responses to conflict is the overriding value placed on community. Given the tight-knit nature 
of African nations that lived communal lives with scarce resources, it is logical that conflict 
would arise and require a process aimed at restoring social harmony (Skelton, 2007:231). As 
the conflict affects the community as a whole, community ownership of the process is stressed 
and seen as a common duty. This communal responsibility becomes important in the case of 
individual crimes, as those closely associated with the perpetrator are seen as responsible for 
compensation, which is owed to all those associated with the victim of the crime (Skelton, 
2007:237).   
Particularly interesting for the purposes of this study is the fact that mediation, in various 
shapes and sizes, appears as a primary traditional dispute-settling tool (Olowu, 2018:12). Most 
traditional African societies are governed by some form of chieftaincy, with a group of elders 
forming a body of community authorities. These elders, whether they be lineage title holders, 
priests, traditional warrior chiefs or skilled personas, usually take on the role of mediators 
facilitating processes of deliberation, negotiation and reflection (Olowu, 2018:12; Bukari, 
2013:89). As is suggested by the earlier discussions of the Insider-Partial mediator, these 
mediators hold credibility leverage by virtue of their position in society, which leads disputants 
to accept their direction more readily than if the mediators were outsiders.  
Several examples of such traditional African conflict resolution mechanisms can be outlined. 
The Barolong people of the North-West province in South Africa are a nation committed to 
dialogue and healing frayed relationships through restoring dignity and respect for all 
individuals involved in a dispute (Olowu, 2018:13). Peace talks take the form of kgotla 
(communal meetings) in which negotiations lead to informal but concrete bargains, formulated 
with the holistic wellbeing of the community as the primary focal point.  
Pastoralist societies in Kenya also present an example of negotiations led by elders in which a 
communal spirit is stressed. In cases of individual crimes, the entire kin group of the defector 
is held responsible for the crime, as the kin are expected to ensure their members abide by 




to define its boundaries and strengthen internal group relations, while re-establishing peace 
between the two groups (Chopra, 2010:104).  
A further example of mediated negotiations can be found in the Southern Sahelian Belt of 
Sudan. These negotiations take the form of goodiya (also known as judiya/judiyya) in which 
an ajawi (a single mediator) or ajaweed (a group of mediators) lead reconciliation conferences 
(Bronkhorst, 2011:35). These conferences do not include the community participation of the 
above-mentioned examples, but include a variety of concerned parties, dignitaries and tribal 
leaders. These parties work together to provide solutions to the disputants and rarely reach 
official conflict resolution channels as community norms dictate outside intervention in local 
affairs to be shameful (Bronkhorst, 2011:35).    
Another important part of many African conflict resolution mechanisms is the prevalence of 
symbolic rituals. An example of which can be found with the Kusasi people of the Bawku 
chieftaincy in Northern Uganda, who have a process of conflict resolution founded on their 
worship of the earth-god. The first stage of this process includes blood-collecting and 
cleansing, in which animals are sacrificed to pacify the land in which human lives were lost to 
the conflict. The sacrificed animal is often roasted and eaten by the conflicting parties to signify 
a common effort towards creating peace (Bukari, 2013:98). The second stage involves the 
burial of an okro stalk as an agreement between the disputing factions and the earth-god to 
cease bloodshed on the earth. Finally, a ceremony of merry making is conducted, during which 
the parties come together to celebrate and declare their support for peace in the area (Bukari, 
2013:99). This example shows the deep connection of the community to their land, and also to 
one another, as each stage of the process requires an acknowledgement of the earth-god, and 
an act of coming together to commit to change.   
The Acholi people of Northern Uganda present a further example of the importance of rituals 
through their dispute resolution mechanism of Mato Oput. This mechanism pre-dates the 
colonial period and is based upon the principle of consensus-building (Murithi, 2006). As the 
aim is communal consensus, the entire community is involved in the public assemblies known 
as Kacoke Madit. In a process similar to that of the gacaca case analysed in this study, these 
assemblies allowed for community members to voice their opinions, ask questions of the 
disputing parties, and make suggestions to the council of elders presiding over the process 
(Murithi, 2006). Once compensation is agreed upon, the ceremony of Mato Oput is performed 




to transcending the bitterness in their minds during the conflict, and thereby restoring harmony 
and trust (Murithi, 2006).  
As these examples illustrate, despite the presence of many different cultures, there are certain 
fundamental values evident in African communities that result in similar traditional conflict 
resolution mechanisms across the continent. These mechanisms can for the most part be 
compared to modern restorative justice processes, in which the need for community 
reconciliation and restoration of social harmony takes precedence over individual punishment 
and assignment of guilt (Skelton, 2007:230; Olowu, 2018:14). This presents these traditional 
mechanisms as particularly relevant in discussions of conflict transformation, where 
adversarial relationship change is the focus, as opposed to the simple compromise of disputant 
interests. Given this context, Africa appears as a fertile testing-ground for mediation 
approaches aimed at conflict transformation, as this is already the tradition of many African 
nations. This gives pertinence to the cases selected for this study and validates the African 
continent as a prime region for such testing.              
2.6 Analytical Framework: A ‘Process-Based’ Mediation Model 
Having provided a broad conceptual and theoretical framework for the resolution approach that 
is mediation, it becomes clear that there are many points of contention when defining a 
mediation project. However, the focal point for this study, and the primary point of dispute it 
aims to contribute to, is the assumption of an outcomes-focus in the practice of mediation. By 
refocusing the intent of the mediation tool away from the signing of peace agreements and 
towards engendering deeper conflict transformation through the process of mediation, 
regardless of its outcomes, this study aims to contribute to a newer theory of mediation.      
In order to provide reasoning for this newer theory, a model of this type of mediation must be 
delineated, to provide a basic analytical framework for the comparative case studies to be 
performed. Each characteristic in this model is chosen based on the surveyed literature and thus 
deemed important in a mediation project aimed at conflict transformation in deeply divided 
societies. These characteristics are focused on the process of the mediation, in particular the 
extent to which relational interaction at a community level is engaged with. In this way the 
study fits into a newer trend in comparative case study research, in which less time is spent on 
“correlating inputs and outcomes,… absent effects, non-instances, or control cases”, and more 
time is spent on understanding “how perceptions, processes, communications, and grievances 




This analytical framework will provide basic categories into which the qualitative data will be 
‘coded’ and thereby cases may be constructed. ‘Coding’ the data in qualitative studies requires 
identifying themes or categories into which the data may be divided (Creswell, 2014:200). The 
basic framework of themes to be used in the ‘coding’ of this study consists of five 
characteristics. These characteristics form the ‘process-based’ mediation theory that will then 
be applied to the two cases.   
The first of these characteristics (other than the basic requirement of a third-party mediator) is 
the involvement of the wider community in the mediation project. As conflict no longer equates 
to war across international borders but is found within nations and in urban centres involving 
civilians as both victims and perpetrators, disputants in deeply divided societies must continue 
to live alongside one another once the active conflict has ended (Assefa, 2015:239). Thus, in 
order to precipitate the kind of reconciliation needed to overcome the deep-rooted causes of 
conflict, national conflict resolution approaches can no longer be limited to elite-level 
discussion. By conducting an inclusive, community-based project, a shared space is created 
that reflects a tangible manifestation of the reconciliatory recognition of one another as ‘moral 
equals’ and part of a shared community (Maddison, 2017:161). Furthermore, this fits the 
project into the transformation paradigm by facilitating restorative justice, in which a 
participatory system includes victims, perpetrators and the wider community (Daly & Sarkin, 
2007:14). 
The second characteristic is the creation of a context-specific project. As conflict is a dynamic 
process and heavily influenced by both the past and present circumstances in which it exists, 
the conflict response must be adaptive and responsive to these realities (Bercovitch & Houston, 
1996:15). Particularly as this study focuses on projects to be carried out in the context of the 
African continent, there are unique historical features in every nation that one would expect to 
have deeply influenced the conflicts that manifested, and thus would have to be heeded in the 
formulation of the conflict response.  
The next characteristic included in this theory is the presence of an ‘Insider-Partial’ mediator 
(Wehr & Lederach, 1996:58-59). While the role, bias and partiality of the mediator are all 
heavily debated concepts in the mediation literature, this non-traditional approach to mediator 
positioning is said to be particularly suited to societies with community-based norms and values 
such as those exhibited in many African societies. This mediator is drawn from the conflicted 




and has extensive contextual knowledge to assist in achieving this goal. These traits provide 
the mediator with credibility leverage within the local community. Given the evidence found 
that ‘biased’ mediators are not necessarily detrimental to the success of a mediation project 
(Wehr & Lederach, 199:58-59; Touval & Zartman, 1985:8-9; Svensson, 2009), practitioners 
need not shy away from involving local actors as mediators. Especially considering the 
community-centric element to this approach, having the proceedings be conducted by a trusted 
individual with an embedded understanding of the deep divisions causing conflictual 
relationships could provide a more encouraging and constructive mediative space.   
The fourth important characteristic is that of minimal resource pressure. Shortage of resources 
dedicated to mediation projects and the resultant limits on project duration places pressure on 
the process as a whole that threatens the potential for durable transformation of conflict 
(Pinfari, 2011; Beardsley, 2008). In allowing for a longer duration of projects with an agenda 
focused on extensive storytelling, disputants are afforded the time and space to present their 
own perspectives and engage in a process of recognition of the opposing side and their differing 
conflict narrative. 
The fifth, final and most important characteristic of this kind of mediation project is that of a 
focus on disputant relationships. This focus is the element that most obviously situates the 
project within the field of conflict transformation, by extending the aims of the conflict 
response beyond settlement and the cessation of violence, towards creating a social space for 
incremental shifts in the quality of relational interaction between disputants (Lederach, 
2002:92). It is under this characteristic that the themes of reconciliation, peace and restorative 
justice all become vital to the process of the mediation and the goals it sets out to achieve. The 
important elements to consider here are the mediator’s approach at addressing the ‘interactional 
crisis’ between disputants through a process of empowerment and recognition (Bush & Folger, 
1994) and thereby creating a social mediative space in which constructive change can take 
place (Lederach, 2002). 
Once the cases have been described and deciphered according to this model of ‘process-based’ 
mediation, the discussion must turn to the extent to which the projects were ‘successful’ in 
transforming conflict. Measuring mediation success has been accepted by scholars in the field 
as a difficult endeavour (Ramsbotham et al., 2016:218), and this is arguably the reason for the 
outcomes-based focus of many studies16 that this research aims to dispute. Thus, in turning 
 




away from the simple indicators of partial settlement, full settlement, ceasefire, or outright 
failure, this study will use the case design and comparative methodology to build a more 
complex picture of the projects’ relative successes. As the research operates on the premise 
that conflict transformation as opposed to conflict settlement leads to more durable 
peacemaking through reconciliation of conflicted relationships, this picture of success will 
necessarily look at the state of both nations today and the extent to which it can be qualitatively 
affirmed that conflict has been transformed.       
2.7 Conclusion 
Considering the debates discussed in this chapter, it can be said that Moore’s (1986:14) 
definition stated at the outset reflects a certain theoretical framework and ideological 
foundation, and thus may not be an all-inclusive definition. Considering the developments in 
mediation theory, Kressel (2006:726) does provide a rather encompassing definition, stating 
mediation to be “a process in which disputants attempt to resolve their differences with the 
assistance of an acceptable third party.” This definition includes the major actors of a mediation 
process, disputants attempting to resolve their conflict and a third-party to assist them in doing 
so, however does not provide any insistence on the role of the mediator or an outcomes-based 
focus.  
The most important aspect of this definition and the reason it will take the place of the definition 
of mediation in this study is its description of mediation as a process. When viewing mediation 
as a tool for conflict transformation, this is arguably the most important component of the 
mediation project. If the process of the mediation, in the sense of managing and facilitating 
disputants’ relational interaction, could be the focus of mediation projects, its potential in 
transforming conflicts at their most fundamental level could be achieved.     
Perhaps what is needed is not an unrealistic agenda aimed at realising the elusive ideals of 
perfect ‘truth’, ‘justice’ and ‘peace’, but creating a political space that facilitates ongoing 
conversations about these concepts. In this way the focus as discussed above shifts from 
seeking tangible resolutions in the form of signed agreements signifying a now harmonious 
society, but recognition of the importance of ongoing, incremental transformations of relational 
engagement (Maddison, 2017:163).   
Furthermore, in light of the need to move away from the idea of mediation as an elite-level 
bargaining process and changing the mediator identity, it is possible to reconceptualise the 




multiple stakeholders with diverse perspectives to work together and can provide a framework 
for addressing conflict guided by the transformative ideological principles of social justice and 
social change (Kim, Jang & Kim, 2018:413). 
Thus, a process-based mediation project can be conceptualised, prioritising incremental shifts 
in the quality of relational interaction between disputants, constructing a common narrative, 
inspiring processes of recognition and empowerment in the individual, while also encouraging 
a collaborative, community-based initiative in a reconciliatory space. Ultimately this kind of 
mediation is intended not simply to manage conflict symptoms through interest-based 
compromises but to transform conflict at its fundamental root causes. This is the form of 
mediation that will be advocated in this study, and that will shape the comparison of the cases 
to be analysed. Having delineated an analytical framework in the form of a process-based 
mediation model, the study may proceed to the construction of these cases, the first step of 





CHAPTER THREE – HISTORICAL CONTEXTUALISATION OF RWANDA AND 
SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1 Introduction  
In order to build a complete picture of the conflict resolution projects to be analysed in this 
study, it is important to have an understanding of the history of the conflicts they were intended 
to combat. As discussed in Chapter One, the cases were chosen based on two focal criteria of 
the study’s model for process-based mediation. Both are examples of conflict resolution 
mechanisms in transitional societies that first, included the presence of a third-party mediator 
or mediating body, and second, had aims based on reconciliation, restorative justice and the 
creation of durable peace. The cases thereby chosen are the South African TRC and the 
Rwandan gacaca courts.   
Both South Africa and Rwanda experienced violent conflict based on racial or ethnic division. 
In both cases, as in most other African countries, this division was heavily influenced by 
colonial intervention. Each of the transitional projects was rooted in this historical context, with 
different approaches aimed at different process goals, however both with the overall aim of 
contributing to reconciliation within their respective citizenries. This chapter will provide an 
overview of these historical contexts, outlining how South Africa and Rwanda came to be 
deeply divided nations. This will then illustrate how their respective transitional projects were 
shaped by history and how they were intended to overcome these deeply rooted divisions.    
3.2 Gacaca – Rebuilding after Genocide in Rwanda  
3.2.1 Hutu vs Tutsi - A Colonial Divide? 
Rwandan society has been plagued by a clear societal divide that long preceded the nation’s 
civil war, the genocide and even colonial intervention. The deep division between the Hutus 
and Tutsis stands as the root cause of the genocide and much of the conflict experienced by 
Rwanda before this violent event. This ethnic divide was a pre-colonial social phenomenon 
based on divided economic activity, as historically the Tutsi were cattle-herders while the Hutu 
majority were peasants who cultivated the land (Prunier, 1995:5). Given the high value of 
cattle, the tension between the groups stemmed from control over this important resource by a 
small minority of Tutsi elite. By the beginning of the 19th century a socio-economic hierarchy 
had been established leaving all Hutu and a majority of Tutsi with lower status as clients in the 
ubuhake or cattle clientage system, and a small minority of Tutsi elite with most of the 




A further significant difference between the groups was physical, the Hutu being shorter and 
more thick-set, resembling neighbouring groups from Uganda and Tanganyika, while the Tutsi 
are generally thin and tall with angular facial features (Prunier, 1995:5). Besides being a clear 
visual differentiator between groups within the Rwandan population, this physical difference 
was imbued with ideas of superiority once colonial powers arrived in Africa.    
There is a tendency, shared by the current Rwandan government, to place blame on the colonial 
administration for allegedly infusing the terms Hutu and Tutsi with inequity. However, it may 
be more accurate to say that the Europeans failed to discourage the pre-existing division 
(Melvin, 2010:939). At the Berlin Conference of 1885 Germany took possession of Rwanda 
and Burundi, however the colony was lost to Belgium in 1918 (Melvin, 2010:938). The Belgian 
regime in particular used the existing ethnic hierarchy to gain some local support for colonial 
rule by affording political control and financial opportunities to a small portion of Tutsi elite. 
As a result of their physical differences and the preoccupation with the pseudo-science of racial 
difference at the time, the colonialists were “quite smitten” with the Tutsi, who resembled the 
European build (Prunier, 1995:6).    
The Tutsi soon became allies of the colonial settlers and came to be perceived by the Hutu as 
colonialists themselves (Drumbl, 2002:5). The constant European reinforcement of racial 
stereotypes during the period of colonial rule led to an inflation of Tutsi cultural ego on the one 
hand and the growth of “an aggressively resentful inferiority complex” among Hutu on the 
other (Prunier, 1995:9). This dynamic was upheld by colonial support of the Tutsis until the 
1950s when the Belgian authorities switched allegiances to the Hutu majority and anti-Tutsi 
violence was sparked. The colonial change in allegiance culminated in the Social Revolution 
of 1959, the first systematic violence against the Tutsis that lasted until 1967 and resulted in 
20 000 murders and the escape of 200 000 refugees (Melvin, 2010:939).     
In the intervening decades of Hutu control between independence in 1962 and the beginning 
of the civil war in 1990, many Tutsis lived as refugees in neighbouring countries such as 
Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi. Those who remained in-country 
faced constant persecution. This meant that when the Hutu government of Juvénal 
Habyarimana gained control of Rwanda in a bloodless coup on 5 July 1973, many were initially 
relieved. Under this new regime it seemed the Tutsi population would have some respite from 
ethnic oppression, as long as they remained outside of political life (Prunier, 1995:76). 




Habyarimana government, so while they were no longer contributing to violent persecution of 
the Tutsis, they were still simmering under the surface of Rwandan society. By the end of the 
1980s when the government’s power came to be threatened, these deeply rooted divisions 
resurfaced with more deadly consequences than before (Prunier, 1995:84-85).  
3.2.2 The Spring of 1994 
The Rwandan genocide was the culmination of four years of insurgency, which began with the 
invasion of Rwanda in 1990 led by the Tutsi-controlled Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the 
armed wing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and its leader, now President Paul Kagame 
(Buckley-Zistel, 2005:114; Melvin, 2010:933). Taking advantage of the insecurity of the 
Habyarimana regime during the period of 1988 to 1990, the RPA invasion was timed to help 
collapse the existing political structure (Prunier, 1995:90). On the 6th of April 1994, after four 
years of civil war, the spark that ignited the genocide was the assassination of President 
Habyarimana and Burundian President Ntaryamira when their aeroplane was shot down 
(Melvin, 2010:938). Despite a lack of evidence as to who was responsible for these deaths, 
Hutu extremists were quick to accuse the RPA of the assassinations and begin the massacre of 
the Tutsi population. Although the genocide was sparked by the President’s assassination, plans 
had been in place to carry it out for months before (Drumbl, 2002:6).  
The genocide would last for 100 terrifying days from April to June of 1994 (De Brouwer & 
Ruvebana, 2013:938). The killing was personal and did not stem from societal chaos, but from 
a shared Hutu belief that the world would be a better place if the Tutsis were exterminated. 
Population density coupled with prosperous agriculture had created a history of resource 
struggle. While the orders to kill came from political leaders, the reason so many ordinary 
citizens became involved was a belief that “there were too many people on too little land, and 
that with a reduction in their numbers, there would be more for the survivors” (Prunier, 1995:4). 
It was a physical, labour-intensive kind of violence and yet the number of deaths rose at nearly 
three times the rate of Jews during the Holocaust (Drumbl, 2002:8). The attacks were 
systematic and state-sanctioned, with the extremist Hutu government ordering neighbour to 
turn against neighbour, completely destroying the social fabric of Rwandan society, including 
the norms and values that underpin collective action and cooperation (Longman, 2009:305; 
Bowd, 2010:163).   
Most estimates situate the number of Tutsi and moderate Hutu deaths between 800 000 and 




and 500 000 (mostly Tutsi) girls and women, as well as boys and men were raped. Given that 
the population of Rwanda is estimated to have been around seven million in 1994 (De Brouwer 
& Ruvebana, 2013:938), the proportion of citizens killed and/or violently assaulted in the 
genocide is immense. It is relevant to note that this was not the first massacre of Tutsi citizens 
in Rwanda, with others having taken place such as the 10 000 Tutsis slaughtered between 
December 1963 and January 1964 (Prunier, 1995:56). The Tutsis had been in increasingly more 
danger from the 1950s when the Hutu population began to gain more favour with the colonial 
administration. The difference between these previous atrocities and the genocide of 1994 was 
that the culprit regime had always retained control of the country, thereby allowing offences to 
go unprosecuted and creating a culture of impunity (Buckley-Zistel, 2005:115).   
Despite the extreme violence and extraordinary rate at which citizens were massacred, the only 
entity that fought to stop the genocide was the RPA. The RPA consisted primarily of Tutsis 
who had fled to Uganda in the previous bouts of violence. Given that the genocide regime was 
poorly trained and equipped and fuelled by an anti-Tutsi sentiment rather than organised efforts 
of civil war, the RPA was able to invade and oust the extremist regime within four months 
(Drumbl, 2002:6). Once they had overtaken the Hutu génocidaires, the RPF took control of the 
transitional Government of National Unity and would then go on to be elected in 2003 as the 
ruling political party, led by President Paul Kagame who has remained in power ever since 
(Melvin, 2010:932).  
Once the RPF overcame the extremist Hutu regime and the four months of slaughter came to 
an end, the arguably more difficult task of rebuilding the nation began. Rwanda had been left 
decimated by the conflict, with the nation’s infrastructure completely destroyed and the 
population left to inhabit the ruins. An outflux of two million refugees had escaped, 500 000 
existing Tutsi refugees returned and over 500 000 people were internally displaced 
(Meyerstein, 2007:472). In addition to the administrative challenge of kickstarting a stagnated 
economy, one of the first major challenges the new government faced was an overcrowded 
prison system, filled with perpetrators arrested for their part in the genocide. Over 120 000 
accused filled prisons designed for 15 000 (Meyerstein, 2007:468), with many of these 
individuals being potentially innocent. 
Not only had a culture of impunity been left behind by previous regimes, but the three months 
of genocide had encouraged “extraordinary lawlessness” that now needed to be contained 




of the adult male Hutu population (Drumbl, 2002:6) making the situation all the more 
extraordinary in its widespread participation.  
In the years following the genocide both the Rwandan government and the international 
community recognised that criminal trials were necessary to end this culture of impunity 
(Longman, 2009:305). In November 1994 the United Nations Security Council voted to create 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to try the most senior leaders and 
instigators of the genocide. The ICTR was based in Tanzania and shared a chief prosecutor 
with the recently formed Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Hague (Longman, 
2005:305). However, by 2002 after over six years of work the ICTR had spent nearly $200 
million and only heard nine cases, resulting in eight convictions and one acquittal with many 
of these subject to appeal (Drumbl, 2002:6).   
While the most common (Western) domestic approach for crimes the likes of murder, rape and 
destruction of property is to try perpetrators in a common court of law, the Rwandan legal 
apparatus along with most other infrastructural systems had been destroyed (Bowd, 2010:168). 
The majority of lawyers and judges had been killed, fled into exile or been involved in the 
crimes themselves. Reported pre-genocide counts place numbers at 758 judges, 70 prosecutors, 
and 631 support staff, while post-genocide these are said to have reduced to 244 judges, 12 
prosecutors and 137 support staff (Meyerstein, 2007:473).  
Initially following the common international approach, a new law was passed in 1996 
establishing 12 specialised chambers to try genocide cases in ordinary courts (De Brouwer & 
Ruvebana, 2013:939). Despite an abbreviated training programme intended to prepare new 
judges and lawyers (Longman, 2009:306), the Rwandan legal system remained vastly 
understaffed, resulting in only 7 000 trials between 1996 and 2002 (when the gacaca courts 
were launched) (Buckley-Zistel, 2005:115). At this rate of prosecution, it was estimated that 
re-building all necessary structures and trying all perpetrators would have taken more than a 
century (Buckley-Zistel, 2005:115; Longman, 2009:306).   
At this pace it was likely that most perpetrators would live their lives through without ever 
having had to answer for their crimes, leading to a situation of ‘justice delayed, justice denied’ 
(De Brouwer & Ruvebana, 2013:939). An innovative solution was therefore necessary to deal 
with the unique circumstances of widespread violence and participation therein. During the 
course of 1998 and 1999, then President Pasteur Bizimungu sponsored a series of meetings 




discussing the way forward for the country (Bowd, 2010:169). It was here that the first 
suggestion of gacaca was made (Longman, 2009:306; Meyerstein, 2007:473). After much 
debate and revision, the Rwandan Transitional National Assembly adopted the Organic Law 
No. 40/2000 on the 12th of October 2000 establishing the contemporary gacaca courts system 
(Longman, 2009:306; Meyerstein, 2007:473).    
3.2.3 The Gacaca Courts 
The Kinyarwanda word ‘gacaca’ can be loosely translated as ‘small grass’ or ‘lawn’ and refers 
to the physical space where communities traditionally gathered in front of respected male elders 
to resolve community disputes (Longman, 2009:306). Gacaca have otherwise been described 
as “traditional village tribunals” (Buckley-Zistel, 2005:113). These relatively informal courts 
were a community-centred, pre-colonial justice system based on reconciliation, that 
traditionally dealt with disputes over land, household and family disagreements, badly-
honoured contracts and pastoral conflicts (Buckley-Zistel, 2005:115; Longman, 2009:306). 
While appropriate punishment was included as part of the tribunal process, the focus was 
placed more on restoring social harmony and tranquillity to the community, as well as 
reintegrating offenders (Towner, 2015:285; Buckley-Zistel, 2005:115).  
The contemporary gacaca courts however can be described as a “truly hybrid” form of criminal 
court, rooted in pre-colonial tradition while also “responding to the problem of mass atrocity 
produced by collective violence” (Meyerstein, 2007:471). While still grounded in restorative 
motives, the contemporary gacaca were courts in the legal sense and employed retributive 
measures to bring perpetrators to justice. The restorative roots however are evident in how they 
shaped the setting of the gacaca. This is reflected in elements such as bringing perpetrators and 
victims together and providing a forum for truth-telling which acknowledges crimes within the 
communities in which they were committed and in front of the victims (Towner, 2015:287). 
Furthermore, in a purely retributive system justice is meted out by the state and the victim is 
largely alienated from the process (Wielenga & Harris, 2011:18), which was simply not the 
case in gacaca, where victims were given agency over their experience and faced the 
perpetrator directly.    
As a result of becoming state-administered, the new gacaca were institutionalised – they 
operated on a national scale, were more regulated and (after low attendance during the pilot 
programme) were no longer voluntary (Meyerstein, 2007:468; Towner, 2015:285; Longman, 




society: the cell, sector and district levels (Bowd, 2010:170). The courts were mandated to deal 
specifically with genocide crimes committed between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994 
(Melvin, 2010:942). Although they were still regarded as respected members of the 
community, those chairing the meetings were no longer community elders, but formally elected 
judges called inyangamugayo (Kinyarwanda for “those who detest dishonesty”) and could be 
women or young people (Longman, 2009:307).    
The stated objectives of the contemporary gacaca can be limited to five: giving Rwandans the 
means to solve their own problems; speeding up the genocide trials; establishing the truth about 
the genocide; rendering justice and thereby ending the culture of impunity; and finally 
reconciling the people of Rwanda (Buckley-Zistel, 2005:116). The process can be considered 
one of transitional justice as it was applied to the political crimes of a former regime, that of 
the Hutu President Habyarimana and his successors (Buckley-Zistel, 2005:114). 
Despite having various objectives, like many other transitional processes the gacaca were 
directed by the project of truth-finding. This is important to note particularly given the 
comparison to be made in this study between the gacaca and the South African TRC. The 
gacaca dealt with two ‘types’ of truth – forensic/factual based on evidence (although this 
evidence was limited to testimonies), and narrative based on the meaning individuals and 
groups ascribe to certain events (Buckley-Zistel, 2005:120). The extent to which factual truth 
can be found is questionable, particularly in this setting where perpetrators faced extended 
prison sentences dependent on their crime. There was a tendency for these perpetrators to make 
partial confessions or accuse co-conspirators that were already dead or hiding abroad (Buckley-
Zistel, 2005:120). Therefore, the factual truth is often “more a reflection of power structures 
than of what actually happened,” (Buckley-Zistel, 2005:121). Narrative truth, on the other 
hand, relies on memory and remembering – a process that involves “rearranging, selectivity 
and interpretation” (Buckley-Zistel, 2005:121). The gacaca contributed to the process of 
finding a common narrative truth surrounding the events of the genocide by giving victims, 
perpetrators and witnesses in the community the chance to give testimony of their experiences.   
The main rationale behind the truth-finding of the gacaca process is an assumption that truth 
leads to justice (particularly in this case where retributive measures were taken) and justice in 
turn is expected to lead to reconciliation. In this way gacaca were again a hybrid, as truth-
telling is generally a component of restorative justice, however in this case it included 




lies on the victim as they must forgive for the greater good of society as a whole (Bowd, 
2010:164). However, the retributive elements of gacaca meant that truth-telling did in fact lead 
to a degree of retribution for perpetrators’ crimes. Uncovering the truth of past injustice is 
expected to lead to closure and contribute to a more consolidated peace (Buckley-Zistel, 
2005:113). As will become clear through the following chapter, these assumptions can and 
have been challenged by critics of the gacaca process, however this is the premise on which 
the courts were established.  
In October 2001, citizens of Rwanda’s 9001 cells (the smallest political unit) elected panels of 
19 inyangamugayo who would then in turn elect representatives to the 1545 sector-level and 
106 district-level courts, with a total of over 254 000 judges elected nationally by the end of 
that year (Longman, 2009:307; De Brouwer & Ruvebana, 2013:941). After a brief training 
programme for judges, pilot tribunals were launched in June 2002, in one sector of each of the 
eleven provinces (Longman, 2009:307). These pilots would make up about 10% of the overall 
number of courts once gacaca was launched nationally in 2005 (Buckley-Zistel, 2005:116). 
Gacaca was to proceed in a two-step process. The first was an evidence-collecting phase to 
record all of the crimes committed, the names of those killed, those suspected as perpetrators 
and those expected to be called as witnesses (Longman, 2009:308). Given the lack of forensic 
evidence concerning genocide events, the detailed records compiled during this phase were 
intended to authenticate testimonies given during the second phase (Melvin, 2010:942). It was 
at this stage that perpetrators were offered the option of confession in exchange for reduced 
sentences, and that crimes were listed according to three categories. These categories were 
confirmed for the national trial rollout in Article 51 of the Organic Law No. 16 of 2004 as: 
category one – leaders of the genocide, well-known murderers and rapists; category two – 
murderers and those who attacked with or without the intention to kill; and category three – 
offences against property (Organic Law No. 16/2004: Art. 15).  
In the second phase of gacaca came the trials, where the inyangamugayo heard testimonies and 
sentenced those found guilty (Longman, 2009:308).  During 2005-2006 there was some 
discussion of trying category one suspects in gacaca, however this was highly opposed from 
all sides. Thus, the gacaca mandate was limited to the trial and sentencing of category two and 
three offenders (Meyerstein, 2007:474). Trials of category one suspects remained in the 




However, by 2008 cases of sexual violence were brought under gacaca jurisdiction as well (De 
Brouwer & Ruvebana, 2013:940).  
After two years of work the information-gathering phase of the pilot programme was complete. 
The government commenced the data collection phase on a national scale in January 2005 and 
the judgement phase of the pilot sectors in March 2005 (Meyerstein, 2007:474). Procedurally, 
cell-level gacaca consisted of weekly sessions involving the General Assembly (comprised of 
all cell inhabitants over 18 years old, witnesses, victims and the accused) and the Bench, a 
panel of nine elected judges and five alternates17 (Buckley-Zistel, 2005:117; Meyerstein, 
2007:475). During the trials, everyone in the General Assembly was free to speak, encouraging 
the participation of the community as witnesses to hold perpetrators accountable. Victims were 
allowed to publicly confront perpetrators and detail accounts of their experiences, under the 
assumption that once the community had recognised victims’ suffering all would be able to 
move forward together (Longman, 2009:306). The accused defended themselves and 
testimonies were seen as sufficient evidence without physical evidence being presented 
(Buckley-Zistel, 2005:117).  
Sentencing was dependent on the perpetrator and their willingness to provide accurate 
information concerning their crimes. If deemed full and sincere, confessions that included all 
the information regarding the crimes committed, incrimination of co-conspirators and an 
apology, could result in the halving of prison sentences in exchange for community service 
(Buckley-Zistel, 2005:117). Most community service was carried out in travaux d’intérêts 
généraux (TIG) camps, administered by Rwanda Correctional Services (Clark, 2010:79). This 
community service in many places was intended to provide practical assistance to victims and 
their families with projects such as building houses, and to help broader society with projects 
such as construction of roads (De Brouwer & Ruvebana, 2013:942).        
After prosecuting over a million génocidaires in front of more than 11 000 gacaca courts, the 
gacaca system was officially closed on the 18th of June 2012 (De Brouwer & Ruvebana, 
2013:937). In terms of its goal of speeding up the pace of genocide trials, gacaca was 
undeniably successful, handling over two million cases in the space of ten years (De Brouwer 
& Ruvebana, 2013:940). However, in terms of its ability to reconcile Rwandans and thereby 
 
17 The number of judges required for a Bench had been reduced from nineteen to nine, with 5 alternates to stand 




address the root cause of conflict in the nation, there is much debate as to its success. These 
debates will be discussed in the following chapter.     
3.3 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission – Uniting a Separated South Africa 
3.3.1 A History of Separatism 
While ethnic divisions in Rwanda were exploited and entrenched by colonial rule, these 
divisions were pre-existing before the settlers arrived. In South Africa on the other hand, racial 
segregation entrenched during the apartheid era was created by European colonialism and its 
accompanying ideas of white supremacy. From the 17th century arrival of the first Dutch settlers 
in the Cape, perceptions of white racial superiority were evident in the division of legal status 
based on race. Legal categories were made of Dutch East India Company officials, free 
burghers (settlers), slaves, ‘Hottentots’ (Khoisan) and Free Blacks (manumitted slaves) 
(Worden, 1994:66). This kind of racial categorisation would serve as the basis on which South 
African society was built and formed the foundation for the racial conflict to follow.   
According to Worden (1994:71), the first example of structured segregation in South Africa 
can be traced as far back as 1846 with the introduction of the ‘Shepstone System’. As head of 
‘Native Affairs’ in the Natal colony, Shepstone decided that to maintain control by the colonial 
state he would need to allocate land unclaimed by white farmers as ‘locations’ for African 
workers to cultivate under the rule of a local chief and ‘Native Law’. This local control was of 
course a façade as chiefs would ultimately report to the white Resident Magistrates and 
Administrators of Native Law. This system served as a precursor to the cornerstone of the 
‘grand apartheid’ project – that of the Homelands system.  
After the end of the South African War in 1902 and once the Union of South Africa was 
established in 1910, segregationist policies truly took hold (Worden, 1994:72). The 1911 Mines 
and Works Act established the colour bar differentiating workers’ rights and pay based on race 
in favour of white workers. The 1913 Natives Land Act segregated land ownership, allocating 
less than 8% of South African land to black individuals and driving the black population into 
cramped reserves or urban townships where they provided cheap labour to white-owned 
industry (Jones, 2014:14; World Bank Group, 2018:1). The 1920 Native Affairs Act set the 
foundation for separate political representation of black people through ‘tribally-based’ district 
councils; and the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act established racial segregation in towns 




Between 1910 and 1920 the white population made up approximately 21% of the overall 
citizenry. Thus, these laws had placed political control of the majority in the hands of a small 
minority (Jones, 2014:13). The history of racial separatism that began with the arrival of Dutch 
colonial settlers set the stage for the enforced segregation that was to come and that left a lasting 
legacy of tension between racial groups in South Africa.       
3.3.2 The Reality of Apartheid 
After the end of World War II in 1945, white supremacism had started to wane in Africa as 
former colonies began to fight for their independence. However, in South Africa it only took 
stronger root (Worden, 1994:65). As its name suggests, the crux of the apartheid project was 
the compartmentalisation of the population on the basis of race. After the National Party came 
to power in 1948 the apartheid project began, with President Malan first introducing the 
prohibition of mixed marriages in 1949 and the Immorality Act of 1950, extending the ban of 
marriage between white and black people to the prohibition of any and all sexual conduct 
between whites and all other race groups (Worden, 1994:95).    
As discussed by Worden (1994:96), the Population Registration Act of 1950 formally 
categorised the population according to four race groups: white, coloured, ‘Asiatic’ and 
‘Native’ (later changed to ‘Bantu’ or African). In the same year the Group Areas Act extended 
the segregation of residential areas on a compulsory basis. The 1951 Bantu Authorities Act 
introduced government-approved chiefs in reserves (African residential areas) and made no 
provision for representation of African people in ‘white’ areas. The 1953 Reservation of 
Separate Amenities Act separated social spaces and all public amenities. The Bantu Education 
Act of 1953 brought all schooling of African children under the control of the Department of 
Native Affairs and altered the curriculum, deliberately preparing students for nothing more 
than manual labour (Worden, 1994:96; World Bank Group, 2018:1). Thus, in every area of life 
the South African population was divided by race, creating a system that greatly privileged the 
white minority and allowed for very little interaction between population groups.      
The cornerstone of apartheid policy is arguably the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government 
Act. This law set up eight, later extended to ten, ‘Bantu Homelands’ converting the existing 
reserves into self-contained national units and effectively removing the black population from 
South Africa entirely (Worden, 1994:110; Jones, 2014:18). This was followed by the Bantu 
Homeland Citizens Act of 1970 which stripped black people from the legal right to South 




assigned (Jones, 2014:18). While these Homelands were supposedly based on ethnicity and the 
historic location of ethnic groups, they were in fact largely determined by the location of 
untenable land left unclaimed by white settlers. Once this policy came into effect, forced 
removals and dispossession of land became a widespread phenomenon, with an estimated 3.5 
million people relocated between 1960 and 1983 under the Group Areas and Separate 
Development legislation (Worden, 1994:110). While developmental intentions were outlined 
for the Homelands originally, these did not come to fruition and instead these areas became 
‘dumping grounds’ for government to resettle black people who had been forcibly removed 
from now-white areas (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2007:351). 
While these laws created the segregation at the root of racial conflict in South Africa, the TRC 
was a transitional mechanism focused specifically on the violence involved in the anti-
apartheid movement. This violence is said to have been started by the turning point that was 
the Sharpeville massacre in March 1960. It was at this point that peaceful protest was 
abandoned as a strategy for instigating change and more assertive action began to take its place 
(World Bank Group, 2018:1). After this event the leading anti-apartheid organisations of the 
African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-African Congress (PAC) were banned and forced 
to join the South African Communist Party (SACP) underground. The armed wing of the ANC, 
Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), also emerged in this era and the PAC was represented in armed 
insurgency by the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (Jones, 2014:20).   
Following Sharpeville and the banning of these major liberation organisations, the 1960s were 
somewhat of a ‘decade of quietude’ (Worden, 1994:113). However this would change from the 
early 1970s, culminating in another critical event in the liberation struggle, that of the Soweto 
Uprising of 1976, when 20 000 high school students protested the Bantu Education system and 
Afrikaans being used as the medium of instruction (Jones, 2014:20). The protest gained 
significant international attention due to the ruthless response of the police, resulting in 176 
deaths in just over a week, most of whom were schoolchildren (Morris, 2004:200). The protest 
was memorialised by a photograph of 13-year-old student Hector Pieterson, one of the first to 
be killed during this protest, being carried by a fellow student while his sister runs alongside. 
This photograph remains “one of the most graphic pictorial records of the brutal realities that 
apartheid rhetoric of ‘separate development’ attempted to disguise” (Jones, 2014:21).  
The labour and urban resistance that characterised the years between 1973 and the 1976 events 




are significant in that they led to a state policy shift from ‘petty apartheid’ segregation laws to 
a full-blown ‘total strategy’ (Worden, 1994:122). The uprisings had caught the government 
unaware and had proven repression was no longer a sufficient response to the efforts of 
liberation activists. A second factor was the shift in South African industry towards 
manufacturing, resulting in a shortage of semi-skilled permanent workers with a labour 
economy set up to provide unskilled migrant black labourers (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2007:347; 
Morris, 2004:208). Thirdly, economic changes had caused a shift in the support base of the NP 
resulting in a party split, with the removed faction forming the Conservative Party under 
Andries Treurnicht in 1982. Finally, the international attention and threat of sanctions in the 
aftermath of the events at Soweto all culminated in a series of policy developments between 
1979 and 1984 that would begin to spell the end of apartheid. However, this end would not 
come before the ‘total strategy’ provided the platform for the worst of apartheid-era human 
rights violations.     
The ‘total strategy’ developments took place in several different sectors. They included a shift 
in government economic policy towards free market enterprise, permission of trade union 
membership and registration for black workers, and the dismantling of white job reservation. 
Pass laws were finally abolished in 1986, compulsory primary education was extended to all 
children and many ‘petty apartheid’ restrictions were removed such as public spaces in major 
cities no longer being segregated and the opening of national sport to all races (Worden, 
1994:123-124; Stemmet, 2013:123). However, these surface-level changes were matched by a 
deepening of apartheid state control over national administration. The introduction of the 
Tricameral Constitution in 1983 gave some powers of self-determination to separate 
parliamentary assemblies for white, coloured and Indian Members of Parliament. However, 
political representation for black people was still restricted to the homelands and as a result the 
Tricameral elections were largely boycotted (Worden, 1994:124; Stemmet, 2013:124-125).  
In light of the conflict response that was to come in the form of the TRC, one of the most 
significant ‘total strategy’ developments was an extension of the role of the South African 
army. Since the 1960s the South African military had been building steadily, with its own 
Armaments Corporation established at this time to counteract arms embargoes. By the 1980s 
the military was fully self-sufficient in producing ammunition, missiles and small armaments 
(Stemmet, 2011:103). Under the leadership of the new Minister of Defence, General Magnus 
Malan, the State Security Council was established in 1972 as an advisory body to the Cabinet 




body was given greater powers under the new policy, including control over intelligence and 
security work. This ‘intelligence and security work’ while explained at face-value as state 
security measures to stem the ‘Communist threat’ was in effect the government giving free 
reign to security forces in terms of murder, torture and abuse for the sake of the apartheid 
regime (Worden, 1994:125).    
The South African Police and South African Defence Force (SADF) were the human face of 
the increased security measures, with their jurisdiction being expanded as the government was 
attempting to market its pretence of policy reform (Stemmet, 2011:104). On the home front, 
the security forces were charged with individual attacks such as the 1982 letter bomb that killed 
Ruth First, wife of ANC strategist Joe Slovo, and also more overt action such as the SADF 
attacks in the same year on 12 targets in Maseru killing 41 ‘political’ refugees (Morris, 
2004:214). In attempts to quell mounting opposition from neighbouring states, President P. W. 
Botha launched a campaign of destabilisation, with both direct military interventions and the 
support of rebel groups such as RENAMO in Mozambique. Raids were ordered for central 
areas that were said to be housing ANC guerrillas in Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and 
Botswana, while a guerrilla war was being fought in Namibia with the nationalist force of 
SWAPO (Worden, 1994:125).    
The 1980s would prove to be a watershed in South African history, as the country found itself 
in the throes of violent conflict on the brink of civil war, with violence built into the strategies 
of both the ruling NP and the exiled ANC (Stemmet, 2015:59). The worst of this erupted in 
1984 with cycles of violence until the end of the decade marked by successive States of 
Emergency each year from 1985 to 1988. Although these were initially imposed only in certain 
areas, once security forces were deployed they were met with increasingly violent opposition 
which quickly spread throughout the country (Stemmet, 2015:60). In a chillingly ironic 
statement given the gross human rights violations that were to be unveiled during the TRC 
process, P. W. Botha launched the 1986 State of Emergency claiming it as an effort of 
“civilised” means of security to protect South Africans’ liberty (Stemmet, 2015:63).  
Given the extraordinary powers and freedoms afforded to the security forces during this time, 
torture, murder and the covering-up of such events became commonplace (Stemmet, 
2011:105). One of the most high-profile cases of torture and death in detention was that of 
Steve Biko, the founder and leader of the Black Consciousness movement. Kept naked and 




the back of a Land Rover and driven 1 628 kilometres to Pretoria to be taken to hospital, but 
died in a prison cell before he was admitted (Morris, 2004:206). Biko’s case is but one of the 
hundreds of instances of gross human rights violations undertaken in the name of the apartheid 
regime that would be the focus of the TRC mechanism.      
By the end of the 1980s the Botha government realised that it could not quell resistance with 
coercion alone but needed the cooperation of certain “acceptable” black groups (Stemmet, 
2015:74). However, despite maintaining the majority of the white electorate through the 
tumultuous decade, they were unable to gain support of moderate black groups. There was a 
parallel realisation that resistance could not be crushed but was continually mounting, fuelled 
by political discontent of the marginalised black majority (Stemmet, 2015:75). 
This was reflected in the strategy of the liberation during this time as well, as summarised by 
the ANC battle cry written by Thabo Mbeki, ‘Make apartheid unworkable and the country 
ungovernable’ (Stemmet, 2011:106). The Soweto riots served as a turning point for the 
liberation struggle as well, as a landslide of support bolstered the fighting power of the armed 
struggle, particularly from the youth wanting to join the armed forces. A key aspect of the 
ANC’s strategy during this time was mass mobilisation at a grassroots level. By creating a 
whole alternate system of governance made up of street committees, self-defence units and 
people’s courts, the ANC aimed to create black communities that were effectively no-go zones 
for apartheid security forces.  
Although this mass mobilisation had the intended effect of encouraging the population to be 
involved in the struggle, it also inadvertently created a system of local justice and lawlessness. 
So-called ‘collaborators’ thought to be connected to apartheid authorities were judged in the 
people’s courts, with sentences often including the death penalty by necklacing to serve as a 
‘deterrent’ for others (Stemmet, 2011:109). In Kwazulu Natal, deep divisions within the 
liberation movement between the United Democratic Front (UDF)18 and the Inkatha Cultural 
 
18 An umbrella organisation that coordinated around 400 various civil society organisations, specifically to oppose 




Movement19 led to intense violence within black communities, a conflict that was only 
exploited by the apartheid security forces20 (Morris, 2004:236).      
On a public level MK was responsible for outright attacks in South African society. Between 
1978 and 1984 the armed wing carried out 212 attacks resulting in 48 deaths (Stemmet, 
2011:111). A car bomb targeting the headquarters of the South African Air Force and Military 
Intelligence in Pretoria killed at least 16 people and injured a further 188 on the 20th of May 
1983 (Morris, 2004:220). 1987 saw a further 200 attacks and in 1988 over 262 were carried 
out (Stemmet, 2011:111). The argument for using civilian targets was that apartheid had been 
held in place by the continued electoral support of ordinary white civilians, thereby ‘justifying’ 
these attacks (Stemmet, 2011:111). Outside of South Africa, ANC camps across the border 
such as the infamous ‘Quatro’ in Angola were used as centres for torture and abuse of alleged 
apartheid agents who infiltrated the organisation as turncoats or spies (Morris, 2004:237-238).    
By the end of the 1980s, given the reality of immense pressure placed on the NP government, 
there came a final realisation that the regime could no longer hold on to power. International 
disapproval had been evident from the party’s election in 1948 and had grown steadily, 
particularly from the time of the ‘total strategy’ onwards. Despite the violence that can be 
attributed to the liberation movement, their cause would always be justified to the rest of the 
world if apartheid continued to exist (Stemmet, 2011:112). The economy was also in downturn, 
with inflation at 18.4% between December 1984 and December 1985, its highest in 66 years 
(Morris, 2004:232). Apartheid had proven simply unproductive, causing another shift in NP 
support. Until the early 1980s the party had enjoyed the backing of white South African 
business leaders, however by the middle of the decade the economic reality caused a switch in 
their allegiance away from the NP and towards the liberation movement (Morris, 2004:232).                             
By 1987 the country had reached a stalemate. For the first time in the elections of that year, the 
NP found itself as the more liberal of apartheid parties, with Treurnicht’s Conservative Party 
eroding its power base. Liberation icon and first President of democratic South Africa Nelson 
Mandela had in 1986 decided to begin discussions with government officials and in 1987 the 
 
19 A cultural movement of the Zulu population, led by the Zulu prince, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi (Joyce, 
2007:140). Inkatha occupied a middle-ground between the government’s separate development policies that Chief 
Buthelezi opposed, and the militancy of the Xhosa-dominated liberation movement he feared (Joyce, 2007:141). 
The movement would later become the Inkatha Freedom Party, a major opposition party based in Kwazulu Natal.  
20 Evidence was in fact uncovered that secret government funding for the training of Inkatha units began in the 
late 1980s and continued until 1991, after President de Klerk was inaugurated, causing him to demote Minister of 




ANC found allies in former parliamentarians Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, leader of the liberal 
Progressive Federal Party (PFP) and Alex Boraine, another PFP MP, holding discussions in 
1987 in Dakar with the two leaders (Morris, 2004:238).  
After suffering a stroke in January 1989, it was Botha’s health that caused the Groot Krokodil 
to resign from his presidency (Morris, 2004:240). The elections later that year placed F. W. de 
Klerk in power, a man Mandela believed ‘represented a genuine departure from his 
predecessor’ (Morris, 2004:240). From this point onwards, the ‘winds of change’ had begun in 
earnest. In February 1990, in a somewhat unexpected move, de Klerk announced the ANC, 
PAC and SACP were unbanned, with leaders such as Mandela released from prison (Jones, 
2014:21). He also lifted restrictions on organisations such as the UDF and the Council of South 
African Trade Unions, lifted restrictions on the media, released other political prisoners and 
“declared that the time had come to create a ‘totally new and just dispensation’ based on 
equality” (Morris, 2004:244).   
In the four years that separated the jubilation of Mandela’s release in 1990 and the first 
democratic elections in 1994, South African political leaders would be wrapped in debate as to 
how the New South Africa was to be created. The armed struggle still waged, with the early 
1990s being one of the most blood-spattered periods of the country’s recent history. Between 
1990 and 1994 there was a total of 15 977 fatalities, approximately 69% of the total number 
over the 12 worst years of political violence between 1985 and 1996 (Guelke, 2012:72). Both 
the apartheid and struggle leaders recognised the need to put an end to the extreme violence 
and to prioritise a state-sanctioned reaction holding perpetrators accountable (Morris, 
2004:253). The mechanism used to achieve this end would be formulated as the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission.      
3.3.3 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Truth commissions have become a popular conflict resolution mechanism used in transitional 
societies, with 19 commissions having taken place in 16 countries over the 21 years preceding 
the South African instance (Hayner, 1996:19). After the purportedly “ground-breaking work” 
of the South African TRC and its perceived success, the popularity of truth commissions only 
grew (Brounéus, 2008:291). Many believed the lack of bloodshed21, retribution and vengeance 
in the country post-apartheid was in large part a result of the TRC process (Gibson, 2006:410). 
Truth commissions are temporary, government-sponsored projects, often having a relatively 
 




short and specific time period over which to complete their work. Apart from the obvious aim 
to find the truth concerning national events, these commissions can promote reconciliation, 
identify societal issues and outline reforms in response, allow victims to speak out about their 
experiences and also represent an acknowledgement of a long-silenced past (Hayner, 1996:19).       
The South African TRC22 was officially established on the 19th of July 1995, by the Promotion 
of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34 (Evans, 2016:707). The mandate of the 
Commission covered instances of gross human rights violations committed between 1960 and 
1994. Its primary reports were completed by 1998, however it continued to operate over several 
more years to complete the amnesty hearings (Hayner, 2006:298). The Commission was led 
by a team of commissioners, nominated by the public but eventually selected by the newly 
inaugurated President Nelson Mandela. In 1996 Archbishop Desmond Tutu accepted the role 
of Chair of the Commission (Vora & Vora, 2004:305).    
The Commission was made up of three sub-committees, each with a distinct role, in an attempt 
to address several broad aims such as achieving social justice, upholding the rule of law and 
attempts at reconciliation (Stanley, 2001:526). These sub-committees were the Human Rights 
Violations Committee, the Amnesty Committee, and the Reparation and Rehabilitation 
Committee. The Human Rights Committee was tasked with taking statements and conducting 
hearings with victims and perpetrators. The Amnesty Committee had a more legalistic 
mandate, in hearing amnesty applications and granting amnesty. Lastly, the Reparation and 
Rehabilitation Committee provided recommendations on state compensation for victims but 
did not have the power to enforce these recommendations (Evans, 2016:708). While it was not 
a legal entity in itself, the TRC ran parallel to the justice system and made recommendations 
to the national courts based on its findings with the goal of reconciliation in mind (Vora & 
Vora, 2004:305).    
Due to the denial of the apartheid state of human rights violations, the truth-telling project was 
important in the South African context, not only for any reconciliatory objectives it may have 
had but to uncover a more complete history of the apartheid reality. This is often the reason 
behind the work of a truth commission – an attempt to prevent history from being lost, rewritten 
or repeated (Hayner, 1996:21). The necessity for this truth-telling process was made clear in 
the unexpected amount of people that came forward to participate, with over 21 000 victim 
 




statements being submitted, 2 000 public testimonies (Jones, 2014:23) and over 7 000 amnesty 
applications (Stanley, 2001:528).    
Possibly the most contested aspect of the TRC process were the operations of the Amnesty 
Committee. This Committee was given the power to grant amnesty in exchange for confessions 
(Hayner, 1996:19) and was comprised of two lawyers and 19 judges independent from the 
Commissioners (Jones, 2014:23). The granting of amnesty had been a requirement of white 
apartheid leaders in their agreement for democratic elections to be held (Vora & Vora, 
2004:302) and was also an attempt to avoid alienating the white population (Evans, 2016:707). 
While the gacaca had exchanged confessions for sentence reductions or community service, 
the TRC was mandated to grant complete amnesty to individuals who unveiled the full truth of 
their actions. The impetus behind this decision was the hope that ‘unburdening of the past’ 
through documenting the full truth of human rights violations took precedence over the call for 
‘natural’ justice (Stanley, 2001:526). It was further hoped that amnesty would help in creating 
a national culture upholding human rights (Wielenga, 2011:41). Perpetrators from the 
liberation movement were also intended to benefit from this policy as many were imprisoned 
for crimes committed on behalf of liberation organisations (Evans, 2016:707).   
The ‘truth-for-amnesty’ model was outlined in the 1995 Act establishing the Commission and 
included three conditions (Hayner, 2001:43). First, there had to be proof provided that the act 
was politically motivated. Second, the Commission had to be satisfied that testimonies were 
complete. Finally, the violation had to be proportional to the intended political objective 
(Evans, 2016:707). The consequence of not revealing the truth in its entirety was that 
perpetrators would not be granted amnesty and would be prosecuted in normal courts (Stanley, 
2001:526). As in the case of the gacaca plea-bargaining option, the hope was that amnesty and 
the threat of prosecution would encourage perpetrators to come forward and thus the full truth 
of apartheid events could be found (Evans, 2016:707).      
As is evident simply from the name of the Commission, this transitional process similarly to 
the gacaca was established off an assumption of truth leading to reconciliation (Melish, 
2012:280; Hirsch, MacKenzie & Sesay, 2012:387). It is interesting to see the long-term impact 
of this association reflected in public perception still today, as the SARB concludes that when 
given a list of potential connotations to attach to the concept of reconciliation, the third most 
frequently mentioned item is ‘Truth – establishing the truth of the past’ (Potgieter, 2017:21). 




reconciliation. The difference here is that while the gacaca institution assumed a process of 
truth leading to (retributive) justice, which in turn is expected to lead to reconciliation 
(Buckley-Zistel, 2005:113), the TRC replaced the emphasis on justice with an emphasis on 
amnesty. It is also said to have incorporated the restorative dimensions of both Judeo-Christian 
tradition and African traditional values of ubuntu – both containing elements of communal 
healing and restoration (Vora & Vora, 2004:306).     
Marketing campaigns for the Commission attempted to highlight these restorative dimensions 
and paint the mechanism as a nation-building project, playing down the truth-for-amnesty 
model. This was done through quasi-religious slogans such as ‘Truth: the road to 
reconciliation’, ‘No future without forgiveness’, ‘Healing our land’ and ‘The truth will set you 
free’ (taken from the Bible verse John 8 vs 32) (Evans, 2016:708).     
Despite all of its proclaimed intentions of providing the full truth of apartheid-era violence, in 
the end many felt the TRC fell short, particularly given the refusal of many high-level leaders 
to submit to the amnesty process. Known culprits of gross human rights violations such as the 
infamous Vlakplaas23 commander Eugene de Kock were able to deflect responsibility to their 
commanding officers and thereby reduce their sentences. Despite de Kock serving a reduced 
sentence (which amounted to a double life sentence), none of the accused commanding officers 
were charged (Morris, 2004:290).  
On the liberation side the leadership of the ANC, MK and UDF accepted full responsibility for 
the gross human rights violations perpetrated by its members between 1960 and 1994. 
However, senior leaders of the ANC did not apply for amnesty. Both the ANC and the NP tried 
to block certain parts of the final report that painted the organisations in a negative light 
(Morris, 2004:291). In some ways this shows that the process was able to remain even-handed 
to the end, placing blame on all sides of the struggle, however it did threaten the legitimacy of 
the common truth created by the process.  
What the TRC was undeniably able to do, like the gacaca, was to bring to the surface many 
previously unknown facts regarding the reality of the conflict and mediate between the 
experiences and testimonies of both victims and perpetrators. When reflecting on the TRC’s 
contribution to the reconciliation project in South Africa, Constitutional Court judge Albie 
 
23 Vlakplaas was from the late 1970s the “base of a counter-insurgency unit that trained and deployed death squads 





Sachs who survived a car bomb assassination attempt stated succinctly that the TRC “meant 
‘people could see human beings were doing things to other human beings’ and this ‘wipes out 
the possibility of denial’, creating ‘some kind of shared understanding, not of the details and 
responsibilities, but that terrible things were done’,” (as quoted in Morris, 2004:295).  
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has thus served as a historical overview of the dynamics that underscored the 
conflict in both South Africa and Rwanda under their respective oppressive regimes. Both 
countries experienced conflict as a result of deep ethnic or racial fault-lines that slowly built 
up to breaking points of intense violence. The gacaca courts and the TRC were both conflict 
response mechanisms aimed at altering these divisive relationships, primarily through a truth-
seeking process in which common narratives were created out of the various experiences of 
those involved. The following chapter now turns to the analytical model of process-based 
mediation outlined in this study, applying it to each case and assessing the extent to which each 





CHAPTER FOUR – APPLICATION OF THE ANALYTICAL MODEL AND 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction  
Having contextualised the cases of the South African TRC and the Rwandan gacaca courts, it 
is now possible to return to the mediation theory and analytical model as outlined in Chapter 
Two. Using Kressel’s (2006:726) pared-down definition, the TRC and the gacaca can both be 
considered mediation projects as they involved “a process in which disputants attempt to 
resolve their differences with the assistance of an acceptable third party.” In both post-conflict 
societies, the conflicted parties had reached a “mutually-hurting stalemate” (Zartman, 2001:8) 
in which neither party was willing/able to make a further power move to revert back to conflict, 
and the continuation of this conflict had become detrimental to all parties involved. It was for 
this reason that both interim governments formulated transitional mechanisms creating the 
space for conciliatory dialogue, mediated by a third party. 
Introducing a mediator into such a conflict environment is intended to overcome three sets of 
barriers impeding pure negotiation between disputants (Kressel, 2006:732). Firstly, 
interpersonal barriers taking the form of negative feelings between disputants can infringe on 
the quality of their direct interaction. This was assuredly the case in both South Africa and 
Rwanda, given the history of deep racial and ethnic division that had resulted in violence 
against all sides of the conflict. Second are substantive barriers, which amount to strong 
disagreement on the content of the conflict, resulting in difficulty ascertaining the ‘truth’ of the 
situation. Again, both cases experienced these substantive barriers, as victims and perpetrators 
in Rwanda told different stories of the extent of violence during the genocide, and given the 
secrecy of the apartheid regime crimes. Finally, procedural barriers impede open 
communication when there is a complete absence of a negotiating forum. Before the 
introduction of the TRC and the gacaca courts, there was indeed no forum for interaction 
between members of the conflicted groups. Due to the presence of these three sets of barriers, 
a mediatory space was required to break them down, provide the opportunity for constructive 
communication and potentially open new, previously unseen political space (Ramsbotham et 
al., 2016:213).  
However, in terms of the traditional conception of mediation as elite-level, interest-based, 
outcomes-focused compromise, these projects do not fit the mould. They have been selected 




model is expected to be more reconciliatory than traditional elite-level attempts at mediation, 
serving to transform the conflict as opposed to mitigating it. These cases are used to investigate 
the validity of this model through a comparison of the TRC and the gacaca courts, applying 
process-based mediation as an analytical framework. By comparing the similarities and 
differences between the cases according to this framework, this fourth chapter will assess the 
applicability of the model, and the potential of each characteristic for inducing long-term 
conflict transformation.                   
4.2 Application of the Analytical Model to South Africa and Rwanda 
As outlined in Chapter Two, the analytical model of process-based mediation includes five 
characteristics: community participation, context-specificity, the use of an Insider-Partial 
mediator, the absence of resource pressure, and a relational focus. These characteristics have 
all surfaced as a result of extensive reading into the debates surrounding mediation theory and 
practice, forming part of a contemporary departure from traditional outcomes-focused 
mediation. This discussion will be divided according to the characteristics, using the case study 
research design in a consecutive application of the model to the cases, illustrating how each 
characteristic manifests in the two cases. Through the methodology of comparative analysis, 
the discussion under each characteristic will also compare the two cases, finding the relative 
similarities and differences between the TRC and the gacaca courts as examples of process-
based mediation projects.    
4.2.1 Community Participation 
Contemporary conflict theory suggests that as post-Cold War conflicts are more often intra- as 
opposed to inter-state in nature, elite-level conflict settlement strategies are no longer sufficient 
in addressing violence that permeates the whole of society (Assefa, 2015:239). Conflict 
theorists have highlighted that as civilians within one nation have taken on the roles of both 
victims and perpetrators, disputants must continue to live alongside one another once violent 
conflict has come to an end (Daly & Sarkin, 2007:9; Assefa, 2015:239). Therefore, to combat 
intra-state conflict in such a way as to engender long-term peace, transformation of the remnant 
fractures in transitional societies is required. In order to achieve this transformation, it is 
expected that restorative measures are required involving victims, perpetrators and the wider 
community (Daly & Sarkin, 2007:14). This is to ensure the conflict response involves all those 




included as a characteristic in process-based mediation, given the aim of the model to transform 
conflict at its root cause in the contemporary era.        
4.2.1.1 Application 
Consequently, a strong motive for using the gacaca courts as a case in this study is their status 
as possibly the most participatory justice mechanism ever seen in a transitional society. 
Mechanisms of transitional justice like the gacaca most often aim to bring the former 
exploitative government regime to justice. However, these courts differ from the norm in that 
their reach was in the first instance local, not national, addressing crimes “committed by 
community member against community members, and not by the state against its citizens,” 
(Buckley-Zistel, 2005:114). This posits Rwanda as a succinct example of the above-mentioned 
contemporary type of conflict – fought within national borders, in urban centres and between 
neighbouring citizens. As a result, community involvement would be a vital component in the 
relevant conflict response, in order to reach those ordinary citizens who had been involved in 
the conflict – which in the Rwandan case was almost every citizen.   
The emphasis placed on the need for a community-based response is evident in the Preamble 
of the Organic Law No. 16/2004 which states that because offences “were publicly committed 
in the eyes of the population,” it is the population itself that “must recount the facts, disclose 
the truth and participate in prosecuting and trying the alleged perpetrators.” Once participation 
was made compulsory for the national rollout of the trials, fines were instituted for community 
members who failed to participate in the proceedings (Meyerstein, 2007:476).     
Community participation was intended to encourage the citizenry, particularly local 
communities, to work together in judging génocidaires (Buckley-Zistel, 2005:116), as opposed 
to having judgements made by unrelatable authority figures in far-removed (both 
geographically and metaphorically) Western-style courts. Prior to judgements, the data 
collection process was also communal, again contrary to the traditional Western approach of a 
prosecutor or investigator building a case on their own (Meyerstein, 2007:477).       
However, in reality community participation was reportedly low in certain areas. In interviews 
conducted with gacaca monitors, Buckley-Zistel (2005:118) found that actual attendance in 
the weekly sessions, at least in the early stages was low, suggesting that trust and hope in the 
project was in turn low as well. She suggests that this was a result of many General Assemblies 
being dominated by Hutu relatives or friends of the génocidaires who protected their fellow 




such as Beatrice Bazayirwa, a survivor who was targeted in stoning attempts by the perpetrators 
who killed her husband and three children (De Brouwer & Ruvebana, 2013:953).    
Furthermore, especially once attendance was made compulsory, the weekly participation 
commitment of one whole productive day clashed with citizens’ priorities of sustenance 
farming. Participation is therefore not only an emotional but also an economic sacrifice, adding 
to existing community obligations as explained by one resident: “One day for the market, one 
for the national work, another one for the Gacaca, and Sunday to Church… we have three days 
left in the week to support our families…” (PRI, 2005:40).    
Despite these setbacks, interviews with survivors conducted by De Brouwer and Ruvebana 
(2013:948) indicated that as time went on members of the public did open up to the process. 
Over time the trials became more common practice and better understanding of its workings 
relieved the fear of many Hutus that it was simply a national Hutu witch-hunt. Better security 
and policing by the end of 2008 also relieved some of the fear of witnesses thus leading to more 
open dialogue (de Brouwer & Ruvebana, 2013:953). It was also suggested in their interviews 
that incentives for lighter sentences and feelings of guilt led perpetrators to admitting their 
crimes more honestly as well.    
Moving to the context of apartheid South Africa, there was a difference in the spread of open 
conflict as extreme physical violence was not experienced by the nation as a whole. However, 
although the physical atrocities were not as widespread as those of the Rwandan genocide, the 
structural violence that oppressed the majority of the population was indeed society wide. 
Wildschut states (as quoted in Stanley, 2001:541), that in order for there to be peaceful 
coexistence and reconciliation in such a society, action has to involve the whole of that society. 
Particularly in a case such as South Africa where there were the oppressed, oppressors and 
beneficiaries to that oppression, with each citizen falling into one of these categories. 
Beneficiaries were not directly involved in creating the system of oppression, but they held 
(and still hold) the most socio-economic power to affect change (Stanley, 2001:541). This 
suggests then that all citizens – oppressed, oppressors and beneficiaries – should have been 
involved in the transitional mechanism. Unfortunately, the TRC process was unable to 
engender widespread public buy-in, arguably its biggest hindrance in the objective of achieving 
long-term reconciliation.      
While TRC hearings were largely public (Hayner, 1996:19), they were not participatory in the 




however after the façade of the Harms Commission24 the South African public was uninterested 
in a truth commission without public hearings. The only hearings to be held in private were 
those where the Commission deemed it ‘in the interest of justice’, or if the participants were 
expected to be in danger (Evans, 2016:709).    
In terms of participation of perpetrators themselves, it is questioned whether the innovative 
‘carrot and stick’ of amnesty for confession actually encouraged participation. Stanley 
(2001:531) posits that in fact the majority of perpetrators did not step forward and thus the truth 
recorded by the Commission was indisputably partial. Influential people and organisations are 
said to have used their influence and powerful legal support to hide the full extent of their 
responsibility for atrocious acts (Stanley, 2001:532). One such example is that of Winnie 
Madikizela-Mandela and her testimony regarding the Mandela United Football Club. 
A sense in which the TRC was indeed participatory concerns the media coverage afforded to 
the process. South Africa was the first country to allow media access to its truth commission 
and attracted much media attention, particularly due to the censorship of the apartheid era 
(Evans, 2016:705). The hope was that live broadcasting could provide transparency and link 
the process to all South Africans. However, due to the expense and strain on resources, only 
two hearings were televised live: the opening hearing and Winnie Madikizela-Mandela’s 
controversial testimony.  
Newspaper coverage on the other hand was extensive, with special correspondents covering 
the hearings from Beeld, Business Day, City Press, Rapport, the Sowetan and the Star in 
Johannesburg; The Cape Argus and The Cape Times in Cape Town; and the Daily News in 
Durban (Evans, 2016:709). The SABC broadcast a weekly documentary round-up of the 
week’s trials called the Special Report between 21 April 1996 and 29 March 1998, which was 
frequently in the top ten viewed programmes of the week (Evans, 2016:710). Furthermore, 
radio coverage sponsored by the Norwegian government was live broadcast daily on a 
dedicated channel, Radio 2000 (Evans, 2016:712). Gibson (2006:416) states that with all of 
these media outlets making witness testimonies so widely available in all their excruciating 
 
24 The Harms Commission of Inquiry was appointed in January 1990 to investigate the activities of the Civil 
Cooperation Bureau, the secret SADF arm operating as an undercover death squad. Although it did find the CCB 
to be involved in many crimes kept secret and without evidence, it exonerated Defence Minister Magnus Malan 
and other leading security force figures, ultimately serving the interests of those it was intended to investigate 




detail, it is likely that the majority of South Africans were in some way exposed to the 
Commission’s work and able to make their own judgements on its conclusions.  
Overall however the public reception of these media releases does not reflect a nation 
committed to understanding and acknowledging the crimes committed under apartheid. Even 
though only two hearings were broadcast live, their low viewership numbers suggest the public 
would not have been interested in more live television coverage. More people watched the first 
episode of the Special Report than watched the first hearing, however it was still only the 
fourth-watched programme of the week (Evans, 2016:712). The live radio broadcasts were no 
better received with less than 100 000 listeners per day on average (Evans, 2016:714).  
In making the hearings more victim-friendly, the Commission sacrificed accessibility to the 
general public through the media. Witness statements were allowed to meander from the theme 
of human rights abuse and in some cases were incoherent or suffered from stilted and monotone 
translation (Evans, 2016:713-714). Radio broadcasts provided little contextualisation and thus 
listeners tuning in struggled to follow the testimonies (Evans, 2016:714). Overall, although the 
TRC has been regarded as a mechanism upholding the democratic values of transparency, 
public debate and participation, the extent to which the public actually involved itself in the 
process is thus questionable.  
4.2.1.2 Comparison 
Considering the above discussion, it can be said that the South African TRC and the Rwandan 
gacaca courts had quite distinct differences in the form of public participation they employed. 
Both societies exhibited the nature of contemporary conflicts in being fought intra-state, 
between citizens of the same nation. It is expected therefore, that both would have needed a 
participatory element in order to achieve longer-term reconciliation. While the Rwandan case 
employed a very broad-based approach, it also displayed the issues with leaving criminal 
justice in the hands of local communities. The TRC on the other hand left the impetus for 
participation up to the individual, resulting in a lack of participation on the part of many 
beneficiaries.   
The gacaca courts involved direct, compulsory public participation through which 
communities were encouraged to collectively hold perpetrators accountable by contributing 
their testimonies to the trials. The result of this was that all Rwandans were compelled to 
involve themselves in the process of conflict resolution, linking the individual to the 




in the minds of certain perpetrators and forced hurting victims to re-live their experiences, over 
time it did lead to open dialogue between these groups as trust was built in the process. Despite 
the various factors discussed that inhibited participation, the communal effort of creating a 
common narrative through mediating different experiences of the same event was an important 
exercise in redefining the rhetoric surrounding the genocide.  
The TRC on the other hand involved passive participation that effectively left individual 
citizens to involve themselves in the process as far as they saw fit. The fact that the Commission 
dealt only with gross human rights violations limited direct participation in the project to 
victims and their families. For the general public this meant that it was up to the individual 
whether they would attend public hearings, listen to live radio broadcasts or watch weekly 
summaries of the cases heard. In this way there was a lack of emphasis on collective 
responsibility for the reconciliation project. This is particularly significant with regards to the 
nature of the negotiated transition in South Africa which for the most part left the underlying 
segregated social and economic structure in place. Beneficiaries to the apartheid regime (i.e. 
white South Africans) were able to remove themselves from responsibility as they were not 
compelled to partake in the activities of the TRC and were also left with their socio-economic 
position relatively untouched.     
In gacaca despite the fact that individuals were on trial, it was the responsibility of the 
community as a whole to recognise the truth of the events that had taken place and work 
collaboratively towards building a common narrative. In South Africa, the white population 
were horrified to learn of the atrocities that had taken place but were able to assign 
responsibility to the individuals appearing in the amnesty hearings. While ordinary Rwandans 
were all compelled to partake in the national reconciliation project, most South Africans were 
for the most part removed from this experience.  
In linking back to the significance of this difference for the model of process-based mediation, 
the difference between these cases does suggest that inclusive direct participation is necessary 
for engendering society-wide conflict transformation. Although there were flaws with the 
Rwandan system, it would have been difficult for any citizen, no matter how personally 
removed they had been from the conflict, to remove themselves from the reconciliation project. 
Relationships between ordinary South Africans were left largely untouched by the TRC 





The model for process-based mediation outlines that mediation projects must be designed with 
cognisance of the conflict context within which they will operate. Conflicts are in themselves 
dynamic processes, and therefore conflict responses must change parallel to the shifting 
contextual dynamics (Ramsbotham et al, 2016:206; Bercovitch, 1996:4). It is here that the 
historical contextualisation of Rwanda and South Africa is vital, especially given the protracted 
nature of their societal divisions, as disputants’ relationships are shaped by previous historical 
interaction (Miall, 2004:75-76).      
4.2.2.1 Application 
In Rwanda, the national reconciliation project after the genocide is said to have been shaped 
by several social factors unique to the Rwandan context (Melvin, 2010:932). The first of these 
is the mass participation of Hutu civilians in the genocide against the Tutsi population. The 
second is the geographical constraints associated with the small area and land-locked borders 
of the country itself. Outside of Kigali communities are mostly rural, meaning that the violent 
conflict of the civil war and genocide was intensified by poverty and overpopulation. Finally, 
the last important factor is that the reconciliation programme was informed by the RPF 
(Melvin, 2010:933). In other words, despite pronounced aims of reconciliation and justice, this 
process was dictated by the victors of war, a reality that would have significant consequences 
as will be discussed below.      
The influence of the first factor on gacaca has been discussed extensively above, in that the 
response to widespread citizen participation in the genocide was a transitional process which 
made community participation compulsory for all adult citizens. In terms of historical 
specificity this approach was matched to a traditional Rwandan mechanism of conflict 
resolution which opportunely suited the widespread nature of the violence. Although amnesty 
was discussed, it was thought that the widespread crimes required criminal prosecution of 
perpetrators, particularly to address the existing culture of impunity (De Brouwer & Ruvebana, 
2013:950). The use of a reformulated traditional mechanism did encounter a problem of 
incongruency in that the pre-colonial gacaca’s emphasis on collective responsibility for the 
crime was replaced by the individualisation of guilt to avoid collective stigmatisation of Hutus 
as génocidaires (Buckley-Zistel, 2005:122). This, along with the problems previously 
highlighted with public participation does illustrate the difficulties encountered in involving 




The second factor, that of geographical constraints, was also a driving contextual element 
behind the formulation of the contemporary gacaca courts. In pre-colonial times, before 
institutionalised national administration had been implemented, gacaca was used because 
community conflicts were central, particularly as a result of the close proximity of rural life 
(Buckley-Zistel, 2005:115). Following the genocide this proximity remained, resulting in what 
Drumbl (2002:8) dubs a “dualist post-genocidal society”. This means that both victim and 
perpetrator occupy the same territories and share the same public spaces, as well as the same 
language, religion and lifestyle. Thus, one of the contributing factors to finding such a 
widespread transitional mechanism was the reality of Hutus and Tutsis having to once again 
live in close proximity with one another, both geographically intermingled and economically 
interdependent.   
The physical location of the courts was also specific to the context as the fields and grasses on 
which trials were conducted were often the actual locations in which crimes were committed. 
The surrounding community would gather in these locations to try cases that occurred within 
their own boundaries and to their own citizens (Towner, 2015:285). This is symbolically 
significant and plays a part in the humanising of the victims, as perpetrators are made to stand 
in the location where they committed the crime, facing the people they have harmed, 
surrounded by the community that witnessed their actions. This humanising process is unlikely 
to have happened if perpetrators remained in prison, surrounded and supported by others with 
their same mindset (Drumbl, 2002:11).     
Finally, the reconciliation process was also informed by the stronghold of the RPF in the 
transitional government. The Rwandan case is an example of a contemporary conflict that falls 
outside of the usual bounds of mediation, as the rise in mediatory conflict responses has been 
attributed to the rise in negotiated settlements in post-Cold War intra-state conflict 
(Wallensteen & Svensson, 2014:317-318). As conflict has become less of a zero-sum game, its 
resolution has required more accommodation and dialogue, and disallowed the imposition of 
victor’s justice (Daly & Sarkin, 2007:9). However, this was not the case in Rwanda as the 
genocide only came to an end as a result of the RPA military victory, which enabled the RPF 
to set the transitional agenda. This influence of context on the mediation process was less 
positive than the previous two as it resulted in one of the primary critiques of the gacaca 
process – that it was biased in favour of RPF members and against the general Hutu population. 
The balance of power that underpinned the national reconciliation programme is exemplified 




Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) and National Service of Gacaca Jurisdiction 
(Melvin, 2010:934).      
The TRC, like the gacaca, was also intentionally shaped by its national context. While 
cognisant of the danger of essentialising ‘traditional African values’, it cannot be denied that 
the TRC is emotively linked to the African context through its purported foundation on the 
concept of ubuntu. This phrase is a Nguni concept that provides a shortened version of the 
proverb ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’, roughly translated as ‘a person is a person through other 
people’ (Jones, 2016:25). This communalistic value system includes a reciprocal relationship 
between the individual and the community as “individual security, safety, and well-being 
depend on ensuring such for others in the community,” (Akinola & Uzodike, 2018:93). The 
ubuntu rationale behind the TRC was that in participating and sharing in the process, a project 
of constructing national unity could be embarked upon creating a sense of belonging (Jones, 
201:26). The above discussion on actual public participation in the TRC has indicated that this 
foundation did not necessarily extend into practice. Nevertheless, similarly to the indigenous 
nature of the gacaca, in its original intentions the TRC was founded on indigenous African 
values and traditions.    
The restorative approach of the TRC is also matched to its context in that while the crimes 
committed in Rwanda were generally public knowledge, in South Africa the truth of apartheid 
crimes had long been denied and thereby covered over. The secrecy that shrouded the apartheid 
regime was by and large lifted by the detailed stories provided to the TRC, with the sincere 
remorse of some perpetrators having a real impact on how citizens reacted to the process 
(Gibson, 2006:417). Gibson (2006:423) points out that apartheid had been a very legalistic 
regime, with segregation laws forming its foundation. This created a political culture of 
legality, with the population being forced to stick quite succinctly to the divisions outlined in 
the laws of the country. Thus, the process of truth-telling in the TRC was constructive in the 
post-apartheid context as it delegitimised the previous government in the eyes of white South 
Africans by illuminating the extent of its misdeeds outside of the law.  
However, there were also less-positive elements of context-specificity in the case of the TRC. 
These were not so much a result of purposefully shaping the mechanism to the context but 
rather inadvertent ways in which the historical context was reflected in the process. Although 
the country is heralded for its ‘peaceful’ transition, the negotiations that made this possible did 




trend as a transitional institution that avoided challenging the status quo too severely (Stanley, 
2001:526). It can be argued that while this avoided the outbreak of full-scale civil war, it 
resulted in limited transformative potential for the process as the racial power structure created 
by the apartheid system was not broken down.        
Furthermore, criminal trials in the Nuremberg format were not altogether possible in the post-
apartheid context for several reasons, and the transitional government was essentially forced to 
sacrifice retributive justice. The apartheid bureaucracy was still in power during the 1990 to 
1994 period, so physical evidence of crimes was largely absent, missing or destroyed. An early 
attempt at high-profile prosecution in the case of Defence Minister Magnus Malan had ended 
in acquittal by 1996 and shown the political and monetary cost of formal criminal trials. Finally, 
the lack of decisive military victory meant that both extremes of retributive criminal trials and 
blanket amnesty were impossible (Jones, 2014:25). Despite the mass mobilisation achieved by 
the ANC and its UDF partner in South Africa, the liberation movement was simply not as 
militarily strong as the SADF bastion. During the 1980s, MK was attempting to topple a 
military regime that spent approximately $2.8 billion on its army alone, with its own budget 
only reaching between $8 million - $25 million (Stemmet, 2011:111). The ANC, weakened by 
the loss of Soviet support and facing a still active and strong SADF, had little choice but to 
accept the non-negotiable condition of amnesty laid out by apartheid leaders (Gibson, 
2006:424).    
Finally, while the appeal to African values of ubuntu did root the process in some form of 
African tradition, it can be argued that the opposite was true for the religious foundation of the 
process. Motsemme (2011:222-224) argues that the dominance of Christian chairpeople and 
mainstream Christian churches in the TRC proceedings marginalised African perspectives of 
healing. By allowing Christian narratives to supercede those of African Traditional Religion, 
Motsemme (2011) highlights the continued predominance of colonial institutions in the post-
apartheid system.  
4.2.2.2 Comparison 
In comparing the two cases and their individual manifestations of context-specificity, there are 
significant similarities that can be outlined. Firstly, the cases illustrate as expected that context 
must be taken into account when formulating a conflict response with the intention of 
transforming conflictual relationships. Both conflict responses were formulated with the 




of the post-conflict nation. The Rwandan case was unique in the mass participation of civilians 
and its geographical limits, resulting in an extreme example of the close quarters of 
contemporary intra-state conflict. A large majority of the population was involved in the 
conflict either as perpetrators, victims or witnesses, and yet had to live alongside one another 
once the violence had ended. Thus, the widespread participation and locality of the gacaca 
suited the dynamics of the post-conflict reality and left no-one who experienced the conflict 
out of the reconciliation process.   
The TRC was also matched to national contextual dynamics in its focus on truth-finding, given 
the secrecy of the apartheid era. The atrocities committed by the secret police were some of the 
most violent of the gross human rights violations committed during the apartheid era and yet 
they were the least documented. The truths brought forward during the TRC process, despite 
some being partial or incomplete, did show the South African population the reality of 
apartheid conflict and delegitimised any attempts to denounce the atrocities that were 
committed. 
A further similarity is particularly significant in the context of Africa and the legacies of 
colonial intervention. These two cases illustrate the potential success of African conflict 
mechanisms that turn from the norms of traditional Western criminal justice and are instead 
rooted in African custom and values. Gacaca was a traditional justice mechanism tailored 
specifically to the Rwandan context, particularly with regards to the close proximity of 
civilians’ lives and the community-centric nature of Rwandan society. These characteristics of 
the Rwandan landscape remained after the genocide and thus by using a reformulated version 
of this mechanism it was afforded a high level of legitimacy and understanding in the eyes of 
citizens. This is a level of legitimacy that far-removed normal courts and international 
mechanisms such as the ICTR would never have enjoyed.  
In South Africa, the TRC’s foundation in and advocacy of the values of ubuntu similarly 
grounded the process as a distinctly African response. This was needed in the context of a 
nation beginning the journey of distancing itself from the oppressive legacy of European rule. 
Particularly given the lack of responsibility afforded to the white population, this placed a 
moral expectation on white South Africans to become African in at least one significant way 
by adopting this cultural-ethical tradition (Jones, 2014:26). In both cases the shaping of the 
mechanism to the context had significant consequences in addressing issues specific to these 




However, it must be noted that both these cases also suggest that context-specificity is only 
positive insofar as it is intentional. While shaping the mediation process to match the dynamics 
of the conflict context, practitioners should be aware of how the context may in turn shape the 
conflict response. In the Rwandan case, the zero-sum military victory of the RPA placed its 
leaders in control of the transitional agenda while the opposition was demobilised to the extent 
that they could not re-ignite the conflict, regardless of their feelings towards the conflict 
response. While gacaca was in many ways well-matched to the project of reconciliation after 
the genocide, it can be described as a form of victor’s justice, given the lack of prosecution of 
RPA perpetrators. Similarly, in South Africa the TRC was limited by its formulation during 
the negotiated transition. The Commission was created by a transitional government that 
avoided upsetting the status quo and was limited due to the power still held by the main 
perpetrators, the apartheid leaders. It was also formulated within a system still structured by 
colonial institutions such as the Christian church. Therefore, the extent to which it was able to 
truly address the root causes of the conflict is questionable, as the inherent structure of the 
apartheid system was left largely intact.     
The above discussion can be summarised in saying that context-specificity would be an 
important characteristic in a process-based mediation project. In order to formulate a response 
that addresses the root causes of a conflictual relationship, it is necessary to understand both 
the current and historical background of this relationship. This is to ensure that the mediation 
project is intentionally shaped to match the conflict dynamics, and to ensure that any influence 
the context may in turn have on the project is accounted for. The need for practitioners to be 
aware of the conflict context suggests that mediators would benefit from having significant 
contextual knowledge to suit this need, a point which leads to the discussion of the next 
characteristic of process-based mediation – the Insider-Partial mediator.       
4.2.3 ‘Insider-Partial’ Mediator 
The discussion of this characteristic contributes to one of the most widely contested elements 
of mediation theory, that of the bias, neutrality and impartiality of the mediator. This contest is 
divided into two broad camps between those who are for25 and those who are against26 the idea 
that mediator impartiality is a necessary condition of effective mediation. Of the two broad 
camps, this study falls into the latter, advocating for Wehr and Lederach’s (1996:58-59) idea 
 
25 See Tillett & French (2010:105), Moore (1986:14-16) and Horowitz (2007:51). 




of the Insider-Partial mediator who is expected to be suited to societies with community-based 
norms such as those in many African countries. The Insider-Partial mediator is drawn from the 
conflict context specifically because of their connection to the local community (a point which 
is particularly important in a community-based project) and because of their extensive local 
knowledge to help in addressing the root causes of conflict (Wehr & Lederach, 1996:58-59). 
These traits provide the mediator with significant credibility leverage within their community.   
As a contribution towards African mediation theory specifically, in this study this characteristic 
is significant. Laurie Nathan, one of the most influential scholars in African mediation literature 
and practice, has posited that African mediation suffers from a lack of consideration when 
mediators are selected (Nathan, 2007:12). He has suggested that African mediators have in the 
past been selected based primarily on their status as prestigious African leaders, and not as a 
result of their mediation expertise (Nathan, 2005:10). While this is influenced by the fact that 
almost all mediation activity thus far on the continent has been concentrated at high-level 
negotiations, the critique is still relevant that African mediation requires a more conscientious 
approach in the choice of a mediator, based on their relevant skills, expertise and societal 
positioning.  
4.2.3.1 Application 
Despite the historic conflict between the Hutus and the Tutsis, Rwandan society has always 
been largely community-based (Prunier, 1995:1-5) and by the late 20th century most 
communities were made up of a mixture of these groups. In this context, specifically given the 
locality of genocide crimes and the resultant community-based nature of gacaca, it is expected 
that mediators with extensive contextual knowledge and ties to the community would be most 
suited to this conflict response. The gacaca judges, or inyangamugayo, therefore fit succinctly 
with the concept of the Insider-Partial mediator. These elected judges were respected 
individuals within Rwandan communities and seen to have a vested interest in the 
transformation of community conflict.  
According to the original design of the gacaca courts, the judges performed the role of mediator 
specifically in the final stages of the information-gathering phase. During validation meetings, 
judges were intended to balance accusations against defence testimonies in debates regarding 
the categorisation of defendants (Meyerstein, 2005:489). The Organic Law 16/2004 prohibited 
individuals with specific political or governmental affiliations from being elected to the Bench. 




gacaca courts (Meyerstein, 2007:475). Article 14 of Organic Law No. 16/2004 stated the 
conditions for Bench judges as: no participation in the genocide, free from ‘the spirit of 
sectarianism’, not having been sentenced to any imprisonment exceeding six months, of high 
morals and conduct, truthful and honest, and characterised by a ‘spirit of speech sharing’.    
In the political sense, there was still an emphasis on impartiality of the judge (read mediator), 
as evident political or governmental affiliations could lead to their dismissal from the Bench. 
However, in the sense of partiality towards the interests of the community, it can be said that 
this was a requirement of the gacaca judges. The intention was for individuals committed to 
the project of truth-finding and reconciliation of the community to take on the role of mediating 
between victim and perpetrator statements and in this way help construct a common narrative 
surrounding the genocide events.    
Unfortunately, in reality, the judges did not always end up performing this mediatory role. 
Information-gathering of the kind originally intended for the inyangamugayo was often 
relegated to underprepared nyumbakumi – individuals who head groups of ten households. 
Abuse of this position is said to have led to inaccurate information and false accusations 
(Meyerstein, 2005:489).    
It has also been reported that judges’ bias and community position did in some cases lead them 
to favouring the side of the perpetrators, resulting in a lack of protection for the victims. An 
individual example of this is the case of Pascasie Mukasakindi, a rape survivor who was 
supposed to testify in closed session, but had to endure community members listening in to her 
testimony and making disparaging remarks through the courtroom windows, which the judges 
did nothing to stop (De Brouwer and Ruvebana, 2013:949). The extent of the potential bias of 
judges is reflected in the fact that approximately 40% of the 254 000 elected judges had to be 
replaced as they were found to have been involved in the genocide themselves (De Brouwer & 
Ruvebana, 2013:941).    
However, interviews with survivors conducted by De Brouwer and Ruvebana (2013:948) 
indicated that generally both Hutu and Tutsi judges were commended for their professionalism. 
The authors also note that judges’ position as local citizens meant they knew their congregation 
well and could empathise well with their fellow community members and support survivors 
while testifying. This supports the suggestion of the process-based mediation model that the 
Insider positioning of the mediator is important in providing a constructive space for dialogue 




Furthermore, as suggested by Drumbl (2002:10), perpetrators are more easily shamed when 
there is familiarity between those involved in the conflict resolution process. In the case of 
Rwanda there is strong familiarity between victims, perpetrators, and the mediator as a result 
of the geographical constraints discussed above. Therefore, if Drumbl’s assertion is correct, the 
Insider positioning of the gacaca judges, alongside the public nature of hearings, is expected 
to have contributed to the shaming and remorse of perpetrators.   
The TRC differed from the gacaca in that the Commissioners, who played the role of mediator 
in this project, were more high-profile leaders that travelled to each community in which the 
hearings were being held. However, especially in the case of Chairperson Desmond Tutu, they 
can still in some ways be regarded as Insider-Partials.     
African truth commissions have generally been criticised for including commissioners who are 
too political and allied either to the government or a specific region. Hayner (1996:25) argued 
that African truth commissions need commissioners who can assert that the commission’s work 
is not politically motivated (Hayner, 1996:25). In this way as with the gacaca courts, 
impartiality in the political sense is seen as negative as it would threaten the legitimacy of the 
mechanism, however partiality in favour of the community and improving disputant 
relationships could signify better trust between the mediator and disputants.   
Chairperson Desmond Tutu is said to have played a primary role in the TRC’s reconciliatory 
ambitions. His involvement was intended to signify that the Commission was not simply a 
façade for a political amnesty deal (Evans, 2016:708). In alignment with the balance of 
accountability upheld by the Commission, Tutu’s relative independence from any political 
organisation, especially from the ANC, meant that he was considered effective at casting blame 
on all sides of the conflict (Gibson, 2006:427). Although this does suggest impartiality was key 
in the character of Tutu as a mediator, he was partial in a sense towards the South African 
population as a whole.        
Archbishop Tutu’s religious affiliations and ideology fit well with dominant notions of 
reconciliation (Gibson, 2006:427). In particular the emphasis on forgiveness, sincere remorse 
for wrongdoing and repentance from future offences were all particular focus points he brought 
to the Commission and that contributed to its reconciliatory potential. Tutu’s persona, 
alongside continued support from President Mandela, was also important in legitimising the 




One high-profile example of his partiality towards remorse and focus on reconciliation is his 
imploring of Winnie Madikizela-Mandela during her testimony saying, “You are a great person 
and you don’t know how your greatness would be enhanced if you were to say: “Sorry. Things 
went wrong, forgive me”. I beg you’,” (as quoted in Evans, 2016:716). Although Tutu’s 
political impartiality is often stressed as a reason for his legitimacy, in alignment with the 
advocacy of an Insider-Partial mediator it was also his clear vested interest in the reconciliation 
of South Africans that helped legitimise the process. 
4.2.3.2 Comparison 
A comparison of the mediators in each of these examples illustrates the continued relevance of 
the partiality debate. On the one hand, they both suggest that political partiality can be 
detrimental to the conflict transformation process. In Rwanda, the fact that many judges were 
Hutus themselves and closely connected to the Hutu proportion of their communities, meant 
that certain judges were seen as biased on favour of Hutu perpetrators. Certain survivors’ 
experiences show that contrary to the expectation of international human rights organisations 
that lawyer-less courts would disadvantage the perpetrators27; it was often the survivors who 
would have benefitted from more support in the face of potentially biased judges. In South 
Africa, the political independence of Chairperson Tutu and his resultant even-handedness 
legitimised his role in the process and further served to legitimise the collective truth that was 
produced by the work of the TRC. These cases therefore suggest that in national conflict 
transformation processes where political division is evident, political impartiality is a necessary 
component of mediator identity. 
However, with regards to the advantages of using an Insider-Partial mediator, the cases also 
serve to validate the potential of an individual drawn from the local context who has extensive 
knowledge of the community dynamics and a vested interest in the constructive transformation 
of conflict relationships. Both the gacaca judges and the TRC commissioners, especially the 
figure of Archbishop Tutu, were important figures in the landscape of their respective 
communities and had vested interests in moving society towards the goal of reconciliation. Had 
these mediators been completely neutral outsiders, perhaps from the international community, 
it is unlikely that they would have had the same contextual knowledge required to shape these 
 
27 This critique of human rights organisations, particularly that of Amnesty International, is discussed further 




processes to achieve reconciliation within their particular contexts. It is also unlikely that they 
would have enjoyed the trust of the communities involved.  
Therefore, in terms of the model for process-based mediation, political impartiality is relevant 
and cannot be completely disregarded, however the Insider-Partial mediator does provide a 
suitable framework for mediators’ role in African community-based mediation projects. It can 
be said that the use of an Insider-Partial mediator in both cases added a sense of legitimacy to 
the proceedings due to their positioning as important members of society. Given that 
impartiality in the political sense is one of the most debated elements of traditional mediation, 
it is unsurprising that political impartiality seems to be held up as an important characteristic 
of the mediators involved in these cases. However, the Insider status of the mediator does take 
on new meaning and importance within this model.  
4.2.4 Resource Pressure 
The fourth element advocated by the process-based mediation model is that of limiting as far 
as possible the resource pressure on the project. In the context of traditional mediation focused 
on outcomes and settlements, time pressure is seen as a positive element in the process as it 
encourages fast agreements and culminates active combat quickly. However, while this may 
solve the immediate conflict crisis, forced agreements are often not self-enforcing and fall apart 
once the mediator leaves the foray (Beardsley, 2008:723-724). This study follows the finding 
of Pinfari (2011) that only when time pressure is low or absent are agreements durable and 
transfers this idea into a project of transformation. The expectation is that durable changes in 
disputant relationships will require low resource pressure so as to afford disputants enough 
time to communicate their grievances in full and to construct new relationship dynamics. 
4.2.4.1 Application  
In a conflict as violent as that experienced during the Rwandan genocide, it is logical that the 
conflict response will take time to address the breadth and depth of societal destruction. The 
gacaca system however, being built on a traditional mechanism that simply required the 
community sitting together on a communal grass, required few physical resources to take place. 
The decade over which the process operated indicates that the government was prepared to take 
the time required to address the conflict as widely as necessary for transformation to occur.  
It is clear from the information-gathering process that priority was given to taking the time for 




Assemblies took two to three months carrying out six informational surveys through a series 
of meetings. These surveys named and listed those who lived in the cell prior to the genocide 
beginning, those who had died during the period of October 1990 to December 1994, those 
cell-members who had died elsewhere, lists of property damage and those suspected of 
participating in the genocide and their respective alleged crimes (Meyerstein, 2007:476). Each 
data-collecting ‘session’ would carry out as many of these meetings as was required to 
complete the six surveys (Meyerstein, 2007:476). There was therefore an institutional 
commitment written in to the gacaca procedures to build as full a picture of the genocide as 
possible, regardless of the lengthy time it took.       
The exceptional length and breadth of this project did however produce an unforeseen 
consequence in that through confessions and the requirement of incriminating co-conspirators, 
the number of accused rose continuously, with an extra 63 447 suspects implicated by the end 
of the pilot phase (Meyerstein, 2007:477) and estimates of over one million accused suspects 
by 2008 (Longman, 2009:310). The pressure that this exorbitant number of suspects placed on 
government resources was reflected in actions taken to release a large number of suspects. In 
January 2003, a Presidential Order released 25 000 prisoners in categories such as the very old 
or underage (Meyerstein, 2005:475). This was followed by a further release of 36 000 inmates 
in July 2005 (Meyerstein, 2005:475). It is thought that this was the government’s response to 
the pressure placed on national resources by overcrowded prisons (Meyerstein, 2005:487).  
Furthermore, while the actual proceedings themselves required little monetary resources, the 
time cost of dedicating one full day a week to gacaca hearings was felt by the citizens 
themselves. As discussed above, this resulted in low public participation and animosity towards 
the process as a whole.  
The TRC was even more limited than the gacaca due to resource pressure, reflected in both a 
limited mandate and limited time period over which to conduct its work. As a result of 
restrictions imposed by the government on the time and finances afforded to the Commission, 
its mandate was limited to ‘gross violations of human rights’. The principal acts documented 
by the Commission included murders by both state agents and armed opposition, 
disappearances, torture and abuse by the police and armed forces, abuse in opposition detention 
camps outside South Africa and raids into neighbouring countries by armed forces targeting 
the opposition (Hayner, 2006:302). While this placed particular focus on the horrific acts 




it provided limited acknowledgement of the structural and institutional nature of apartheid 
segregation (Stanley, 2001:530). Furthermore, it focused on human rights violations that 
involved bodily trauma, and did not look at violations such as socio-economic dispossession 
or forced removals that had arguably more pervasive effects (Evans, 2016:708; Hayner, 
2006:302). This limitation in turn limited the potential of the TRC to contribute to social 
transformation, as it dealt only with these high-profile events and not with the structure that 
had produced them.   
The time afforded to the TRC to fulfil its mandate was simply not long enough to heal the 
extended history of conflict and division at the root of apartheid segregation (Stanley, 
2001:542). As has been noted before, it would be misguided to judge the success of a project 
in achieving a goal it was not in fact intended to achieve. The TRC had the purpose of gathering 
testimonies from victims and perpetrators of gross human rights violations during the apartheid 
era, a mandate that was dictated by time pressures. It did fulfil this mandate and heard 
thousands of testimonies. However, the fact that reconciliation took place more so at the 
individual level as opposed to the societal level does show the impact that limited time and in 
turn limited mandate can have on the transformative potential of a transitional project.   
4.2.4.2 Comparison 
Concerning the characteristic of resource pressure, the differences between the two cases are 
therefore significant. The gacaca courts, though incurring costs on the side of the participants, 
required few physical resources relative to other transitional mechanisms such as criminal trials 
or a travelling truth commission, as was the case with the TRC. This meant that gacaca was 
able to operate for a decade, covering a breadth and depth of the conflict that would otherwise 
have been practically impossible, particularly given the decimation of infrastructure as a result 
of the violence. Due to the developing nature of African economies, transitional mechanisms 
often face a nation-building project with very little resources to fund them. The gacaca 
therefore again provide an example of an African country finding an innovative indigenous 
solution to a problem experienced by many other post-conflict African countries.      
The TRC on the other hand was limited in its available resources but was also in itself a costly 
process, resulting in a limited mandate covering only gross human rights violations. Although 
these were important historical events that had been largely covered up before the work of the 
Commission, they represented the worst outcomes of an extensive underlying system of 




needed to be brought to light to give families and victims some form of closure, and to hold 
perpetrators accountable in the public eye, this limited mandate resulted in a national focus on 
individual events and people, instead of dismantling the underlying oppressive system. The 
project did not infiltrate the grassroots level of South African society, allowing many to remove 
themselves from the reconciliation project and failing to create the mediative space required 
for disputant relationships to be transformed on a national scale.  
Resource pressure is therefore shown to be an important element for mediation practitioners to 
be conscious of, as durable transformation of conflictual societal relationships requires a much 
longer process than traditional mediation allows for. Although there are not always extensive 
resources available to aid in a long-term reconciliatory project, it is up to the formulators of the 
mediation project to find practical solutions that will be sustainable at a grassroots level. One 
can reiterate here the sentiments of Ramsbotham et al (2016:215) and Gartner and Bercovitch 
(2006) as mentioned in Chapter Two concerning the importance of ‘Track II’ mediation efforts 
involving non-state civil society actors. These efforts can maintain pressure on governmental 
reconciliation activities and continue reconciliatory practices long after the state-led 
transitional period has come to an end. If civil society can be included in state-sanctioned 
transitional mechanisms, this may relieve some resource pressure off government reserves and 
reinforce a feeling of communal responsibility for the reconciliation project.   
4.2.5 Relational Focus 
This analysis now turns to the final, and most important characteristic of the process-based 
mediation model, that of the relational focus. Of the five elements included in the model, it is 
this one that most obviously removes the practice of mediation from the field of conflict 
settlement or management and reconceptualises it within the field of conflict transformation. 
The aim of the mediation project is no longer reaching a negotiated agreement based on 
compromising disputants’ interests but is extended to creating a social space in which the 
quality of their relational interaction can begin to change (Lederach, 2002:92). In this way 
mediation can be used to engender more sustainable peace, due to the transformation of 
conflictual relationships at their root cause.    
4.2.5.1 Application   
An analysis of gacaca in light of this relational element highlights the mechanism’s focus on 
transforming disputant relationships through the mediation of opposing testimonies. As the 




that its aims went beyond those of elite-level settlement and cessation of violence as is typical 
of traditional mediation approaches. It created the social space for incremental shifts in the 
quality of relational interaction between disputants (Lederach, 2002:92), and was premised off 
goals of reconciliation and (in some ways) restorative justice. The Rwanda Reconciliation 
Barometer (RRB) (NURC, 2015:25) notably found in 2015 that Rwandans do in fact view 
reconciliation as relational, agreeing that it involves ‘building good relationships’ (97.9% of 
citizens, 87.1% of which strongly agree), asking for forgiveness (98.2% of citizens), and 
granting forgiveness (98% of citizens). This suggests that the Rwandan transitional process did 
emphasise relational change as important for reconciliation, leaving a lasting impression on the 
citizenry.       
Turning to the elements of Bush and Folger’s (1994) ‘transformative mediation’ as discussed 
in Chapter Two, one can draw parallels with two of the gacaca process’ stated aims. The first 
of these was the intention to establish the truth about the genocide (Buckley-Zistel, 2005:116). 
This contributes to the element deemed necessary in transformative mediation of recognition 
of disputant experiences. Survivors were given the opportunity to talk about their experiences 
in gacaca, giving them an audience to hear stories that otherwise would not have been told in 
such a public manner (De Brouwer & Ruvebana, 2013:946). As has been mentioned above, the 
community-centred nature of the project with its public testimony and confrontation of 
perpetrators was intended to both bring out the whole truth of the events and have the 
community collectively recognise the victim’s suffering (Longman, 2009:306). The 
institutionalised and government-mandated nature of the gacaca also contributed to 
recognition at the bureaucratic level, as there was official acknowledgement of human rights 
abuses and violations (Melvin, 2010:934).  
During the trials, accusations and testimonies did become heated but even this has been seen 
as a positive element allowing for hidden grievances and resentments to be made public 
knowledge, encouraging the community to fully recognise the extent of divisions and from that 
point find constructive ways to deal with them (Longman, 2009:308). Through these kinds of 
interaction recognition could also go both ways between victims and perpetrators, with each 
side recognising the other as a ‘moral equal’ (Maddison, 2017:161). Perpetrators would be 
forced to bear witness to the suffering of their victims and recognise the part they played in 
producing such suffering. Perpetrators’ families in some cases were shown the extent of their 
family members’ actions that they had not previously known in full (De Brouwer & Ruvebana, 




government-sanctioned violence and the consequential pressure placed on some Hutu 
perpetrators, inducing the recognition of a different side of the conflict (De Brouwer & 
Ruvebana, 2013:946; Wielenga & Harris, 2011:23). This process of mediating between 
different experiences can be regarded as a key dimension of gacaca that matches the relational 
focus in this model of process-based mediation.                 
The gacaca also contributed to the second element of Bush and Folger’s (1994) transformative 
approach, that of empowerment. This can be seen clearly in the stated aim of giving the 
Rwandan population the means and capacity to solve their own problems (Buckley-Zistel, 
2005:116). This pan-Africanist-type ownership of the transitional process fits quite directly 
into Bush and Folger’s (1994) stated need for a process of empowerment in mediation attempts 
intended to transform disputant relationships. The genocide had not only left survivors with 
broken families, communities and bodies, but had broken their collective spirit leaving feelings 
of hopelessness and fear. The gacaca process allowed victims and communities on the whole 
to take ownership of their own narrative, speaking their stories out into the world and having 
them recorded as a part of Rwandan history.    
The relational focus as evidenced by a restorative element is seen in the confession mechanism 
of the gacaca, intended to encourage apology and forgiveness (Buckley-Zistel, 2005:117; 
Longman, 2009:306). The hearings provided a space in which perpetrators were compelled to 
face their victims, in the hopes that humanising the crime in connection with the victim would 
inspire sincere remorse. This was intended to give relief to victims by finding out the full truth 
of events and seeing perpetrators convicted for their confessed crimes (De Brouwer & 
Ruvebana, 2013:942). In some cases, confessions also resulted in perpetrators directing 
families to where the remains of their victims lay, allowing for proper burials which are 
symbolic in Rwandan society (Longman, 2009:308). The plea-bargaining exchange of prison 
time for work done in service of the community or the victim is further thought to have been 
restorative in its potential to reintegrate offenders back into their communities (Longman, 
2009:306).     
This is not to say that most confessions were sincere or even deemed necessary by the 
perpetrators. One author reported from interviews with survivors, that they were shocked by 
the arrogance of some perpetrators who argued “that the state (and for some also God) has 
forgiven them and thus demand that the survivors do so, too,” (Buckley-Zistel, 2005:125). In 




stories. Particularly in cases concerning sexual violence, many perpetrators are suspected to 
have given only partial confessions, as full confession could result in life imprisonment (De 
Brouwer & Ruvebana, 2013:947).       
Through what she calls a ‘Fantasy Theme Analysis’ of trial transcripts, Towner (2015) finds a 
pattern in the rhetoric of survivors versus perpetrators that shows the significance of mediating 
a common narrative through communication in the gacaca space. Perpetrators are found to 
have what Towner (2015:290) describes as a “macro-vision”, that despite the limited mandate 
of each court (geographic boundaries of the community and time boundaries for crimes 
committed between October 1990 and December 1994) sees testimonies extending far beyond 
its bounds emphasising systemic, historical causes. Survivors on the other hand are described 
as having “micro-vision”, with their testimonies emphasising localised details of genocide 
events in specific people, places and implications or effects.  
The allocation of responsibility in the macro-vision is on large groups and higher-level 
leadership while the micro-vision points out specific individuals. The macro plotline is 
‘collective and conspiratorial’, with ideological motives given and indirect means used such as 
laws, military orders and fear. The micro plotline however highlights the personal nature of the 
violence with neighbour killing neighbour, motives of vengeance or hatred, and using handheld 
weapons such as machetes and clubs (Towner, 2015:292). It is interesting to note here that in 
the survivor interviews conducted by De Brouwer and Ruvebana (2013:944) all interviewees 
agreed to have their names included in any research published from their experiences, with 
many specifically requesting the inclusion. This demonstrates the detailed and personalised 
‘micro-vision’ of survivors’ narratives in that they wish to be recognised as specific individuals 
with specific personal experiences. Towner’s (2015) analysis is not only a compelling insight 
into the different psyches of victim versus perpetrator but is significant in showing the necessity 
for communication of experiences between these groups in the process of recognition and 
rewriting the accepted truth of events. 
When turning to the case of the TRC, the limited mandate of dealing only with gross human 
rights violations in turn limited the potential of the mechanism in engendering societal 
relationship transformation. Despite the gravity of these violations, they were not nearly as 
widespread in South Africa as in Rwanda and therefore by only addressing these crimes the 
mechanism did not directly involve society at large. However, in its official intentions the 




participation. As stated with regards to its openness to the public, through attempts to be 
accessible the TRC was intended to shift relationships between citizens, despite the focus of 
hearings on individual perpetrators. The use of a truth commission as opposed to legal trials 
meant that it was accessible to ordinary citizens, a necessity if the process is to be directed at a 
project of societal transformation (Gibson, 2006:424).    
As was the case with gacaca, the TRC contributed to the necessary element for transformative 
mediation, that of recognition. Stanley (2001:529) succinctly states that “In allocating a space 
for those who have been previously silenced, the Commission played a part in affirming that 
individual experiences of trauma are important at a societal level.” The work of the truth 
commission and the publication of its Final Report were state-sanctioned, which provided an 
official acknowledgement of victims’ previously denied truths and played an important 
psychological role in healing (Hayner, 1996:22). The official end of the process and publication 
of a Final Report is also thought to lend a feeling of closure to individual victims and society 
(Hirsch et al., 2012:387).   
In terms of the empowerment potential of the TRC, it did give victims the opportunity to take 
control of their own stories and have their history written in a way that reflected their 
experience. Despite the fact that amnesty was granted, due to the involvement and direction of 
commissioners in the dialogue amnesty hearings are said to have often turned into “tutorials 
on reconciliation and forgiveness” (Gibson, 2006:425).     
Similar to the micro- and macro-visions Towner (2015) discusses with regards to Rwandan 
perpetrators and victims, Gibson (2004b:132) distinguishes between the micro- and macro-
truths of reconciliation in South Africa. These two truths represent two different relationship 
planes on which reconciliation can and should occur. The micro-truth is the truth of what 
happened to specific loved ones and involves the direct relationship between victims and 
perpetrators. This kind of reconciliation was the most publicised during the TRC process as it 
was the most visual. The macro-truth on the other hand concerns reconciliation between racial 
groups on the whole, operating more at a societal level. This macro-truth requires an acceptance 
of responsibility for harms done under the apartheid regime, an acceptance that many white 
South Africans have not entirely maintained, as will be discussed below with regards to the 
transformative success of the TRC.      
Following his own research Gibson (2006:414) has concluded that the TRC process produced 




bringing to light the reality of the lived experience on all sides of the conflict, the TRC was 
able to inspire attitude change or ‘cognitive dissonance’ with citizens’ conscious/sub-conscious 
views. What is interesting here with regards to this study is that this altering of South Africans’ 
attitudes towards one another was not necessarily a direct product of truth-finding but could 
arguably be explained as a result of building a common understanding. If a project of process-
based mediation is focused intently on this goal in creating a new common narrative based on 
the experiences of all parties involved, and thereby altering the relationship disputants have 
with one another, it could achieve the same cognitive dissonance as was produced by the TRC.  
Wielenga (2011:42) in fact posits that, “This was at the heart of the TRC: a rehumanisation of 
both perpetrators and victims, so that South Africans could begin to engage each other as 
human beings in relationships, in the way that Lederach described.” 
4.2.5.2 Comparison 
These two cases thus demonstrate the process-based mediation characteristic of a relational 
focus but to varying degrees. Both mechanisms contributed to the recognition and 
empowerment of disputants (especially victims) in providing the space for them to share their 
experiences on a public platform. The key process that this engendered was the creation of a 
common narrative concerning the events of the past, thereby creating a foundation for moving 
forward from a place of mutual understanding. The extent to which the general public accepted 
this common narrative is however different in the two cases and is linked to the extent of public 
participation. In the gacaca courts the whole community was compelled to be involved in the 
process, meaning that all of society was made responsible for the reconciliation project. In 
South Africa on the other hand, while there were captivating events of individual reconciliation 
between victims and perpetrators of gross human rights violations28, the lack of widespread 
participation limited the societal transformation the project could engender.  
Neither of the mechanisms were focused on conflict settlement or mitigation, both were 
formulated with the intention of catalysing reconciliation at a societal level. Therefore, both 
provide examples of a mediated conflict transformation initiative, however their approach at 
achieving this goal was different and resulted in differing transformative capabilities. This 
suggests that the multi-faceted analysis provided in this study is valid, as in assessing the 
characteristic of relational focus, the extent of community participation, informed by the 
conflict context, is shown to have an effect. These characteristics are inextricably linked to one 
 




another and therefore in formulating mediation projects practitioners must be cognisant of them 
all, and the effect they will have on one another.   
As a final comment on the relational characteristic, while it is recognised that neither project 
was run as a mediation project employing intentional mediation techniques, both provided a 
space in which common understanding could be created and at the very least laid the foundation 
for disputing parties to view each other as moral equals. Given that this relational impact was 
more a by-product of the truth-finding process than an intentional step-by-step transformative 
mediation approach, the hope would be that a project intentionally formulated with the 
theorised relational focus in mind would be even more successful at transforming disputant 
relationships.          
4.3 Transformative Success 
Having analysed the cases of the gacaca courts and the TRC with regards to the analytical 
framework of process-based mediation, the study now turns to an assessment of the 
transformative success of the mechanisms. As the purpose of this study is to advocate for a 
model of mediation aimed at driving a process of society-wide transformation, the 
transformative success of each case must be analysed. In discussing their demonstrated ability 
to transform disputant relationships, the explanatory potential of the five process-based 
mediation characteristics can be explored.     
In the case of the gacaca courts, it must first and foremost be recognised that certain sections 
of the international community, particularly human rights NGOs, opposed the gacaca form of 
justice. One such organisation was Amnesty International (AI) (Meyerstein, 2007:468). This 
opposition was founded on the organisation’s claim that the informal, testimony-based trials 
failed to satisfy the demands of Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, which includes the right to fair trials, the right to be presumed innocent, the right to 
equality of arms, and the right to impartial judges. This critique is valid in that while the 
methods of the courts allowed for the processing of over two million cases in ten years, this 
was not without some sacrifice in terms of perpetrator representation.  
Furthermore, it cannot be denied that the RPF has created a political system that more closely 
resembles a dictatorship than the liberal democracy Rwanda is purported to be. Disappearances 
and unexplained deaths seem to follow any political opposition, and so-called free and fair 
elections have kept Kagame’s coalition party in power with a vast majority of the vote since 




able to set the agenda post-war with little opportunity for dissent from the disempowered losing 
side.           
Returning to the gacaca process itself, despite all good intentions associated with community 
participation fostering ownership of the process and improving communication, the lack of 
participation at least initially in gacaca undermined these key aims, inhibiting the achievement 
of a common ‘social truth’ and thereby inhibiting the potential for reconciliation (Buckley-
Zistel, 2005:119). As argued by Daly and Sarkin (2007:6), the potential of truth to lead to 
reconciliation is threatened when there are opposing conceptions of this truth, making the 
narrative-building potential of process-based mediation important in its reconciliatory success. 
Without public buy-in to this process the reconciliatory potential of gacaca was thus 
threatened.  
The absence of physical evidence and promotion of confessions also made it difficult for the 
gacaca to fulfil its intention of finding the whole truth and instigating sincere apologies from 
perpetrators. On the side of the Tutsi population, the process lost legitimacy due to threats and 
violence against witnesses, incomplete confessions, majority Hutu General Assemblies and 
reliance on witness testimonies subject to intimidation (De Brouwer & Ruvebana, 2013:949). 
The government had lost a certain measure of trust of the Tutsi population before the national 
trials had even begun as overcrowding in prisons had led to the afore-mentioned release of 
prisoners through two Presidential Orders (Meyerstein, 2005:475). A lack of process 
legitimacy and the potential for partial testimonies thereby inhibited victim-perpetrator 
relationship transformation as the creation of a common narrative upon which the process 
depends is also threatened.     
Perhaps one of the biggest obstacles to the transformative success of the gacaca was its sole 
mandate over genocide crimes – in other words, ignoring crimes committed by the RPF during 
the insurgency of 1990-1994, the massacres after they had taken office, and the tens of 
thousands of deaths during the 1996 invasion of the Congo. It is estimated that the RPF’s 
campaign to end the genocide along with attacks intended to find remaining Hutu extremists 
had led to between 25 000 and 60 000 Hutu deaths (Meyerstein, 2007:472). Despite this reality 
there came to be a problematic relationship between gacaca and ethnic identity, as crimes were 
only considered to be part of the genocide, and thereby the gacaca mandate, if the perpetrator 




the eyes of the Hutu population as well, as this came across as a kind of ‘victor’s justice’ 
(Buckley-Zistel, 2005:123).    
This victimisation Hutus felt was supported by the fact that conviction in gacaca became 
legally sufficient grounds for termination of employment and also stripped the perpetrator of 
many of their civic rights as citizens, including the right to hold public office and the right to 
vote. This placed many Hutu in a “socially subservient and vulnerable position” (Longman, 
2009:310), potentially reinforcing this root cause of societal division. Penal Reform 
International (PRI) (2006:49) states that although it is difficult to determine the true extent of 
false accusations, they are not negligible and contributed to the collective fear and anxiety felt 
by the Hutu population once the gacaca were rolled out nationally.      
However, despite these procedural issues with gacaca, its aim of reconciliation did remain a 
focus throughout the process and in the minds of citizens. An important point to note is that 
most of the critique administered against the gacaca was a result of government intervention 
and manipulation of the process (Longman, 2009:309), as in the case of excluding RPF crimes, 
and therefore not necessarily a result of flaws in the process itself. In interviews with survivors, 
reconciliation is almost always mentioned as a key objective of the courts (De Brouwer & 
Ruvebana, 2013:951; Clark, 2010:308) showing that despite the various issues threatening the 
legitimacy of gacaca truth, reconciliation did remain a primary objective of the citizenry 
throughout.   
One positive element to the gacaca process linked to the transformative mediation goal of 
empowerment was the ownership of the process by Rwandans themselves. It is important to 
note here the positive view of citizens towards gacaca compared to the ICTR, which by and 
large is viewed as a somewhat hypocritical imposition of the international community, stepping 
in to ‘provide justice’ when there was almost no response from international actors before or 
during the genocide itself (Drumbl, 2002:12). The gacaca presented an innovative and 
legitimate attempt to transform traditional Rwandan social institutions to fit contemporary 
social needs (Longman, 2009:307). Particularly in the African post-colonial context where 
states have struggled to restructure social institutions in truly African ways, the gacaca provide 
an example of former South African President Thabo Mbeki’s often-used adage: ‘African 
solutions to African problems’.   
This focus on the locally specific nature of gacaca is evident in the Rwandan Supreme Court’s 




response borders on a form of ‘soft’ cultural relativism, the points it raises concerning a lack 
of recognition of Rwanda’s resource limitations are completely valid. The Supreme Court 
highlighted the immense difficulty the Rwandan government faced in providing a solution 
“given the near-impossible context of a mass participatory genocide in a developing country” 
(Meyerstein, 2007:469).         
Despite the Western critiques questioning the fairness of lawyer-less criminal trials, the gacaca 
arguably included innovative elements of fair trials outside of the Western criminal court 
structure. In this light gacaca is only viewed as deficient in its capacity as a substitute for 
Western transitional justice (Meyerstein, 2007:470). Extensive public participation provided 
more transparency and public oversight than is often possible in transitional mechanisms, and 
decentralised control of each community’s process could explain survey data suggesting 
widespread support (90.8% of Rwandans in February 2002) of gacaca before trials even began 
(Longman, 2009:307).      
As an institutionalised process for justice and reconciliation, the gacaca was successful in 
recording and trying the vast majority of genocide cases that otherwise would have taken over 
a lifetime to achieve. Communities were able to voice their experiences and create a common 
narrative around significant events. In many cases survivors found out how friends and family 
had died and where their bodies were buried (Wielenga & Harris, 2011:23). These effects 
together show how the gacaca was able to transform the post-genocide society from one of 
distrust and suspicion to one of comparatively open dialogue, facilitating a new narrative 
around the violence and disrupting the divisive relationship between the Hutus and the Tutsis.    
In line with the theories of John Paul Lederach, the physical and metaphorical space that gacaca 
created is perhaps the most vital ‘relational’ component to this study. Lederach’s theories of 
reconciliation as a place (Lederach, 1997:25-26) and social mediative capacity (Lederach, 
2002:92) must be recalled here. When describing reconciliation as a place, Lederach contends 
that it can only be achieved when a social space has been created where Truth, Mercy, Justice 
and Peace meet together. Gacaca created this physical social space, where the General 
Assembly creates a boundary inside of which the perpetrator and witnesses stand or step 
forward to give their testimonies, faced by the locally elected judges (Towner, 2015:285). 
Within this space Truth was the professed goal, Mercy was given in exchange for confession 
and apology, Justice was served through sentencing, and Peace was instigated by communities 




In assessing the ‘success’ of the gacaca, a phrase used by Buckley-Zistel (2005:113) regarding 
the rationale of the process is useful to consider. She describes the fact that the intention and 
incentives of truth-telling were to uncover past wrongs and, in this way, move towards a 
consolidated peace. It is the use of the word consolidated here that could be descriptive of the 
transformative success of this process.  
Given that the gacaca had the enormous, arguably insurmountable, task of reconciling a nation 
after the most rapidly destructive genocide in history, the mark of its success cannot be a 
completely reconciled nation in which all is forgiven and forgotten but is instead measured by 
the consolidation of its people. Consolidation means to bring several entities together to form 
a stronger and more effective whole. Again, one can stress the fact that in terms of its 
democratic consolidation, the Rwandan political system leaves much to be desired. There can 
be no denying that intimidation and suppression are rife within the work of the RPF. There is 
room to suggest that any post-genocide government institution, the gacaca included, would 
have been negatively affected by RPF dominance. However, the aim of this study was not to 
analyse the democratic consolidation of the cases, but to ascertain whether the process-based 
mediation project did transform conflict relationships and thereby consolidate citizen 
relationships. Through the discussion it facilitated, gacaca helped neighbours who had just 
months before been perpetrators and victims of intentional massacre, sit together and once 
again live alongside one another. Recognising that there is still much work to be done before 
Rwanda can be regarded a stable democracy, one can argue that conflict relationships were to 
a certain extent transformed.            
This distinction in assessment of transformative success is not unique to this study, as the 
deduction of peaceful co-existence being a sufficient sign of reconciliation thus far falls into 
the pragmatic of two ‘reconciliation camps’, the other being a moral (Christian) approach 
viewing reconciliation as broad-based social harmony (Buckley-Zistel, 2005:114). It is true 
that certain civil and political rights have been pushed to the wayside as a cost of promoting 
state legitimacy and nation-building (Melvin, 2010:933), as is demonstrated by the lack of legal 
support in gacaca trials. However, in comparison to the lawlessness and division of the 
genocide era, the post-gacaca Rwanda demonstrates an undeniably more consolidated 
citizenry.      
While the process was flawed and many victims may have felt silenced, many others were able 




point off which all understood the gravity of their community’s division and could from there 
at least attempt to move forward (Longman, 2009:308). Survivors report that before the gacaca 
process began in 2001, Hutu and Tutsi could not even greet each other on the street, yet after 
gacaca they were able to talk, invite one another into their homes, come to each other’s aid, 
and even intermarry. It is also not uncommon to find survivors living with the families of their 
relatives’ killers or living alongside perpetrators who have served their sentence and re-joined 
the community (De Brouwer & Ruvebana, 2013:952).    
It was gacaca that provided the physical space and impetus for this communication to take 
place that is otherwise unlikely to have happened. Along with other NURC programmes, 
gacaca has contributed to reshaping the rhetoric around the genocide, restructuring 
“discussion, education and legislation surrounding ethnicity, identity and Rwandan history” 
(Melvin, 2010:933). Here the project was able to unveil the roots of division left behind by the 
genocide and thus is a signifier of some level of transformative success.   
A quote from one genocide survivor, Beatrice Bazayirwa, shows the reality of gacaca success 
despite is shortfalls when she asked at the end of an interview: “Are there people who are going 
to read this? I am asking you, because there are some people abroad who deny or underestimate 
the workings of gacaca. You, however, have been able to visit us in Rwanda and to get the real 
truth from us survivors. You should make it clear to others that gacaca was very important to 
Rwandans; it brought us from one level to the other” (De Brouwer & Ruvebana, 2013:964).  
In turning to the case of the TRC however, relationship transformation was arguably more 
aesthetic than deep-rooted. As the hearings were focused on individual perpetrators and their 
testimonies, it is unsurprising that some of the most note-worthy indicators of TRC 
reconciliation were in the form of individuals with reconciliatory attitudes (Stanley, 2001:542). 
One example of this was the “symbol of hope” handshake between Neville Clarence and 
Aboobaker Ismail. Clarence, a former South African Air Force captain, lost his sight after 
falling victim to a bomb attack, planted by Ismail, the former head of the MK special operations 
unit (TRC, 1998:392). The hope in publicising individual events such as this was that South 
African society would find inspiration in the emotive visual representation of a reconciliatory 
spirit. Ultimately however, these interactions involved only the individual disputants, while 
wider society voyeuristically watched reconciliation take place from a distance, personally 




Despite critiques regarding the fullness of truth uncovered through the TRC, it is undeniable 
that the project illuminated the realities of apartheid to the broader population, particularly the 
oblivious white portion. This is significant as the legal apparatus of the apartheid government 
had rendered the black population practically invisible to the eyes of white South Africans. 
Laws such as the Group Areas Act, the Bantu Authorities Act and Bantu Homeland Citizens 
Act had removed black people from the South African landscape or restricted them to positions 
of service and thus subjectively invisible to the gaze of the ruling race (Jones, 2014:19).  
The TRC process worked to highlight the experiences of the oppressed majority, forcing the 
white population to see the plight of their fellow citizens in a way they had never before been 
expected to do. Thus, the TRC was in some ways able to force a change in society by disrupting 
the structures that had allowed human rights abuse to take place on this scale. The hope is that 
consequently this should prevent injustice of the same kind happening again in the future. This 
is a condition that Melish (2012:276) argues is indicative of more long-term success of a 
transitional justice mechanism.     
As stated by Hayner (1996:22) and Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010:24), truth commissions generally 
are expected to create a more knowledgeable citizenry that will be able to recognise similar 
patterns of oppression in the future and avoid return to oppressive rule. Having held thousands 
of hearings, accepted tens of thousands of witness testimonies and produced a large five-
volume Final Report, the TRC did provide the public with an abundance of new knowledge on 
the hidden realities of apartheid violence (Gibson, 2004b:130). The revelations of the TRC 
were instrumental in South Africans being forced to recognise culpability on all sides of the 
conflict, creating more of a common history that without the TRC is unlikely to have surfaced, 
nor been so widely publicised (Gibson, 2006:427).      
To provide some empirical evidence of the reconciliatory success of the TRC, one can look at 
a study using a nationally representative sample of ordinary South Africans conducted by 
Gibson (2004a; 2006:414). He finds that truth did not undermine reconciliation during the TRC 
process and that those who subscribed to the TRC’s truth are more likely to be reconciled. 
What was less clear from his findings is the validity of the causal claim that truth created 
reconciliation.    
While the hope for amnesty to provide a full truth was well-intended, as was the case with the 
confessions given in gacaca, there are doubts as to the fullness of truth found through the TRC. 




responsibility for their actions (Stanley, 2001:527). As would be expected there were also 
victims who did not experience the cathartic healing hoped to be a result of testifying, and some 
felt like pawns in the national healing process, having to sacrifice individual justice for the sake 
of building the nation (Wielenga, 2011:42). The family of Black Consciousness activist Steve 
Biko are an example of a high-profile group that was openly against the amnesty process and 
were reluctant to participate, threatening the legitimacy of the proceedings (Evans, 2016:713).    
One could question, if the TRC sacrificed criminal and social (retributive) justice in a project 
of truth-finding, yet arguably failed to produce a full truth, was it able to contribute to the 
reconciliation of South African society at all? The real problem here is not necessarily the lack 
of criminal justice, but the lack of social justice that limits the reconciliatory potential of the 
mechanism.  
While gacaca was directly focused on destroying the culture of impunity that allowed the 
genocide to take place, the amnesty granted by the TRC arguably allowed a culture of impunity 
to flourish in the South African context. With regards to officers of crime control, impunity has 
created long-term crises of legitimacy, as many perpetrators under apartheid were crime control 
officers whose actions were allowed to go unpunished, creating a legacy of impunity in crime 
control in democratic South Africa (Stanley, 2001:536).    
Empirically, the surveys conducted by the SARB provide information on public perception 
regarding the state of reconciliation in South Africa. The SARB found that in 2017 only 56.1% 
of South Africans agree that South Africa has made progress towards reconciliation since the 
end of apartheid, however, slightly more do believe the TRC provided a good foundation for 
the country to achieve reconciliation at 62.4% (Potgieter, 2017:22). This Report also found that 
in terms of perceptions of change with regards to race relations, 38.3% of South Africans 
reported race relations have stayed the same since 1994, and 29.4% believe they have 
worsened. This discovery is described as a “somewhat damning indictment” of the progress 
made towards reconciliation in this crucial post-1994 period, indicating that progress is taking 
place but at a slow pace (Potgieter, 2017:23).      
In terms of its overall transformative potential, what the TRC failed to do was to challenge the 
structural inequalities that apartheid policies were founded on. In this way neither the 
perpetrators nor the beneficiaries of apartheid were obligated to make substantive changes to 
their lives and self-definitions (Zehr, 1997). The subsequent ‘middle-ground’ between peace 




prosecution of passive perpetrators, the lack of responsibility taken by the beneficiaries of 
apartheid and the lack of developmental change in South African society (Stanley, 2001:527). 
The findings of the SARB show interestingly that out of the four apartheid-era race groups, 
white South Africans are the most inclined to believe both the oppressed and oppressors of 
apartheid must come to the table for reconciliation to work but in practice they are not doing 
so themselves (Potgieter, 2017:22). This suggests that white South Africans recognise that 
reconciliation requires two sides coming together but do not feel obligated to personally act on 
this recognition.       
It is interesting to note that in a study conducted by Vora and Vora (2004) into South Africans’ 
perceptions of the TRC according to three ethnic groups, the Afrikaans and English (i.e. white) 
respondents generally had a more negative perception than the Xhosa respondents. In the 
question of whether the TRC was effective in bringing out the truth, all respondents perceived 
the TRC to be effective however Afrikaners believed it to be less effective than the English, 
and even less effective than the Xhosa (Vora & Vora, 2004:308). When asked if the TRC was 
effective in bringing about reconciliation, the mechanism was generally not perceived to be 
effective, however Afrikaners and English respondents perceived it to be significantly less 
effective than Xhosa respondents (Vora & Vora, 2004:310). Finally, in the question of whether 
the TRC had a positive effect on South African society, Xhosa respondents perceived it to have 
been significantly more positive than Afrikaner and English respondents (Vora & Vora, 
2004:311). This is a noteworthy study as it demonstrates the reality that the beneficiaries of 
apartheid are generally the groups more uncomfortable with the TRC process and its outcomes.    
It is at this point that the long-term reconciliation effects in the two countries become relevant. 
In 2019, as Rwanda reaches 25 years since the end of the genocide and South Africa reaches 
25 years since the first democratic election, assessments of the longer-term impact of these 
reconciliatory efforts are possible. In both countries, at the most basic and pragmatic level, one 
could say that consolidated reconciliation was achieved simply by the fact that open conflict 
as was seen pre-democracy has not been repeated in either nation. However, in terms of 
relational transformation at the root cause of conflict, it can be argued that Rwanda has 
achieved more than South Africa.    
As evidenced by the SARB statistics provided above, only a slight majority of South Africans 
(56.1%) believe that the country has made progress towards reconciliation since apartheid 




reconciliation in Rwanda was 92.5% (NURC, 2015:xiii). While Rwandan survivors report 
being able to live alongside perpetrators, greeting one another and sharing meals (De Brouwer 
& Ruvebana, 2013:952), continued racial division in South Africa has begun to show its effects 
such as in the nationwide #FeesMustFall protests that began in 2016.  
The cases give validity to the claim made by Ramsbotham et al (2016:208) highlighted in 
Chapter Two, that true resolution of conflict through mediation requires not that the mediator 
appeals to disputants’ humanity, but that they are able to inspire fundamental shifts in parties’ 
interests, goals and self-definitions. The gacaca courts forced Rwandan society as a collective 
to recognise responsibility for the atrocities committed during the genocide but also for the 
reconstruction project that was required as a consequence. By breaking down the experiences 
of communities collectively, the community as a whole was able to reconstruct a complete 
narrative of their history and in the process reconstruct Rwandan society (both literally and 
figuratively) from the ground up. Rwandans’ redefinition of the self is most clearly exemplified 
in the terms ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ being replaced by Umunyarwanda (Rwandan) (NURC, 
2015:49). The TRC on the other did not encourage redefinition of the self in relation to the 
other, and thereby failed to create a new national identity based on transformed disputant 
relationships between races.    
In linking the transformative success of the projects to the characteristics of the model, a 
primary finding of this study is the importance of community participation for the 
transformative impact of a process-based mediation project. The direct, compulsory public 
participation of the gacaca encouraged collective accountability for the reconciliation effort 
and placed all adult Rwandans as personally involved in the process. Although it must be noted 
that the TRC was a truth commission in its formulation, given that it was the primary 
transitional mechanism and remains the only state-administered national reconciliatory effort, 
its reach was simply not broad enough. This difference suggests that community-based public 
participation would be an important characteristic for the transformative potential of a process-
based mediation project.       
In terms of context-specificity, there is a link between this characteristic and the former, as it 
was the recognition of a need for widespread participation, based on the historical reality of the 
Rwandan conflict, that led to the gacaca success in transforming the conflict relationships of 
an entire nation. The use of a traditional, locally based dispute mechanism also contributed to 




to an extent in linking the process to the African values of ubuntu. However, its failure to 
recognise the need for broad-based participation to engender a feeling of collective 
responsibility for the reconciliation project, meant that wider society in the end did not 
personally experience reconciliation, limiting the society-wide transformative potential of the 
mechanism. Context-specificity was therefore key to the transformative potential of the 
gacaca, suggesting the characteristic is also vital for this model of process-based mediation.  
The importance of the Insider-Partial mediator to the transformation of conflict relationships 
is less convincing in these two cases than was expected. Neutrality, at least in the political 
sense, appears to have been an important characteristic of the authority figures leading these 
projects, as a lack of political influence was needed to give legitimacy to the proceedings. 
However, the Insider status of both the inyangamugayo and Chairperson Tutu did give them 
inside knowledge of the conflict contexts and what was required for their transformation. In 
terms of the Partial aspect of the Insider-Partial mediator, the necessary partiality stems from 
the mediator’s Insider status in that their persona and actions should reflect a vested interest in 
the constructive resolution of disputes. These cases therefore indicate that mediator identity 
continues to be a topic of contestation in mediation theory, but also give credence to the 
assertion of Nathan (2007:12) that regardless of debates over partiality, African mediators 
should be chosen with much more contextual consideration than they have in the past.  
The differences in transformative success between the projects are also indicative of the 
implications of resource pressure, as the limited time frame of the TRC compared to that of the 
gacaca inhibited its reach, a point which was decidedly problematic in its transformative 
potential. While it was able to uncover previously unknown truths that played an important 
part in the process of recognition throughout society, these efforts should have been 
complemented by a system of community-based projects that addressed the grassroots-level 
division left behind by the apartheid system. The decade over which the gacaca courts operated 
and the limited physical resources required to conduct the process in each community, meant 
that each individual was in some way personally involved in the national reconciliation project. 
It also allowed for trust in the process to develop over time, which slowly overcame the 
problems of the Hutu fear of an ethnic witch-hunt and the Tutsi disdain for meetings dominated 
by a Hutu majority. This was an important factor in the transformative potential of the gacaca 
as it encouraged public buy-in to both the process and the common truth it created, highlighting 




Finally, both the gacaca courts and the TRC illustrate the importance of a relational focus for 
long-term transformation of disputant relationships. Given the widespread impact of conflict 
within both these countries, had the respective governments kept transitional conflict resolution 
purely at the level of elite negotiation, society would have been left with deep remnant fractures 
and no forum for their transformation. Despite the differing extent of transformation that the 
two mechanisms produced, both included society in a way that traditional mediation projects 
would never before have considered. In creating a demarcated space for recognising the 
different sides of the conflicts and empowering disputants to create a common narrative out of 
their differing experiences, these projects afforded participants with the social mediative 
capacity Lederach (2002:92) argues is necessary to engender a constructive change process. 
Although the TRC did not extend as far as the gacaca, limiting its ability to transform society 
as a whole, it did create the foundation for relational change to take place, at the very least for 
those disputants directly involved as victims and perpetrators of gross human rights violations. 
The cases thus suggest that if mediation projects are formulated with an intentional focus on 
transforming the quality of relational interaction between disputants at a broad-based 
community level, there is great potential for process-based mediation projects to engender 
societal conflict transformation.     
4.4 Conclusion 
The TRC and the gacaca courts both provide compelling examples of African transitional 
conflict resolution mechanisms with the mammoth task of reconciling a deeply divided nation 
in the aftermath of violent conflict. This study aims to provide support for a model of process-
based mediation that could be used to combat such deep divisions by altering disputant 
relationships at a grassroots community level in the aftermath of future conflicts. Through the 
application of process-based mediation as an analytical model, Chapter Four has compared the 
relative manifestation of each characteristic of the model within the two cases. By investigating 
the similarities and differences between these characteristics, and the subsequent differences 
in the projects’ transformative success, several deductions on the validity of the model could 
be made. 
The primary findings showed firstly that in many ways these characteristics are linked, which 
necessitates a conscientious approach in the formulation of mediation projects. Practitioners 
should be aware of the effect that each decision they make can have on the transformative 




participation is vital for the transformation of contemporary intra-state conflict. Widespread 
citizen participation, whether as victims, perpetrators or bystanders, requires a conflict 
response that reaches all those who will have been affected by it – thereby necessitating a 
society-wide response. This leads on to the finding that practitioners should be mindful of the 
local conflict dynamics in order to suit the project to the context at hand, while at the same time 
remaining wary of the influence this context may in turn have on the project.  
In being mindful of matching the mediation project to the context in which it operates, this 
analysis showed that particular care should be taken in the choice of mediator. Contrary to 
initial expectations, the impartiality of the mediator at least in a political sense was shown to 
be important in legitimising the projects to their respective citizenries. However, as the 
characteristic of context-specificity would suggest, the Insider status of the mediator was 
shown to be a positive characteristic in understanding local dynamics and gaining citizens’ 
trust. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that in deeply divided societies limited resource 
pressure is necessary to engender sustainable transformation of deeply rooted societal fractures. 
The reason for this is in line with the necessity for widespread public participation in that 
transforming disputant relationships on a national scale requires a project that reaches 
throughout society, which inevitably requires extended time frames and as little resource 
pressure as possible.  
Finally, in building process-based mediation projects with the aim of building sustainable 
peace, the study shows that a relational focus at the community level is warranted. In the 
contemporary era where conflicted parties must continue to live alongside one another once 
violence has come to an end, mediation projects that remain in the realm of elite-level 
negotiation will not have the societal impact that is necessary for extended peace. These 
projects showed that where disputants were brought together face-to-face in the presence of 
their communities, reconciliation was possible, even for those who had committed the worst of 
atrocities against one another. These findings suggest that if a project is formulated with the 
goal of affecting constructive change in the quality of relational interaction between disputants, 
transformation is plausible and could lead to more sustainable peace.                 
Following this analysis, Chapter Five will now return to the original research question, 
providing a conclusion as to whether this comparative case study suggests process-based 





CHAPTER FIVE – CONCLUSION 
5.1 Introduction 
This fifth and final chapter serves as a conclusion and summary of the primary findings of the 
comparative case studies presented in the previous chapter. In doing so it will present the 
answer to the research question posed in Chapter One as to what extent process-based 
mediation succeeds as a tool for conflict transformation in African nations. Given the 
preoccupation with settlement-focused strategies in traditional mediation literature and African 
mediation practice, this study aimed to present a newer model of mediation suited to the 
contemporary realities of African conflict and focused on sustainable conflict transformation. 
This chapter will discuss whether the model achieved this aim. It will conclude with a reflection 
on the part of the author and recommendations for further research.         
5.2 Evaluation of the Research Question 
As a tool for conflict resolution, mediation has traditionally been situated within the field of 
conflict management or settlement (Mitchell, 1981:275; Burton, 1988:2; Ramsbotham et al., 
2016:24). This “task-oriented” (Fisher, 2011:159) and “interest-based” (Furlong, 2005:110) 
approach is focused on the outcomes of the mediation process, quantifying mediation success 
as the signing of a peace agreement, settlement or ceasefire (Touval & Zartman, 1985:14; 
Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006). While there is of course merit in such efforts that bring an end to 
the destruction of violent conflict, the purpose of this study was to show that mediation has 
potential not only as a tool for conflict management but also for the transformation of conflict 
relationships at their root cause.  
When situated as a tool for conflict transformation, mediation initiatives target the foundations 
of conflict by altering the way actors perceive themselves and their opponents, thereby 
disrupting the ‘interactional crisis’ between disputants that is ignored by problem-solving 
approaches (Bush & Pope, 2002:73). By focusing on the fractured relationships between 
disputants upon which outward conflict is founded, mediation reformulated as a tool for 
conflict transformation is expected to create more durable society-wide peace. In the context 
of the African continent with its history of extended violent conflict, there is a need for 
resolution mechanisms that address the root causes of conflict, to avoid the recurrence of 
violence and ensure limited available resources are used in the most efficient and sustainable 
manner. Africa therefore presented a meaningful testing ground for a newer theory of 




In order to address this research problem, this study asked the question to what extent a 
‘process-based’ mediation project succeeds as a tool for conflict transformation in African 
nations. The discussion was to be framed by two sub-questions, investigating under what 
conditions a mediation project can be deemed ‘process-based’, and further under what 
conditions such a project can be deemed ‘successful’.  
The answer to the first of these two sub-questions was developed through a careful reading of 
the mediation literature and its progression from the traditional outcomes-focused to a process-
focused approach. This approach redirects the attention of mediation practitioners away from 
the outcomes of settlement and ceasefire towards the constructive changes in relationships 
brought about through the process of mediation. By resituating mediation practice within the 
paradigm of conflict transformation, a set of characteristics was devised to shape the model of 
process-based mediation that forms the core structure of this study. These characteristics were 
community participation, context-specificity, the Insider-Partial mediator, an absence of 
resource pressure, and a relational focus. The answer to the first sub-question that would serve 
as the analytical framework of the case analysis to follow was therefore deducible from the 
mediation literature.  
The answer to the second sub-question, that of under what conditions a mediation project can 
be deemed ‘successful’, proved more challenging than the first. As with many abstract terms 
dealt with in social science research, measuring such concepts as ‘reconciliation’ and ‘conflict 
transformation’ can warrant whole research projects on their own. The approach therefore 
taken in this study was simply to follow the case study research design and build a detailed 
picture of the conflict contexts and how they reacted to their respective transitional 
mechanisms, using the available secondary data. The research question did therefore encounter 
a challenge to its answerability here, however the case studies and their subsequent comparison 
did provide insights into transformation in the countries. 
In terms of the overarching research question, the case study design held true to its promised 
strength of allowing for detailed understanding of complex phenomena within their natural 
context (Miller & Brewer, 2003:22). The historical dynamics of division in these cases were 
vital to the analysis, the complexities of which would have been lost without a detailed 
qualitative discussion. While the case study design encompassed the complexity of the cases, 
the problem of comparability in the face of infinite possible variables was mitigated through 




developing the structured analytical tool and applying it to the cases, their similarities and 
differences relevant to the study were easily identified.  
The application of the analytical model of process-based mediation to the cases, and the 
comparison of their relative characteristics and transformative successes, therefore provided 
the answer to the research question. The main findings contribute to the development of 
contemporary mediation theory, affirming its potential as a tool for conflict transformation. 
These main findings will be discussed below.     
5.3 Main Findings 
In answer to the primary research question, this study has found that process-based mediation, 
formulated according to the five characteristics outlined in this model, does have the potential 
to transform conflict in African nations. This is not to say that traditional mediation practice 
should be excluded from conflict resolution discourse in Africa but presents process-focused 
projects as an option for peacebuilding authorities in post-conflict societies. It does suggest that 
the restriction of mediation practice to the level of elite-level negotiation has restricted its 
potential in engendering longer-term sustainable peace in African societies. This potential can 
be utilised however if practitioners resituate mediation practice within the field of conflict 
transformation as opposed to conflict management and focus on the benefits of the mediation 
process as opposed to mediation outcomes.  
According to this model, the first main characteristic that an African process-based approach 
would include is that of direct public participation. Post-Cold War conflict is most often 
contained within national borders, as was the case in Rwanda and South Africa, meaning that 
most citizens’ lives are impacted by the division. A mediation project that aims not to induce 
a ceasefire or settlement, but to use the process as a means for transforming conflictual 
relationships, must reach all those involved in the conflict. Therefore, such a project should be 
community-based, involving everyday citizens, with the cumulative effect of transforming 
national disputant relationships.  
In Rwanda, community participation was compulsory and gacaca hearings were essentially 
community gatherings. Individual citizens were encouraged to tell their stories and speak out 
about their grievances, with the community as an audience. In this way the process touched the 
lives of all Rwandans and posited the reconciliation project as a national responsibility. The 
TRC on the other hand limited direct participation to victims and perpetrators of gross human 




Despite the fact that the apartheid regime had in some way involved every South African, the 
majority of the nation was left to watch the reconciliation project happen from a distance, 
inhibiting its potential to transform societal relationships. While Rwandans are able to interact 
quite freely after the atrocity of genocide, South Africans still live largely separate lives based 
on racial division, a reality that arguably resulted from a lack of participation in the transitional 
reconciliation project.  
Next, the study found that context-specificity is also an important element to the transformative 
success of process-based mediation, as the conflict response must match the contextual conflict 
dynamics. Particularly in cases such as South Africa and Rwanda where protracted conflictual 
relationships have been shaped by previous interaction, addressing the cause of the division 
will require cognisance of the dynamics that created these fractures in the first place.   
In both cases the division of society was not a consequence of conflict, but a cause thereof and 
predicated on a history of entrenched separatism. In Rwanda the pre-colonial hierarchy based 
on difference in resource ownership was exploited by the colonial authorities, creating deeply 
entrenched definitions of the self versus the Other between the Hutus and the Tutsis. The 
apartheid regime in South Africa had manufactured a divided society on a designated system 
of separatist laws, distancing groups from one another both physically and emotionally on the 
basis of race. The conflict response used in both cases could not ignore these historical realities 
and required a reconciliation project that directly addressed the needs of the conflicted society. 
As a traditional dispute resolution mechanism, the gacaca was already afforded a level of trust 
from the Rwandan public, and the participatory nature suited the widespread involvement in 
the genocide. In South Africa, attempts to link the TRC to the values of ubuntu did connect the 
citizenry via a common cultural-ethical tradition, however in avoiding the disruption of the 
status quo the project did not address the extensive impact apartheid had on societal 
relationships and therefore limited its transformative ability.  
Considering the third characteristic, that of Wehr and Lederach’s (1996) Insider-Partial 
mediator, places this study as yet another contribution to the ongoing mediation debate over 
impartiality of the mediator. Initially this study expected to agree with authors such as Touval 
and Zartman (1985:12) who consider partial and interventionist mediation as both possible and 
potentially useful. With regards to the Insider positioning of the mediator and their partiality to 




constructive. However, the cases did show that impartiality in the political sense can be an 
important factor in gaining participants’ trust and affording legitimacy to the proceedings.  
This dynamic was illustrated by the case of the gacaca, as the inyangamugayo were both 
respected and feared as a result of their partiality to the groups in conflict. Due to the contextual 
reality of a Hutu majority in Rwanda, most of these elected judges and the majority of the 
General Assemblies consisted of Hutu individuals. In some cases, this led to bias in favour of 
the perpetrators and was cause for discomfort on the part of testifying survivors. However, 
these judges were elsewhere described as professional and were valued for their connection to 
the community which demonstrated empathy between the Bench and those testifying. In the 
case of the TRC, the impartiality of Chairperson Tutu was also regarded as vital to the success 
of the process in creating a common narrative, as his lack of political connections led to trust 
in the TRC process and its collected truth. However, as was the case with the inyangamugayo, 
his Insider status as a celebrated leader of the liberation inspired trust in his position, in the 
proceedings and the Reports produced as a result. It can therefore be said that at least in terms 
of the Insider position of the mediator, this characteristic is important to the process of 
transformative mediation.  
The fourth characteristic concerning an absence of resource pressure was found to be important 
to the transformative potential of both the analysed projects, especially considering the 
protracted nature of societal division. As the goal of traditional mediation theory is producing 
a settlement or ceasefire as quickly as possible, time and resource pressure is seen as a positive 
inducement of compromise. However, as these agreements are rushed and based on just that, 
an interest-based compromise, they are often not self-enforcing and rely on continued mediator 
presence to remain intact. This model suggests therefore that if durable conflict resolution is to 
take place, conflict responses must prioritise the constructive change that happens during the 
mediation process, as opposed to the tangible outcomes it may produce. Particularly in 
examples of widespread national conflict, as is the case in many African countries, the societal 
fractures that precipitate violent outbreaks have deep historical foundations. A mediation 
project aimed at transforming these historical relationships must therefore be afforded the 
necessary time to fully deconstruct and reconstruct such relationships.  
In both the case of Rwanda and South Africa, societal divisions were deeply embedded and 
therefore reconciliation at the root of the conflict required a long-lasting, holistic conflict 




conducted over a decade, allowing the space for the project to reach the depth and breadth of 
the conflicted relationships. It also notably allowed time for citizens to gain trust in the process, 
an element that would prove important in the legitimacy of the mechanism and of the 
communal narrative it produced. In the TRC on the other hand, limited resources and the 
resultant limited mandate meant that the primary transitional conflict resolution mechanism 
was limited to only the most adversarial of conflicted relationships between victims and 
perpetrators of gross human rights violations. As is suggested by the need for community 
participation, in conflicts that permeate the whole of society, a mechanism that is limited to 
only a small portion of disputants severely reduces the potential for societal transformation. 
The final finding with regards to the characteristics of this process-based model was the 
demonstrated relevance of a relational focus for transformative mediation attempts. This 
portion of the analysis showed the validity of the main premise on which this study is based – 
that mediation can be used as a tool for conflict transformation. While most traditional 
discussions regarding mediation, and most of the African mediation literature, operate on the 
assumption of mediation being an interest-based approach, this study makes a contribution to 
more contemporary mediation theory in supporting the idea that the mechanism can be used to 
transform conflict relationships. Particularly when posited as a communal effort with the 
potential for individual transformations, community-based mediation projects can create the 
space for communication and open dialogue, encouraging mutual understanding and the 
recognition of one another as moral equals. This is the most important element of the process-
based approach, and the vital component in creating a sustainable peace.  
Given their twin aims of mediating a common national truth surrounding their respective 
conflict histories, both the TRC and the gacaca were focused on the process of disputants 
sharing their experiences and, in this way, inspiring recognition of one another’s perspectives. 
Both projects included reconciliation as one of their stated aims and it was hoped that the 
mutual understanding encouraged by the process would achieve this end. What is perhaps the 
most important point to take away from this analysis is that these projects created a designated 
mediative space that encouraged a level of interaction between disputants that is otherwise 
unlikely to have happened. Gibson (2006:431) states quite succinctly that “if societal change 
is to take place, some exogenous force must convince ordinary people to rethink their views 
about the contentious past.” This, as mentioned at the very beginning of the study, is one of the 
main positive characteristics of mediation and the inclusion of a third-party and is a reason that 




Overall, a final important finding was the evident links between these characteristics, which 
give support for the presentation of this study as a multi-faceted model. Each of these 
characteristics could indeed warrant empirical analyses in their own right, particularly if strong 
causal claims are to be made between each element and a project’s transformative success. 
However, the links found between the characteristics show the validity of researching and 
presenting a multi-faceted model for process-based mediation which shows at the very least 
that when formulating conflict responses with the aim of transformation, practitioners need be 
aware of each of these elements. 
5.4 Reflection 
Although this study has achieved the aim of providing support for a conflict transformation 
mechanism that could provide future conflicted societies with longer-lasting peace, the 
difficulty of reconciliation in the developing world was a clear theme throughout the readings 
for the cases of Rwanda and South Africa. As has been highlighted in the process-based model, 
context cannot be ignored, and the contemporary African socio-economic/political reality is 
important in understanding the potential extent of reconciliation in its nation-states.  
In the case of Rwanda, despite impressive efforts at economic growth averaging at 7.5% over 
the decade of 2008 to 2018, the country is still in the initial stages of development, with poverty 
remaining stagnant at around 39% between 2014 and 2017 (World Bank, 2019a). This means 
that many citizens, particularly survivors, still live under the poverty line and therefore endure 
socio-economic struggles while suffering from latent trauma and diseases such as HIV/AIDS 
(De Brouwer & Ruvebana, 2013:945). While South Africa retains a stronger economic position 
than Rwanda, the country is still rife with socio-economic issues such as the high 
unemployment rate of 27.1% in the fourth quarter of 2018 (World Bank, 2019b). Vast 
inequality also remains a persistent legacy in South Africa with the richest 10% of citizens 
holding around 71% of net wealth in 2015 while the bottom 60% held only 7% of net wealth 
(World Bank, 2019b). 
Given the persistent economic subjugation of large portions of society in both South Africa 
and Rwanda, along with many other nations on the African continent, emotive goals of national 
peace and reconciliation do occasionally feel somewhat naïve. As someone who was not 
present during these violent parts of history reading of the atrocities experienced by individuals 
in both countries analysed in this study, one feels almost astonished at the progress that has 




economic difficulties present to reconciliation demonstrated by the SARB finding that 63.4% 
of citizens believe reconciliation is impossible while those who were oppressed under apartheid 
remain poor (Potgieter, 2017:23). 
Furthermore, it became clear through reading around the procedures of these mechanisms that 
state-sanctioned projects do, necessarily, become highly institutionalised and legalistic in 
nature. Even in the case of the TRC where there were no legal trials involved in its mandate, it 
could only begin work once the debate and discussion behind the Promotion of National Unity 
and Reconciliation Act No. 34 was closed, and then after it was passed the mechanism was 
limited to the bounds of this law upon which it was founded. It is logical that in countries 
attempting to transition to democracy that the rule of law is important for legitimising the 
institutions of the new government. However, when dealing with issues such as reconciliation 
that are often wrought with emotion and changing dynamics, a more flexible transitional 
process may be better suited. One gets the sense that these legalistic state-administered projects 
engender stringent processes that fulfil the need for government oversight but are ultimately 
quite restrained. This dynamic therefore gives even more reason to the argument of 
Ramsbotham et al (2016:215) concerning the importance of Track II civil society efforts that 
may be less constrained and more reactive to the grassroots communities they interact with.    
It is therefore recognised that a mediation project such as that presented in this study is unable 
to solve every socio-economic and political reality that constrains reconciliation in a post-
conflict society. True reconciliation undoubtedly will require economic and political 
development in both Rwanda and South Africa, in order for previously oppressed citizens to 
feel more comfortable with their lives and deter resentment over the historical injustice that 
placed them in a disadvantaged position. However, as has been reiterated throughout this study, 
the nature of contemporary conflict results in disputant groups having to live alongside one 
another once conflict has ended. Deep historical fractures must be intentionally transformed if 
sustainable peace is to be a possibility. The forum created by this model of mediation has the 
potential to transform adversarial relationships, at least to the point of mutual recognition as 
moral equals. The hope is that in rebuilding the nation through a communal narrative and inter-
group trust, projects of socio-economic development will take on new meaning and inspire 




5.5 Recommendations for Further Research 
Given the demonstrated applicability of the analytical model, this research could be replicated 
using more cases to further investigate the importance of each characteristic in the process-
based mediation model. Aside from the improved comparability it affords between complex 
cases, this was the reason for using George’s methodology of structured, focused comparison 
(George & Bennett, 2004:67-70). As this study presents a new model for mediation which falls 
within a contemporary movement in mediation theory, reproducing a similar investigation 
would further contribute to the generalisability of the model.  
Furthermore, having developed a specific model for community-based mediation projects, in 
the instance that an appropriate conflict setting and the required resources were available, a 
further study could put this model into practice and formulate a conflict response following the 
characteristics of the model. This would provide the most concrete evidence of the 
transformative potential of the mechanism, as monitoring of the changes in disputant 
relationships as a result of the project would demonstrate whether the theory translates into 
practice.                             
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
Violent conflict and deep societal fractures continue to be a looming presence in contemporary 
African societies. In order to build a more sustainable peace than has been achieved in many 
of these countries, innovative approaches focused on the transformation of deeply rooted 
conflictual relationships are necessary. This study was undertaken with the purpose of positing 
mediation as an approach suited to these transformation goals. By pulling the attention of a 
mediation project away from the outcomes it produces and focusing on the transformative 
potential of the mediation process itself, this study provides one such innovative approach. 
The model for process-based mediation was formulated with five basic characteristics: 
community participation, context-specificity, the use of an Insider-Partial mediator, limited 
resource pressure, and a relational focus. Using these characteristics as an analytical tool, a 
comparative case study was undertaken concerning the transitional mechanisms of the 
Rwandan gacaca courts and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The 
analysis that followed suggests that conflict responses formulated according to this model have 
the potential to transform conflict at its root cause, thereby showing that mediation does not 
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